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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

ESSAYS ON JOB-RELATED RISKS AND WORKER SORTING
This dissertation examines heterogeneity in the value of a statistical life (henceforth VSL) stemming from employer-provided health insurance (henceforth EHI) and
worker sorting. The dissertation consists of three essays.
In the first essay (Chapter 2), I investigate the effect of health-driven productivity
on the wage compensation for mortality risk, and how EHI influences VSL using the
US labor market data. In this chapter I build a framework showing that the level
of job risks influences the incentive of employers to provide EHI. The basic notion
of the framework is that health insurance is an investment in health and health is a
form of general human capital. Employers are willing to invest in employees’ health
and pay the associated costs as long as they can recoup the costs of health investment. Occupational hazards, however, are harmful to health; productivity gains from
health tend to decline as risk increases, resulting in lower health investment made by
employers. As a result, the workers in risky jobs have to contribute more to their
health investment in the form of lower wages than do workers in safe jobs. This
behavioral response pushes down the wage offer curve of the insured in high risk occupations. Consequently, workers with health insurance, on average, accept a lower
risk premium, leading to a lower VSL. Empirical findings from this dissertation suggest evidence of heterogeneity in VSL due to health insurance status : the estimated
VSL for workers with health insurance is lower than those without one.
In the second essay (Chapter 3), I extend the framework of the second chapter
into the United Kingdom (the UK) labor market. Different from the US, the UK
has universal health care system in which all eligible individuals (almost all the UK
citizens) are covered by publicly-provided health care. This chapter also provides
evidence that private medical insurance in the universal health care system affects
the risk premium. Despite the fact that the UK and the US have different institutional
settings in health coverage, findings from the UK are, to some extent, qualitatively
similar to the US.
A major issue in estimates of VSL is that people are not randomly assigned to
jobs. That is, heterogeneous people would sort into jobs based on their preferences
on risk and safety-related skills. Thus, failure to account for heterogeneity in both
risk preferences and safety-related skills will bias the estimated VSL. In the third

essay (Chapter 4), I discuss worker sorting and how it may affect the mortality risk
premium. In this chapter, I focus on the role of personality traits in safety-related
skill and their influence on worker sorting based on job risk. I use Five-Factor Model
of personality or also known as the Big Five personality traits. The big 5 personality
traits are extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism, and openness to
experience. In my framework, these personality traits are inputs and the technology
of skill formation transforms the traits into safety-related skill.
KEYWORDS: Value of Statistical Life, Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance, Worker
Sorting, Personality Traits, Big Five
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Chapter 1 Introduction

Different occupations exhibit vastly different job-related likelihood of death and injury. Certain jobs expose workers to high probabilities of injury, such as construction
laborers or truck drivers. Despite these risks, some people are voluntarily willing to
bear the risks for higher wages in return, holding other things constant. This observed
behavior in the labor market is the key prediction of the compensating differential
theory that individuals must be compensated by higher than average wages to induce
them to take unfavorable jobs. Based on the theory, economists have developed a
method to quantify individuals’ willingness to accept fatal risk at workplace—i.e. the
tradeoff rate between monetary compensation and fatal injury risks, or what is known
as the value of statistical life (henceforth VSL).
Over the last three decades, a vast body of research has documented various
estimates of VSL (Viscusi and Aldy, 2003). Earlier research focused attention to
the precision and accuracy of VSL. However, these studies produced a wide range
of estimated VSLs (Viscusi and Aldy, 2003). As such, these estimates hardly offer
a precise benchmark for policy evaluations. This raised skepticism that VSL could
provide a guideline for policies (see Leigh (1995) for example). Nevertheless the
availability of new data and more refined measures of risks allow economists to have
better estimates of VSL. Recent research using panel data from the US labor market
data has narrowed down estimates of VSL that are robust to various specifications
(Kniesner et al., 2012).
Recently, research in VSL has shifted its attention to explore heterogeneity in
VSL. It is obvious that individuals’ valuation of risk depends on their characteristics,
such as income, age and other demographic factors. Thus, one would expect that
VSL may differ for different populations under study. For instance, the VSL tends
to be higher among high income individuals (Kniesner et al., 2010), and thus, higher
income countries tend to have higher VSL that do poor countries (Viscusi and Aldy,
2003). Relatively older individuals are more likely to have lower VSL than are middle
aged individuals (Aldy and Viscusi, 2008). This heterogeneity in VSL across different
populations would have policy implications. As policies reducing mortality risk would
be costly, heterogeneity in VSL suggests that different populations value differently
the benefits of risk reduction. Thus, a single estimated VSL may be too high or low
than what society is willing to pay for risk reduction. Consequently, policies intended
to reduce risks may fail to improve welfare.
1

Heterogeneity in VSL may also stem from workplace characteristics or other policies as well. In states where workers receive generous workers’ compensation, they
accept a lower wage premium for risk of injury (Viscusi and Moore, 1987). This
essentially suggests evidence of compensation transfer. In particular, employers compensate workers for risks they are taking either with wage payments (i.e. ex ante
compensation) or workers’ compensation benefits (i.e. ex post compensation). A
lower risk premium that is associated with generous workers’ compensation suggests
that the employer transfers compensation from wage compensation to workers’ compensation benefits. Yet there is a wide array of compensations and the employer
may use them to attract workers as well. Thus, it is plausible that other noncash
compensations, such as health insurance, play role in affecting VSL (Dorsey, 1983).
In this dissertation, I investigate the influence of employer-provided health insurance (henceforth EHI) on the wage compensation for fatal risk. Thus so far the
literature has no extensive discussion yet on this issue.1 However, there is policy relevance for taking into account heterogeneity in VSL stemming from health insurance
coverage. As workplace safety in most developed countries has improved substantially
over decades, the rate of fatal accident at work has declined to an unprecedented level.
Overall, occupational mortality rates in developed countries are much lower than they
were in previous decades.2 But at the same time, the costs of illness and other health
risks increase substantially. Accordingly, individuals may be willing to accept a lower
risk premium in return for health insurance.
The policy relevance of employer-provided health insurance in the estimated VSL
is also related to a recent trend and variation in health coverage across occupations.
In the US, employer-sponsored health insurance continues to be the major source
of health coverage for the nonelderly population.3 Health insurance coverage varies
substantially across sectors, yet workers who lack health insurance are concentrated
in occupations considered blue-collar, and in industries associated with high rates
of fatal injury, such as, agriculture, mining, and construction. So, if VSL differs
by health coverage status and uninsured are concentrated in particular industries, a
single benchmark VSL used for policy evaluations may be too high or low for workers
in different sectors.
Conceptually, health insurance would have an impact on the estimated VSL when
1
I am only aware one paper that discusses the role of fringe benefits, including health insurance
on the wage premium for risk, that is, the paper of Dorsey (1983).
2
In the US, the overall fatality rate is 3.4 per 100,000 workers (BLS 2014). It is 1.2 in the United
Kingdom (UK HSE 2014).
3
It was estimated that 67.8 percent of workers ages 18-64 received EHI in 2012 (Fronstin, 2013).

2

workers’ valuations on health insurance differ across different levels of job riskiness.
If job safety is normal good, more productive workers would seek safer occupations.
However, more productive workers that tend to earn higher incomes may value more
health insurance than are less productive workers. On the other hand, workers who
go to riskier occupations reveal that they are more tolerant to risks, and, may value
less the benefits of health insurance. At the same time, working environments where
risks to human health are high make the costs of health insurance are high too.
Thus, both employers and workers in risky occupations are less willing to purchase
health insurance. Consequently, as workers in riskier occupations tend to prefer full
wage compensation, we may expect that workers with health insurance—mostly are
located in safe jobs—would accept lower wage premium for risk than do workers
without health insurance.
I proceed the dissertation as follows. Chapter 2 discusses the role of employerprovided health insurance on the VSL using the US labor market data. In this
chapter I build a framework showing that the level of job risks influences the incentive of employers to provide EHI. I view that health insurance is an investment in
health and health is a form of general human capital. Employers are willing to invest
in employees’ health and pay the associated costs as long as they can recoup the
costs of health investment. Occupational hazards, however, are harmful to health;
productivity gains from health tend to decline as risk increases, resulting in lower
health investment made by employers. As a result, the insured in risky jobs have
to contribute more to their health investment in the form of lower wages than do
the insured in safe jobs. This behavioral response pushes down the wage offer curve
of the insured in high risk occupations. Since VSL is estimated through the slope
of the wage offer curve, it implies that workers with health insurance, on average,
accept a lower risk premium, leading to a lower VSL. Empirical findings from this
dissertation suggest evidence of heterogeneity in VSL due to health insurance status:
the estimated VSL for workers with health insurance is lower than those without one.
Chapter 3 extends the framework of the second chapter into the United Kingdom
(the UK) labor market. The US is unique among developed countries as it has
a strong link between health insurance and employment. Different from the US,
the UK has universal health care system in which all eligible individuals (almost
all the UK citizens) are covered by publicly-provided health care. Despite the low
coverage of private medical insurance, private health insurance, which majority is
employer-provided, is growing in the UK. Thus, research on the effect of employerprovided health insurance on VSL is warranted. This chapter provides evidence that

3

private medical insurance in the universal health care system affects the risk premium.
Despite the fact that the UK and the US have different institutional settings in health
coverage, findings from the UK are, to some extent, qualitatively similar to the US.
A major issue in estimates of VSL is that people are not randomly assigned
to jobs. Indeed, the central implication of the compensating differential theory is
that heterogeneous people would sort into jobs based on their preferences on risk.
Shogren and Stamland (2002) note that an individual who chooses to work in a
riskier occupation reveals that “he is more tolerant to risk or has personal ability to
reduce risk of death or both”. Hence, failure to account for heterogeneity in both
risk preferences and safety-related skills will bias the estimated VSL. Findings from
Chapter 2 and 3 confirm that controlling for the latent variable reduces the estimated
VSL, suggesting that the estimated VSL using OLS is upward bias.
Chapter 4 discusses worker sorting and how it may affect the mortality risk premium. In this chapter, I focus on the role of personality traits in safety-related skill
and their influence on worker sorting based on job risk. I pursue a pragmatic approach by which I use measures of personality traits that have been developed by
personality psychologists and, recently, widely used by economists. Specifically, I use
Five-Factor Model of personality or also known as the Big Five personality traits
(Borghans et al., 2008). The big 5 personality traits are extraversion, agreeableness,
conscientiousness, neuroticism, and openness to experience. In my framework, these
personality traits are inputs and the technology of skill formation transforms the
traits into safety-related skill.4
Using data from the United Kingdom Household Longitudinal Study (the UKHLS),
I find evidence of worker sorting based on personality traits. I particularly find that
conscientious and extravert individuals tend to be employed in riskier jobs (i.e. jobs
with high rate of fatal and nonfatal injury). On the other hand, I also find that agreeableness, openness, and neuroticism are negatively associated with risk of injury—i.e.
individuals with these traits are inclined to choose safer jobs.
Finally, Chapter 5 concludes the dissertation and discusses extension for further
research.

Copyright c Teguh Yudo Wicaksono, 2015.
4
This notion is similar to that of Heckman et al. (2006). Yet I use a simpler approach in which
I directly employ measures of personality traits to observe worker sorting.
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Chapter 2 Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance and Wage
Compensation for Risk

2.1

Introduction

Despite a declining trend since 2000, employer-sponsored health insurance (EHI)
continues to be the major source of health coverage for the nonelderly population
in the US.1 Health insurance coverage varies substantially across sectors, yet workers
who lack health insurance are concentrated in occupations considered blue-collar, and
in industries such as, agriculture, mining, and construction. In 2012, the uninsured
rate in these sectors was 38.9 percent (Fronstin, 2013). These jobs are also associated
with high rates of fatal injury. Thus, the empirical observation seems to suggest
that the riskier the job, the less likely the worker will be covered by EHI. At the
same time, we also observe that the insured workers typically earn higher wages and
receive better fringe benefits than do observationally similar workers who lack health
coverage.2
The concentration of desirable job attributes—e.g. jobs offering higher wages
and health coverage—in safe jobs is expected to have an impact on the structure
of wages, and consequently, the valuation of risk of injury. This paper investigates
the impact of employer-provided health benefits on wage premiums for mortality risk
at workplace—i.e. usually is expressed in terms of value of a statistical life (VSL).3
The link between health insurance coverage and wage premiums for risk rests on the
incentive of employers—which is determined by the level of job riskiness—to provide
health coverage, and, the structure of wages between jobs with and without health
coverage. If safe jobs are more likely to provide health coverage than are risky jobs,
and that health coverage is associated with higher wages, EHI would affect both wage
levels and the choice of job risk. In turn, it has an impact on the wage compensation
for mortality risk.
The premise that lies at the heart of this paper is that EHI is an investment in
1

It was estimated that 67.8 percent of workers ages 18-64 received EHI in 2012 (Fronstin, 2013).
Earlier empirical papers do not find evidence of negative relationship between EHI and wages
(Currie and Madrian, 1999). Lehrer and Pereira (2007) find that the provision of EHI has contributed
to wage inequality. Particularly, the wages of workers in jobs with EHI have increased by 50 % over
decades.
3
The wage premium for fatal risk represents the fatal risk-wage tradeoff. It is also known as the
value of statistical life.
2

5

health, and that healthy workers are more productive.4 I model health as a form
of general human capital. Employers are willing to invest in employees’ health if
they can recoup the associated costs of health investment. Yet, the elevated risk of
death at work reduces the level of health investment made by employers. The reason
is that hazardous working conditions have deleterious impacts on health such that
productivity gains from health decline.5 The insured in dangerous jobs then have
to pay more than do the insured in safe jobs for the health investment in the form
of lower wages; they trade the risk premium for health insurance. Accordingly, this
behavior affects the wage structure of the insured, and thus, the provision of EHI
reduces the wage premium for risk.
I provide empirical evidence consistent with the model using Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). The empirical strategy of this paper is designed to deal with
several prominent issues in the literature on the wage compensation for fatal risk
or value of statistical life (VSL). The first issue is the potential endogeneity of job
riskiness. People are not randomly assigned to jobs. Hence, there may be unobserved individual heterogeneity that affects both wage levels and the choice of job
risk (Garen, 1988). Therefore, failure to control for unobservables results in biased
estimates of compensating differentials for risk. I deal with this issue by exploiting
the capabilities of panel data to control for individual-specific heterogeneity. Another
key issue is measurement error in the fatality risk variable. Many studies in the VSL
use the aggregate measure of fatality risk by major industry groups.6 The aggregate
measure of risk ignores substantial variation in risks across occupations within industry groups. More importantly, it may not be pertinent to workers in relatively
safe occupations but in industries perceived dangerous, for example, an office-based
manager in a construction firm. To address this problem, I follow Kniesner et al.
(2012) to construct the risk variable by occupation-industry groups. The measure of
4

The improved productivity can be in the form of higher ability in avoiding work-related injuries.
Empirical papers in the literature generally assume that risks are independent of individual actions.
In fact, some individual actions affect the likelihood and the magnitude of danger. For example, two
workers in the same workplace, but one is more attentive to their working condition and always uses
protective gears (e.g. a hard hat), would face different probabilities of injury. That is, despite facing
the same working condition, the risks of injury of these two workers are different (i.e. the risks are
endogenously determined by individual behaviors). A more relevant example to this paper, workers
taking regular medical checkups would have less vulnerability to health risks leading to injuries.
Some papers explore how individual actions determine the valuation of risk (Ehrlich and Becker,
1972; Berger et al., 1987; Shogren and Crocker, 1991; Shogren and Stamland, 2002).
5
Evidence suggests that high occupational hazards are also associated with high risk of fatal
injury.
6
Viscusi (2004) and Kniesner et al. (2012) use the fatality risk based on occupation-industry
groups.
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fatality risk based on occupation-industry cells is expected to provide a more refined
fatality risk variable.
I find that an increase in the mortality risk leads to a lower probability of EHI
coverage. The effect of risk on EHI coverage is statistically significant but modest.
This suggests that employer-provided health coverage is less sensitive to the elevated
mortality risk. Given that observed health coverage reflects an equilibrium condition—i.e. supply of and demand for health coverage, the low responsiveness of EHI
to mortality risk changes is likely to be driven more from the demand side: demand
for health coverage continues to increase despite increasing risk. Thus, the workers in
dangerous jobs would have to accept substantial lower wages to compensate for EHI
coverage. The results from hedonic wage model with health insurance status support
this theory.
I also find that controlling for unobserved heterogeneity leads to a reduction in
the wage compensation for fatal risk by more than 53%—i.e in terms of the value of
statistical life (VSL). With the baseline model accounting of individual heterogeneity,
the estimated value of statistical life (VSL) is $ 7.68 million. Inclusion of health
insurance in the baseline model leads to a slightly increase in the estimated VSLs by
2.5-7.2 %. The increase in VSLs in the model with health insurance suggests that the
VSL is likely to be biased downward when we omit health insurance status from the
standard model. However, the bias seems to be small due to the low responsiveness
of EHI to mortality risk at work.
Salient evidence from this paper is heterogeneity in the estimated VSLs stemming
from EHI coverage status. I find that workers with employment-based health coverage
accept lower wage premium for risk, implying a lower VSL. Particularly, the estimated
VSL of those with health coverage reduce by 26-37 %, depending on econometric
specifications. From the specification accounting of unobservables, the implied VSL
of the insured is $ 4.87 million. This confirms the model that the insured trade
the wage-risk premium for health insurance, resulting in the lower VSL. Yet, I also
find that the VSL of the uninsured is $ 20.87 million. The considerable increase
in the VSL of the uninsured cannot be explained merely by the rate of tradeoff
between the risk premium and health insurance. As I investigate further, I find that
the high VSL of the uninsured is driven by uninsured married men. This may be
because uninsured married men exhibit greater aversion to financial risk and require
a substantially high wage premium to attract them to risky jobs.7 Particularly,
7
Eeckhoudt and Hammitt (2004) posit that a positive correlation between mortality risks and
financial risk increases VSL.
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health insurance minimizes catastrophic financial shock due to unexpected medical
expenditures. Thus, the uninsured are at greater risk to financial loss, and, those
displaying strong aversion to financial risk require relatively higher risk premium as
precaution.
This paper makes several contributions. First, the paper provides a mechanism
and evidence that health insurance provision has an impact on VSL. Specifically, I
explore the effect of health-driven productivity on the wage compensation for mortality risk. Thus far there has been no extensive discussion on this subject in the
wage-risk relationship literature. Second, the paper provides insight into how risk of
job-related death coupled with labor market frictions affects firms’ decision to invest
in workers’ health. This paper reveals the role of job characteristics (i.e. the risk of
fatal injury) in explaining a health coverage gap across occupations.8
The findings also have some policy implications. Numerous government agencies
such as, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (U.S. EPA), have long used observational labor market data to estimate wage-risk premiums for policies on workplace
health and safety (Cropper et al., 2011). The estimates of risk premium depart from
the canonical hedonic wage model that tends to ignore heterogeneity in the estimated
VSL across jobs with different levels of non-pecuniary benefits. It also does not account for a possibility that workers use risk premium to purchase various desirable job
attributes such as, health insurance. I show that failure to account of heterogeneity
in VSL stemming from employer-sponsored health coverage status may overestimate
(or underestimate) the benefits of risk reduction at workplace if the benchmark VSL
is too high (or too low). In this paper, I also provide evidence that workers trade
the wage-risk premium for health coverage. This behavior affects the structure of
wages, and, determines the valuation of mortality risk reduction. Policy evaluations
then should take into account possible tradeoffs between wage-risk premium and job
amenities in estimates of wage compensation for mortality risk at work.
Finally, the remainder of the paper is organized in the following way. Section 2
discusses related literature while section 3 discusses analytical framework and model.
Section 4 derives econometric implications derived from the basic model. Section 5
covers the estimation results and conclusion is in section 6.
8

The finding is complementary to findings in Currie and Yelowitz (1999); they find that the low
rate of health insurance coverage among some workers is partly driven by the employer side.
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2.2

Related literature

This paper is closely related to papers that focus on heterogeneity in the value of statistical life (VSL). Empirical papers in VSL suggest that estimates of wage premiums
for risk range between $ 5- 12 million with the median estimate at $ 7 million (Viscusi
and Aldy, 2003). However, there is variation in VSLs that can be attributed to both
unobserved and observed variables. On issues pertaining to unobserved characteristics, some papers show that failing to take account of unobserved worker characteristics results in biased estimates of premiums for risk. Using an instrumental variables
approach in order to address this concern, Garen (1988) finds a twofold increase in
the mortality risk premium from the standard hedonic model with OLS.
Although there is consensus that the inability to control for unobserved heterogeneity can bias estimates of compensating differentials for risk, there is disagreement over the direction of the bias. Hwang et al. (1992) argue that the hedonic wage
model may underestimate the premium of mortality risk if the model does not control for unobserved labor productivity. In contrast to Hwang et al. (1992), Shogren
and Stamland (2002) argue that heterogeneity reflects more safety-related productivity than general unobserved productivity; some workers possess skills—typically are
unobserved—that help them to avoid injuries. Thus, the inability to control for unobserved skills in the hedonic model will overestimate wage premiums. Recent studies
employing longitudinal data confirm the theoretical findings in Shogren and Stamland (2002). Kniesner et al. (2012) find a significant reduction in the risk premiums
associated with a method accounting for unobservables.
Brown (1980), and Dorsey (1983) consider the effect of non-pecuniary benefits on
the money-risk tradeoff in a way that is similar to the one which I explore. With
inclusion of non-pecuniary benefits into the hedonic wage model, Brown (1980) finds
no evidence of the wage premium for mortality risk. Using the survey of employers’
expenditures for employee compensation, Dorsey (1983) finds heterogeneity in VSLs
when the cash-equivalent of non-pecuniary benefits is included in the model. He also
finds that the elevated risk of death is negatively associated with EHI provision. While
obviously complementary, there are several important differences between this paper
and that of Dorsey (1983). Dorsey (1983) assumes that a dollar value of fringe benefits
is equivalent to one dollar in wage. I do not assume this as health insurance has,
indirectly through health, a productivity effect. In particular, I provide a mechanism
showing that health insurance could affect the structure of wages, and in turn, it
affects wage premiums for risk.
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Another related literature explores human capital investment. Under the competitive wage theory with no friction, workers take all the returns to their general human
capital investment (Becker, 1964). Accordingly, no employer is willing to pay for general human capital investment. Yet, the conjecture of the competitive wage theory
does not confirm the empirical observation that firms often bear the costs associated
with the general training of their employees. Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) show that
with labor market friction, firms may be willing to pay for general trainings. Friction
leads to “wage compression” that transforms “technologically” general skills into de
facto “specific” skills. This gives an incentive for firms to invest in their employees.
Fang and Gavazza (2011) apply the framework of Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) to explore dynamic inefficiencies of employment-based health insurance system. They find
that employment-based health coverage leads to underinvestment in health during
working years and, consequently, increasing medical expenditures in the retirement
period (Fang and Gavazza, 2011).
The literature on the impact of health insurance on health is extensive. Many
studies share the findings that health insurance improves health (see Levy and Meltzer
(2004) for a thorough survey). There is a wide range of measures of health, yet some
health issues are precursors to occupational injuries. For example, many papers
show that visual impairment strongly contributes to occupational injuries (Zwerling
et al., 1996; Legood et al., 2002). Stress and depression have also long been associated
positively with work-related accidents (Johnston, 1995), and productivity loss (Lerner
et al., 2004). Ample evidence suggests that health coverage benefits substantially
people with these health problems (Newhouse and The Insurance Experiment Group,
1993; Baicker et al., 2013), and also increases survival rates due to better treatments
(Doyle Jr, 2005).
My paper views that improvements for health measures considered precursors to
injuries are similar to improvements in workers’ skill. That is, these health improvements basically increase workers’ ability to cope with dangerous working conditions,
and accordingly, workers become more productive. Tompa (2002) provides a survey
showing evidence on the positive effect of health on productivity. Pinheiro and Dizioli
(2012) show a direct link that health coverage reduces work absenteeism, which can
be translated into higher productivity for workers with health insurance. They find
that a worker with health coverage loses, on average, 55 % fewer workdays per year
than does a similar worker without health insurance. An indirect effect of health insurance on productivity can also be found in Lehrer and Pereira (2007). Lehrer and
Pereira (2007) find that returns to a college education in jobs with health insurance
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increase by almost 30 percent. This suggests that health coverage has an impact on
productivity and wage levels.
2.3

Analytical Framework

The main objective of the following framework is to provide some intuition and a
mechanism through which the health investment affects wage structures and the
wage-risk tradeoff. I develop a static model that adapts labor market frictions of
Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) and Fang and Gavazza (2011) into the standard model
of hedonic prices.
2.3.1

Assumptions

My model is a two-period model without discounting. In period 1, workers are endowed with an initial stock of health, denoted by h1 . Workers or employers can make
health investment. I denote m as the total amount of health investment with a unit
cost of c. Allowing contribution from the worker or the firm, we have m = mw + mf ,
where mw and mf are the worker’s and the firm’s contribution, respectively. m can
be interpreted as health insurance, since it allows workers to access medical services,
which are essentially the same as investment9 . Health investment in the first period
increases workers’ health stock in the second period. Following Fang and Gavazza
(2011), the evolution of worker health stock is assumed as follows
h2 = k(h1 , m)

(2.1)

h2 is health stock in period 2 and k(., .) is the health production function for
worker. I assume that the health production function is homogenous across workers.
k(., .) is assumed to be a well-behaved health production function: k(., .) is continuous
and increasing in h1 and m-i.e. ∂k/∂h1 > 0 and ∂k/∂m > 0. When there is no health
investment, h2 = h1 .
As in Figure 2.1, workers and firms set the level of health investment simultaneously.10 After that, workers decide the level of risk they are willing to accept for two
9

In this paper, I use health insurance and health investment interchangeably. Many studies show
that people with health insurance utilize more health service (Currie and Madrian, 1999). Fang and
Gavazza (2011) find that workers with health insurance spend higher medical expenditures than
those without health coverage.
10
Both workers and firms do not know who is going to die or survive in period 2. As such, firms
cannot select and invest in the health of individuals who are perceived to survive in period 2. This
is a critical assumption as I concern with statistical lives and “not identified lives” (Viscusi, 2008;
Blomquist, 2015).
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periods. Let p denote the risk of fatal injury, where 0 ≤ p ≤ 1. The risk for each
period is assumed to be independent from one another. In the beginning of period
2, the worker either stays with the current firm or quits and works at another firm
with probability q where q ∈ (0, 1). When the worker quits, he receives an exogenous
outside offer, v(h2 , p) (i.e. the external wage).
The firm’s production is a function of risk and health stock. I assume that each
worker produces output, f (ht , p), where t is time period in which t = 1, 2. The
current firm offers wage rates that are equal to the worker’s productivity, wt (ht , p) =
f (ht , p). Firms must pay additional wage payments to attract workers to bear extra risk—i.e. wage premiums for mortality risk. Formally, this can be written as
fp (ht , p) = wpt (ht , p), where fp = ∂f (., .)/∂p, and, wpt = ∂wt (., .)/∂p. The assumption
suggests that marginal costs of safety improvements, wpt , should be equal to marginal
benefits from additional outputs due to the increased risk, fp . Wage premiums for
risk, wpt , are positive, and thus, fp will be positive as well (i.e. fp > 0). Health adds
output, so fh2 > 0, and fh1 > 0.
In addition, the necessary second-order condition of production function requires
that fpp < 0, fh2 h2 < 0, and fh1 h1 < 0. It is also assumed that safety increases
health productivity, and assuming symmetric condition, I have fh2 p = fph2 < 0. The
assumption of negative cross-productivity, fh2 p < 0 also means that health stock and
risk of accidents are substitutes.11 To give an example on this assumption, a wellfunctioning worker may not be able to work optimally due to poor visibility brought
by air pollution at the worksite. As the pollution increases, the worker’s additional
output would eventually decline.
Labor market friction is important to this framework, and in the spirit of Acemoglu and Pischke (1999), I assume that worker productivity is higher than the
external wage offer, that is, f (h2 , p) > v (h2 , p). The assumption tells us that the
worker is not paid at his full marginal product of labor if he moves to another firm.
However, it is important to note that the worker is equally productive in the current
firm and the outside firm, that is, f (h2 , p). The assumption of friction implies that
fh2 (h2 , p) > vh2 (h2 , p). Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) provide several institutional
settings creating such frictions. For instance, frictions may be caused by costly-job
searching which creates monopsony power of firms. With monopsony power, firms
are then able to capture a fraction of the higher output due to the worker’s higher
productivity.
11

This is a similar assumption as in Thaler and Rosen (1976).
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2.3.2

Equilibrium

I follow Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) non-cooperative regime under which health
investments by the firm and the worker are chosen non-cooperatively. Under this
regime, the worker and the firm set simultaneously the amount of resource they want
to allocate for health investment. The worker may pay for his health investment
with the period 1’s wage; the first period wage is then w1 = f (h1 , p) − cm.12 Health
investment in period 1 increases the worker’s productivity in period 2. If the worker
does not quit in period 2, there will be a productivity surplus, f (h2 , p) − v(h2 , p).
f (h2 , p) is the output produced by the worker in period 2, and v(h2 , p) is the wage
that the worker receives if he quits from his current job. The productivity surplus,
f (h2 , p) − v(h2 , p), is shared between the worker and the firm according to the Nash
bargaining solution. Let β represents the worker’s bargaining power, β ∈ (0, 1). With
the probability 1 − q the worker stays with the current firm and receives w2 (h2 , p).
Otherwise, the worker quits and get v(h2 , p) with probability q. Let E(w2 ) be the
expected second period wage. Hence, the worker’s maximization problem can be
described as 13
W = E(w2 ) + w1
W = v(h2 , p) + (1 − q)β(f (h2 , p) − v(h2 , p)) + f (h1 , p) − cm

(2.2)

Similar to the worker, the firm selects the level of health investment that maximizes profit. The firm may also pay for the worker’ health investment; the firm’s
first-period profit is π 1 = f (h1 , p) − w1 (h1 , p) − cm. The profit maximization problem
can be written as the sum of the profits in two periods.14
Π = E(π 2 ) + π 1
Π = (1 − q)(1 − β)(f (h2 , p) − v(h2 , p)) + f (h1 , p) − w1 (h1 , p) − cm
12

(2.3)

On the other hand, if the firm pays full costs of health investment or there is no health investment, the worker receives full wage w1 = f (h1 , p).
13
To be more detailed, with probability (1 − q), the worker stays at the current firm and receives
2 2
w (h , p) = v(h2 , p) + β[f (h2 , p) − v(h2 , p)]. If he quits, he takes the outside offer, v(h2 , p). Thus,
E(w2 ) = (1 − q)[(1 − β)v(h2 , p) + βf (h2 , p)] + qv(h2 , p).
14
The intuition is similar. By probability 1−q, the firm gets the surplus (1−β)[f (h2 , p)−v(h2 , p)]
and with probability q the firm gets surplus 0.
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The worker maximizes equation 2.2 by choosing mw ≥ 0 and takes mf as given.
Thus, the optimal contribution to health investment can be found by taking first
order condition of 2.2 with respect to mw .



vh2 (h2 , p) + (1 − q)β fh2 (h2 , p) − vh2 (h2 , p)



∂k/∂mw − c = 0 if mw > 0
≤ 0 if mw = 0(2.4)

The firm also selects the optimal level of health investment, mf , by taking the
worker’s contribution, mw , as given. So the first order condition of 2.3 with respect
to health investment is
(1 − q)(1 − β)(fh2 (h2 , p) − vh2 (h2 , p))∂k/∂mf − c = 0 if mf > 0
≤ 0 if mf = 0

(2.5)

Expressions 2.4 and 2.5 suggests that either the worker or the firm that pays
all costs of health investment. The intuition is that the firm’s and the worker’s
contributions to health investment are perfect substitutes. Let m
b f be the level of
health investment that holds the equality condition of 2.5, and, m
b w is the solution
to the equality condition of 2.4. If m
bf > m
b w , the firm bears all the costs, and as a
result, mw = 0. On the other hand if m
bw > m
b f , then it is the worker who pays all
the costs of health investment. From this inspection, it is clear that within-industry
variation in health coverage from the empirical observation is due to heterogeneity in
the desired levels of health investment of the firm and of the worker.
Furthermore, Proposition 1 explores the effect of mortality risk on the equilibrium
level of health investment made by the firm. As we will see, the utilization of health as
an input depends substantially on the risk produced by the firm. Health becomes far
less productive in high hazard working environments, and thus, the elevated mortality
risks reduces the firm’s incentive to invest in the worker’s health. Consequently, the
worker with health coverage in risky job bears health investment in the form of lower
wage: he trades the risk premium for health insurance.15 This also rationalizes the
low rates of EHI coverage among workers in risky jobs.
15

In addition to the firm technology, a decrease in the firm’s contribution when risk of death
increases may be related to the possibility of accidents, and thus, the firm cannot recoup the costs
of health investment. Recall that the health investment is made in the period 1. If in period 2, a
substantial number of workers die due to job-related accidents, the firm cannot recover the costs and
lose the potential surplus. Of course this is an extreme case yet it plausibly affects firms’ decision
to invest in their employees.
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Proposition 1. An increase in the job-related death decreases equilibrium health
investment made by the firm.
The firm makes health investment. The equilibrium health investment of the firm
implies m∗f > 0, and hence, the equality condition of 2.5 holds. From the expression,
let us define λ(p, m∗f ) as follows.
λ(p, m∗f ) = (1 − q)(1 − β)(fh2 (h2 , p) − vh2 (h2 , p))∂k/∂mf − c
Applying the implicit function theorem, we have
∂m∗f
∂λ(p, m∗f )/∂p
<0
=−
∂p
∂λ(p, m∗f )/∂m∗f
Proof is as follows.
∂λ(p, m∗f )
= D(fh2 p − vh2 p )∂k/∂mf < 0
∂p
Furthermore, the necessary second-order condition of the equation 2.6 is
(
!)


2
∂λ p, m∗f
∂ 2k
∂k
+ (fh2 − vh2 )
= D (fh2 h2 − vh2 h2 )
<0
∂m∗f
∂mf
∂m2f
Where D = (1 − q) (1 − β). Therefore, we have that ∂m∗f /∂p < 0.
Figure 2.2 describes the idea of my model, and, depicts the relationship between
wages and risk of death at work. Person 2—his utility is u
b2 —is willing to take a
relatively high risk job (i.e. p2 ), and thus, he chooses firm 2—the firm 2’s wage
offer curve is ob2 . Person 1 prefers to work in safe job—i.e. his utility is u
b1 and firm
1’s wage offer curve is ob1 . A risky job pays premium, that is, w
b2 > w
b1 . Under a
perfectly competitive market, no firm is willing to invest in the workers’ health. If
workers are less willing to invest in their health too—for the reason that the surplus
will be disproportionately captured by the firms—we only observe the wage locus of
jobs without health insurance, w
bno HI . The wage premium for mortality risk is then
∆w/∆p.
b
Under imperfect labor market, workers are less mobile, and, given that health increases productivity, firms are willing to unilaterally invest in their workers’ health—i.e.
now we observe the wage locus of jobs with health insurance, w
eHI . As the probability of death is low, let say below p∗ , health is productive—making health investment
then attractive to the firms. Thus, some of type 1 workers are covered by health
15

insurance, and, as health insurance improves health and productivity, he is paid by
higher wage—i.e. w
e1 > w
b1 . Yet, the increasing risk of injury reduces health investment made by the firms, and consequently, the insured workers in risky jobs (i.e. u
e2 )
bear the costs of the investment; their wage is lower than the wage of worker without
health insurance, w
e2 < w
b2 . Thus, the wage-risk premium for the insured worker is
∆w/∆p.
e
It is clear that the risk premium of the insured will be lower than that of
the uninsured—i.e. ∆w/∆p
e
< ∆w/∆p.
b
2.3.3

Testable Implications

The previous discussion results in several testable predictions that can be derived
from the above framework. I summarize them as follows
1. Workers in high risk occupations are less likely to be covered by employmentbased health insurance. The harmful effect of job hazards reduces the incentive
to invest in workers’ health.
2. The insured workers in dangerous jobs have to pay the associated costs of health
benefits in the form of lower wages. Hence, we should observe the wage-health
insurance tradeoff among workers in risky jobs.
3. The risk premium for the insured will be relatively lower than that of the
uninsured. Implication 2 suggests that the increased mortality risk reduces the
wages of the insured workers relative to the wages of the uninsured workers; the
mortality risk compresses the wages of the insured workers. Accordingly, the
wage-risk slope of the insured workers will be flatter than that of the uninsured.
2.4
2.4.1

Data and Econometric Specifications
Data

The main dataset is the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). The PSID consists
detailed information on workers’ characteristics and health insurance. The advantage
of using of panel data is that it permits us to reduce bias from individual unobserved
variables. Information on employment covers the employment conditions in the current and the previous survey year. But information on health insurance refers to the
two-previous years of the survey year.
Beginning in 2003, industry and occupation codes in the PSID data changed. As
controlling for industry and occupation has been a standard approach in hedonic
16

wage model, the changes could create a complication. To deal with changes in these
codes, I split the PSID into two periods: before and after 2003. Prior 2003, industry
classification in the PSID is based on the 1987 Standard Industrial Classification (SIC
1987). After 2003, the industry classification is based on the Census 2002. In order
to match with the fatality data where industry and classification codes after 2003
is based on the 2002 NAICS, I recode industry classification in the post-2003 PSID
into the 2002 NAICS. Given that I use three-year average fatality rate, classification
changes in both the PSID and fatality data lead me to drop the 2001 PSID (I will
discuss more detailed on the fatality data in the following section). Yet, I take the
information of health insurance in the survey year of 2001 as it refers to the health
insurance coverage in 1999. The final sample consisting both employment and health
insurance information, is then composed from the surveys of 1997, 1999, 2003, 2005,
and 2007.16
In constructing the sample, I follow Kniesner et al. (2012) by restricting the sample in the following way 1) heads of households ages 18-60 in the Survey Research
Center. 2) They worked for hourly and salary pay. 3) not permanently disabled or
institutionalized, 4) not working in agriculture or the armed forces, 5) have a real
hour wage between $2 and $100, and have no missing data on wages, education, region, industry and occupation. This sample includes both full-time and part-time
workers.17
Table 1 exhibits the summary statistics of the sample. Real hourly wage in the
sample is $23.44 in the 2005 dollar. The 3-year average fatality rate is 4.23 per 100,000
workers. Based on the PSID data, we see that 82 percent of workers reported that
they have been, at least, covered by employer health insurance in the past two-years
before the survey year.
Fatal Data
The focal variable in this model is the risk variable. In this paper, I use reported
fatal injury as a measure for risk perceived by workers. The key assumption of using
reported fatal injury is that subjective risks perceived by workers and employers
are reflected through the objective measure of fatal risk represented by the rate of
fatal injury. The assumption has also been at the heart of many studies on VSL
16

Meanwhile controlling for occupations is important in the hedonic wage equation. I follow
Bollinger and Hirsch (2006): I create dummy variables for occupation codes in different periods.
17
the PSID does not distinguish jobs into full-time and part-time jobs. We could possibly identify
part-time jobs from types of their pay, that is, whether the respondent is paid by hourly pay by
which most of part-time workers are paid
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(Kniesner et al., 2012). Moreover, Viscusi and Aldy (2003) collecting from various
studies suggest that there is a strong correlation between workers’ subjective risk
assessments and reported injury rates. Hence, it is plausible that the reported injury
rates render workers and employers about the nature of the job, and thus, workers use
this information to form risk beliefs. Therefore, we expect that the rates of injuries
could serve as a proxy for the subjective risk beliefs.
To construct the risk variable, I use the reported public version of fatality data
from the Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries (CFOI). The CFOI defines fatal injury at workplace and thus includes the injury in the data when such injury satisfies
following criteria (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2015). First it is a traumatic injury
defined, among other things, as any wound or damage to the body due to exposure
to heat, electricity, or impact from a crash or fall. Sudden death due to some causes,
such as heart attacks or strokes, are excluded from CFOI. But, if a traumatic injury involves, the resulting injury, including death, is included in the data. Second,
an injury is considered workplace injury when such injury occurs on the employers
premises—e.g. such as building, parking lots, facilities, and so on —and the injured
person was there to work. A workplace injury may occur off the employers premises.
But as long as the injured person was there to work and the causes of injury were
related to his job or status as an employee, it is a workplace injury and thus included
in the data.
I constructed fatality data from 1992-2010. The CFOI data report the total
number of annual fatalities by various categories such as industry, occupation, and
causes. The dataset does provide fatality rates nevertheless. Thus, I calculate the
fatality rate by taking the ratio of fatalities in any occupation-industry group from
the CFOI data to that group’s average employment from monthly Current Population
Survey (CPS) over a year.
Previously, similar to the PSID, industry and occupation classifications in the
CFOI also changed in 2003. To cope with this issue, I split the fatality data into two
periods:1) 1992-2002 and 2) 2003-2010. Following Kniesner et al. (2012), I construct
the fatality rate based on occupation-industry groups. Prior to 2003, the fatality
rate is constructed from 720 occupation-industry groups consisting of 72 two-digit the
1987 Standard Industrial Classification (SIC 1987) and 10 one-digit code occupations.
Prior to 2003, both the CFOI and PSID use SIC 1987, so I can match both datasets
directly. For the 2003-2009 CFOI data, I construct 900 occupation-industry groups
containing 90 three-digit the 2002 North American Industrial Classification System
(NAICS) and 10 one digit code occupations. I recode the 2002 census-based industry
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and occupation classifications of the PSID into the 2002 NAICS. By doing so I can
match the 2003-2007 PSID with the 2003-2010 CFOI data. After this step, I merge
back all the datasets.
As fatal accidents are rare events, even in occupations perceived as high risk jobs,
there may be large swings in fatality rate from year to year. In order to avoid this,
I use 3-year average fatality rate.18 The 3-year average fatality rate is calculated by
averaging three year forward annual fatality rates (e.g. for the fatality rate in 2003, I
average fatality rates in 2003, 2004, and 2005). I use the average forward fatality rate
is because industry and occupation classifications changed in 2003 for both PSID and
the CFOI data. Thus, I cannot create continuous occupation-industry fatality rates
covering periods before and after 2003. As I match the PSID and the CFOI data
based on occupation-industry groups, calculating mean fatality rate forward allows a
higher sample size of PSID. This is also the reason why I drop the 2001 PSID from
the sample.
Health Insurance Data
Started in 1999, the PSID individual data has asked respondents whether they were
covered by any health insurance in the two calendar years before the survey year. For
instance, the 2009 PSID asked health insurance coverage in 2007 and 2008. If they
reported having had coverage, the interviewer further asked types of coverage with
up to four mentions allowed. Table 2.2 provides types of coverage asked in the PSID.
The health insurance variable is a binary variable coded as 1 if a respondent
has employer-sponsored health insurance and 0 otherwise. Individuals having no
insurance or those having other types of health coverage are coded as 0—i.e. non
employer-provided health insurance would be coded as zero. This distinction fits with
the proposed framework. Recall that the proposed framework views health insurance
as health investment intended to improve worker productivity. Labor market frictions,
moreover, create an incentive to the firm to share the productivity gains from the
investment. Thus, the shared productivity gains from health would be reflected in
wages. Other types of health coverage also improve worker productivity. But the
firm is able to capture those productivity gains without paying the costs and sharing
the gains. Consequently, other types of health insurance theoretically should have no
effect on wages, and thus, the wage offer of workers with non EHI coverage may be
the same as the ones without health insurance.
18

Kniesner et al. (2012) provide a valid case of averaging fatality rate over some periods.
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A major issue with the health insurance question in the PSID is that the PSID
does not distinguish between policy holder and dependent. This creates a problem
when the head of household is covered through his spouse’s employment. Thus,
one could falsely think that he gets health insurance through his own employer.
To address this problem, I include marital status and a dummy variable indicating
whether or not spouse is working. While this is not ideal, I expect that marital
status and spouse’s working status could pick up the effect of spouse’s employersponsored health insurance if the head of household is in fact covered by his spouse.
In addition, I also split the sample into married and single men and estimate the
wage model separately. Thus, we are able to get a relatively clean identification
of EHI coverage through the sample of single men. Given that single men may be
systematically different from married men and the difference may be correlated with
EHI coverage, in the following robustness check I split the sample of married men. In
particular, I distinguish married men into 1) married men whose spouse is working
and 2) married whose spouse is not working. The observed EHI coverage from the
later sample tells us that people in this group get health coverage from their own
employers.
Moreover, the question on health insurance is multi responses, allowing respondents to report more than one types of health insurance coverage. Without the
specific date of coverage, I am not fully able to identify respondents who switch types
of health insurance (e.g. from private health insurance to public within this two-year
survey interval), and reference years in which they change the coverage. Despite these
limitations, Levy (2007) notes that the PSID estimates of the population with private
coverage are very accurate. Levy (2007) suggests PSID users to rely on respondent
reports of “any private coverage” for estimating respondents with private coverage.
In constructing the health insurance coverage variable, I pursue Levy’s (2007) algorithm. Respondents are considered having employer health insurance if they report
having had “any employer health insurance”.
Since the health insurance question is retrospective, I need to align demographic
and employment variables with health insurance variable. To be specific, I match
health insurance information collected in the current survey with the previous survey.
For example, information on health insurance in the survey year 2009 is matched with
employment information in the 2007 survey. So, for employment and demographic
variables in the 2003-2009 period, I practically use three surveys (i.e. 2003, 2005, and
2007).
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2.4.2

Econometric Specifications

In this section, I set up econometric specifications aimed at testing the main implications of the framework. I begin with implication 1, that is, the elevated risk of death
leads to lower health investment made by firms. To empirically test this implication,
I specify the following regression equation:
Hijkt = ci + δZjkt + X ijkt β + εijkt

(2.6)

Hijkt is a binary variable indicating health insurance status (i.e. Hijkt = 1 covered
by EHI, 0 otherwise) for worker i (i = 1,. . . , N ) in industry j (j =1,. . . ,J) and occupation k (k = 1,. . . ,K ) at time t ( t = 1,. . . ,T ). ; Zjkt is the industry and occupation
specific fatality rate.; Xijkt refers to a vector consisting demographic variables: education, age, age squared, race, union status, marital status, industries, occupations
and states of residence. The error term is denoted by εijkt , and ci is unobserved
individual heterogeneity.
A challenge to the identification of model 2.6 is a non-random selection of jobs.
Worker characteristics induce workers’ decision on the choices of job risk and of
job amenities, such as health insurance. As an example, workers with relatively
high ability may go to safe jobs that provide health insurance as well. If these
characteristics are unobserved—as is in ability —the estimated δ will be biased. I
utilize the panel component of PSID to deal with this selection problem and employ
methods accounting of person-specific heterogeneity. To get information on the size
of the bias, however, it is useful to compare results that control and do not control
for individual heterogeneity (Wooldridge, 2010).
I start with Probit to estimate the model. Here I do not control for the individualspecific heterogeneity, ci . Next, I estimate the above model with Linear Probability
Model with panel fixed-effects estimator to control for individual heterogeneity. Finally, I estimate the model with Chamberlain-Mundlak device (i.e. Correlated Random Effects, CRE). CRE probit model allows to preserve a non-linearity structure of
the model while controlling for individual heterogeneity.
To empirically test implications 2 and 3, I use the standard econometric framework
of hedonic wage equation used in the literature on the wage-risk relationship. I begin
with a baseline specification in which I do not include the health insurance variable.
The hedonic wage equation is described by
ln wijkt = ci + α1 Zjkt + Xijkt β + εijkt
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(2.7)

ln wijkt denotes the natural log of the hourly wage rate and, the same as before,
ci is unobseved heterogeneity. The main coefficient of interest is α1 that measures
the rate of the wage-risk tradeoff.
In the following econometric model, I investigate whether the inclusion of health
insurance in the hedonic wage model affects risk premium. I include health coverage
status as an additional control variable to specification 2.7.
ln wijkt = ci + α1 Zjkt + α2 Hijkt + Xijkt β + εijkt

(2.8)

If health insurance is negatively associated with risk but positively correlated with
wage, as what we observe empirically, α1 in specification 2.7 will suffer a downward
bias. Consequently, the inclusion of health insurance increases the estimated VSL—α1
in model 2.8 will be larger than α1 in model 2.7.
In model 2.8, I assume that the slope of wage offer curve of the insured is the
same as that of the uninsured, although they may have different levels of wages. The
assumption may not hold. Indeed, the model predicts that jobs providing health
insurance differ from jobs not providing one such that the wage offer slope of the
insured will be lower than that of the uninsured. Specifically, risk affects the wage
structure of the insured. To capture the impact of health insurance on the structure
of wages, I interact the variable of risk of fatal injury and the indicator of health
insurance coverage. Thus the specification 2.8 becomes
ln wijkt = ci + α1 Zjkt + α2 Hijkt + α3 Zjkt × Hijkt + Xijkt β + εijkt

(2.9)

Different from model 2.8 and 2.7, α1 in model 2.9 measures the rate of the wagerisk tradeoff when the health coverage variable is zero (i.e Hijkt = 0). In other words,
α1 is the risk premium for the uninsured workers. Moreover, the new feature of model
2.9 is the interaction between the risk variable and EHI status (i.e. Zjkt × Hijkt ).
The coefficient of the interaction, α3 , provides evidence whether health insurance
coverage has an impact on the wage structures of the insured and the uninsured—i.e
the slopes of wage offer locus are different between jobs with and without health
coverage. Based on the framework, we expect that α3 is negative. It reflects that
workers trade wage-risk premiums for health insurance. The negative coefficient of
interaction also suggests that health and risk are substitutes. Here, I do not directly
measure health in the above hedonic wage equation. Yet, since health insurance
improves health (i.e. a positive relationship between health insurance and health),
and if health and risk are substitute, the coefficient of the interaction between risk
and health insurance will be negative.
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Similar to the health insurance and risk relationship, there is a major issue pertaining to the identification of the hedonic wage models in equations 2.7, 2.8 and
2.9, namely, selection problem. That is, workers are not randomly allocated to jobs.
Thus, unobserved heterogeneity, such as ability or unobserved productivity associated with risk is correlated with fatal injury and the health insurance coverage in
jobs they choose. The implication is that the estimated coefficients of interest (i.e.
α1 , α2 , and α3 ) will be biased.
To better understand the magnitude of the bias due to unobservables, I use various
econometric methods. First, I use models accounting of heterogeneity. In particular, I
use panel fixed effects estimator—the most preferred specification—and panel random
effects. Despite controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, in random effects model, I
impose an assumption that the unobserved individual heterogeneity is not correlated
with the risk variable. I compare the models with cross-section estimators: Pooled
OLS (POLS) and between effects. Here I assume strict exogeneity in explanatory
variables and no individual heterogeneity.
The preferred specification, fixed-effects model, permits us to control for personspecific heterogeneity by employing within-transformation of data. However, withintransformation of data plausibly leave little variation in the fatality rate and as such,
we may not be able to identify credibly the fatality parameter. Table 3.4 shows that
between-group variation exceeds within-group variation. However, for all sample,
the within-variation in the fatality rate is sufficiently large—i.e. it is about 45 % of
the between variation. Thus, using fixed effects model is feasible to estimate VSL.
Furthermore, the decomposition of variation by job switch status suggests that job
switchers are the one that contributes substantially to within-group variation—, that
is, the within variation of job switcher is 59 % of the between variation. Table
3.5 displays variation in employer health insurance coverage. We see that withingroup variation in EHI status in the total sample is sufficient to identify the health
insurance parameter (about 48 % of the between variation). Similar to fatality risk,
a large fraction of within-group variation in EHI status is driven by job switching. I
exploit this evidence to address potential endogeneity in risk and health insurance by
estimating the fixed-effects model with the sample of job changers.
Furthermore, the implied value of a statistical life at the level of wages, w̄, can be
calculated as follows
∂w
= α1 × w̄) × 2, 000 × 100, 000]
(2.10)
∂Z
Here the fatality risk is per 100,000 workers and I assume a fixed annual hours
VSL = [(
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point of 2000. I also use the same formula to estimate VSL for the uninsured workers
in models 2.7 and 2.8. To estimate VSL for the insured workers, however, I use the
following formula
∂w
= (α1 + α3 ) × w̄) × 2, 000 × 100, 000]
(2.11)
∂Z
VSLHI is the value of a statistical life for the insured workers. When workers
covered by EHI, the coefficient of the interaction, α3 , is not zero. I calculate standard
error of the estimated VSL for the insured workers by simply computing the standard
error of linear combinations between α1 and α3 .
Moreover, inclusion of health insurance on the hedonic wage function permits us
to estimate “wage premiums” for health investment. If I set Zjk to zero (i.e. jobs with
zero mortality risk), then α2 is the wage premiums for health coverage of workers in
very safe jobs. What it becomes clear to us is that the elevated risk decreases the
wage premiums for health coverage—as α3 is negative—and, at some point of fatal
risk, workers with health coverage receive lower wages. We can see this as follows
VSLHI = [(

WPHI = (α2 + α3 × Z̄jk ) × w̄ × 2, 000

(2.12)

WPHI is the wage premium for health insurance. A negative value of the wage
premium for health insurance suggests the wage-health insurance tradeoff, that is, the
worker pays for health insurance in terms of lower wages. In general, equation 2.12
measures the changes in the wage-health insurance tradeoffs as risk of fatal injury
increases.
2.5

Empirical Results

This section provides empirical results. Before addressing the effect of EHI on the
wage-risk gradient, I first investigate the effect of mortality risk on EHI coverage.
2.5.1

Health insurance and mortality risk

I estimate the likelihood of health insurance coverage conditional on mortality risk
with Linear Probability model (LPM) with fixed effects, Probit, and Probit with
Correlated Random Effects (CRE). The results are shown in Table 2.5. Column 1 of
the table exhibits the result of LPM while the column 2 and 3 report marginal effects
(evaluated at the mean of all variables) of Probit and Probit CRE respectively. It is
instructive to note that the observed health insurance coverage reflects the equilibrium
condition between health insurance offer from the firm side and the worker decision.
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Thus, in general, we can interpret the coefficient of risk in Table 2.5 as the equilibrium
condition.
I find that the elevated risk of death is associated with lower EHI coverage. The
coefficient of fatality rate is negative and statistically significant in both LPM and
Probit. With panel fixed effects estimator, a one unit increase in fatality rate per
100,000 workers is associated with a reduction in probability of EHI coverage by 0.16
percent. From Probit estimate, the marginal effect of risk is a little bigger, that is,
0.18 percent. A concern regarding Probit model arises due to a possible correlation
between the risk variable and unobserved heterogeneity, which potentially leads to
biased estimate of the risk coefficient. Yet, the estimates of LPM with fixed effects
accounting of unobservables and probit model apparently are similar, suggesting that
the magnitude of the bias appears to be small.
All specifications—both with and without controlling for individual heterogeneity—exhibit a similar pattern. Thus, individual heterogeneity does not seem to have a
substantial impact on the risk-health insurance relationship. However, it is plausible
that firm heterogeneity affects both risk levels and decision to provide health insurance, and, inability to account of firm heterogeneity results in biased estimates of the
risk coefficient. Unfortunately, the data do not permit us to control for firm heterogeneity. However, Dorsey (1983) uses data on employers’ contribution to employee
non-wage compensation, and finds a negative association between fatal injury and
the probability of providing health insurance.19 Meanwhile Dorsey (1983) employs
data on the employer side. His findings are qualitatively similar to my finding using
labor data. Thus, we can conclude that both workers and firms respond in a similar
way regarding employment-based health coverage as the mortality risk increases.
Overall, the finding on the risk-health insurance relationship is fairly consistent
with the proposed framework that workers in jobs with high mortality risk are less
likely to receive EHI. As discussed previously, firms’ decision on the health investment
of employees is determined by the firm production technology tied to external risks.
At higher level of risk, health improves incrementally at which firms see no incentive
to provide health investment. Accordingly, workers would incur the associated costs.
Unless they are unconstrained financially or willing to take lower wages for health
insurance, we will observe the low rate of health insurance coverage among these
workers.
19

Dorsey (1983) uses a different measure of the fatality variable. So I cannot make a direct
comparison between his result and mine. But, relative to other variables in his model, the effect of
mortality risk on the probability of providing EHI in Dorsey (1983) is also relatively small.
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However, it is worth noting that the magnitude of the risk coefficient is rather
moderate. Apparently, employer-provided health coverage is less sensitive to the
elevated mortality risk. If the low responsiveness of EHI to mortality risk changes is
much more driven from the demand side—demand for health coverage is high despite
increasing risk, it is then likely that the workers in dangerous jobs have to accept
lower wages to compensate for EHI coverage. Thus, the wages of the insured grow
much less as the mortality risk increases. As I discuss later, the results from hedonic
wage model with health insurance status confirm this assertion.
2.5.2

Health insurance and the wage-risk relationship

Here I investigate the effect of health insurance on the money-risk tradeoff. I start
with the baseline model 2.7, and the empirical results are presented in Table 2.6.
For brevity, I only report the coefficient of risk. Table 2.6 provides the coefficient of
risk based on various econometric models. Comparisons between panel fixed effects
and other estimates inform us the magnitude of the bias in estimates of wage-risk
premiums. Furthermore, I also calculate the implied value of a statistical life based
on equation 2.10.
With fixed-effects model, the most preferred specification, the estimated wage-risk
premium for an increase in deaths per 100,000 workers is 0.16 %, and accordingly,
the implied VSL is $ 7.68 million. The implied VSL with fixed-effect estimator is
in the median of estimated VSLs from many studies. When I use random effects
specification, the estimate of the wage premium for risk is slightly higher, and, the
implied VSL is $10.52 million.20 We notice here that unobserved heterogeneity has
a substantial impact on estimates of compensating differentials for risk. Models
accounting of heterogeneity (i.e. Random and fixed effects) reduce the estimated
VSL by about 66 % relative to models ignoring heterogeneity. Estimates of VSL
from the cross-section models assuming no heterogeneity (i.e. POLS and between
effects) yield high implied VSLs. With POLS model, the implied VSL is around
$22.6 million. Overall, the implied VSLs are close to estimates in Kniesner et al.
(2012) that use PSID and panel econometric model.
The substantial difference in estimates of VSL with heterogeneity versus without
heterogeneity confirms the theoretical conjecture of Shogren and Stamland (2002).
Shogren and Stamland (2002) argue that failing to control for unobserved skill will
overestimate the VSL. In particular, the reduction in the estimated VSLs after con20

Random effects assume that heterogeneity is distributed normally and not correlated with the
variable of interest. If the assumption is violated, the estimate will be biased.
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trolling for individual-specific heterogeneity suggests that heterogeneity reflects more
safety-related productivity and risk preferences than general unobserved productivity
in the context of Hwang et al. (1992).
In the following discussion, I examine the impact of health insurance on the hedonic wage function. From Table 2.5, I find that fatal injury leads to lower probability
of EHI coverage. If EHI coverage affects both wage levels and job riskiness, omitting
health insurance status from the hedonic wage model results in a downward bias in
the estimated VSLs presented in Table 2.6. Results from the hedonic wage models
including health insurance are presented in 2.7. I find that the estimated VSLs in
Table 2.7 are higher than are the estimated VSLs in models without health insurance.
This is consistent with the notion that health insurance is positively correlated with
wages but is negatively related with risk, leading to underestimated VSLs in models
ignoring EHI as a control variable. However, we also notice that EHI coverage is
less responsive to risk changes—i.e. this is a suggestive of small bias. Thus, the bias
from omitting health insurance in the hedonic models seems to be small: we see here
that differences in the estimated VSLs between models with and without health coverage are rather small. Additionally, I still observe a consistent pattern that models
accounting of person-specific heterogeneity yield lower VSLs.
The framework, furthermore, suggests that risk affects the structure of wages between jobs providing and not providing health benefits: heterogeneity in estimates of
compensating wage differentials for mortality risk may arise due to employment-based
health coverage. This implies that health insurance has an impact on the wage-risk
gradient. Results of model 2.10 are, then, shown in Table 2.8. In general, models
with the interaction between EHI and fatality risk increase wage-risk premiums relative to the standard model. Particularly, the coefficient of risk increases by 51-63 %,
depending on the specifications, relative to models without health insurance. Given
that the coefficient of risk in these specifications actually measures the rate of the
wage-risk tradeoff for the uninsured workers (i.e. Hijkt = 0), this evidence suggests
that the uninsured workers receive higher wage premium for risk of death at work
than do the average workers (i.e. the wage-risk premium for all sample).
Columns 2 and 4 of Table 2.8 report estimates from the panel random-effects
and the fixed-effects estimators respectively. The fixed-effects estimator produces the
implied VSL of the uninsured at $ 20.87, which is far larger than the estimated VSL
in the hedonic model without health insurance. Columns 1 and 3 of Table 2.8 present
the results of the cross-sections estimators. In contrast to specifications controlling
for person-specific heterogeneity, these specifications produce considerably high wage
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premiums for risk—about 0.91-0.99 %, and the implied VSLs are around $ 42.7-44.7
million.
I estimate the risk premium for the insured from the sum of the risk coefficient
and the coefficient of the interaction term between the risk and health insurance
(i.e. α1 + α3 ).21 I find that, inclusion of health insurance status and controlling
for heterogeneity, the estimated VSLs decline by 34-37%. Specifically, with models
accounting of individual-specific heterogeneity, the implied VSLs of the insured are
around $4.87-$6.91 million, despite being statistically insignificant at 95 % confidence
level. On models ignoring heterogeneity, the implied VSLs of the insured range between $ 15.7-17.5 million. These empirical findings are consistent with the conjecture
of the model: the insured workers receive lower mortality risk premiums than do the
uninsured.
Striking evidence from Table 2.8 is that the coefficient of the interaction between mortality risk and health insurance is negative and statistically significant in
all specifications. This reflects that risk and health insurance are substitutes. Health
investment improves health and increases productivity. But hazardous working environments have deleterious impacts on health such that health investment improves
little employees’ health. This reduces the level of health investment made by firms
with high occupational hazards.
Another economic intuition to the lower VSL of the insured is because the insured
trade the risk premium for health insurance. The low health investment made by
the firm is compensated by the contribution of the insured worker in the form of
lower wage: The insured workers basically are willing to accept relatively lower risk
premium to get health insurance. The model predicts that this would be the case of
the insured in dangerous jobs. However, it may occur among the insured in safe jobs
as well. If there is heterogeneity in mortality risk such that the wage-risk premium
of safe jobs is lower than is the wage-risk premium of dangerous jobs, workers in safe
jobs would have a strong incentive to give up premiums for risk of death—which is
very small—in order to get health coverage provided by employers. The productivity
impact of health investment is then the pull-factor that attracts workers to give up the
wage-risk premium for health coverage. Also notice that from the coefficients of risk,
health insurance, and the interaction between them in Table 2.8, the insured workers
in relatively safe jobs (i.e. low fatality rates) earn high wages than the uninsured
workers.
However, we should be cautious in interpreting it as solely the tradeoff between
21

That is, I set Hijkt = 1
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risk premium and health insurance or the worker productivity effect. The substantial
gap in the implied VSLs indicates that other factors are at play. There could be
true inter-industry wage differences between jobs with and without health insurance,
and those jobs providing health insurance are locating in industries with low rate of
fatal injury. Another plausible explanation is worker aversion to other types of risks
that affect the estimates of VSLs. In the next section, I investigate how aversion to
financial risk may explain the wide gap in the estimated VSLs between the uninsured
and the insured.
It is useful to put the findings presented in Table 2.8 into the context of theoretical predictions in Hwang et al. (1992) and Shogren and Stamland (2002). The
substantial difference in estimated VSL with individual-specific heterogeneity versus
without individual-specific heterogeneity in the model reaffirms the theoretical emphasis of Shogren and Stamland (2002). That is, latent individual heterogeneity is
likely to represent unobserved skill related to personal ability to avoid injury, and risk
preferences. Accordingly, failure to control for unobserved skill leads to a potentially
substantial upward bias in the estimates of compensating differentials for fatal risk.
However, job characteristics inducing labor productivity are also important to control
in the hedonic wage function, and particularly, if these characteristics vary with the
level of mortality risk (i.e. health insurance). We see that employment-based health
insurance induce, indirectly, worker productivity and omitting health insurance status from the hedonic wage model leads to a potentially substantial downward bias
in the estimated VSL. This evidence lends support to the theoretical conjecture in
Hwang et al. (1992).
2.5.3

Risk aversion, family structure, and the wage-risk premium

The lower VSL estimates of the insured relative to that of the average workers can be
attributed to the fact that the insured trade the wage-risk premium for health benefits.
However, the substantial difference in the implied VSLs between the insured and the
uninsured cannot be explained merely by productivity differential or the tradeoff
between wage-risk premium and health insurance. It is then natural to think that
the high estimate of VSL for the uninsured workers may be related to other types of
risks—in particular, financial risk.
Eeckhoudt and Hammitt (2004) show that aversion to financial loss leads to an
increase in VSL. Some individuals exhibit greater aversion to financial risk, and accordingly, they need to get higher mortality-risk premiums. Specifically, a married
man derives his utility from—in addition to his own consumption—the consumption
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of his spouse (e.g. bequest model). When a work-related accident occurs, his utility decreases. But it decreases further when income loss due to accident reduces
his spouse’s consumption. The same argument applies to health insurance. Health
insurance reduces financial risk. The uninsured could face catastrophic financial
shocks—both in terms of the monetary value of working time losses and the direct
costs of illness—when they are sick. Accordingly, married men, and particularly,
uninsured married men whose utility depends on their spouse’s utility would require
higher wage premium for mortality risk than do single men.
To empirically test this, I split the sample into two groups: married men and
single men. I then estimate wage-risk premiums separately for these two groups with
models 2.9 and 2.10 and use the fixed-effects estimators to control for individual
heterogeneity. The results are presented in Table 2.9. The implied VSLs for both
groups are calculated using the formula 2.11, using the average wage for each group
instead of the mean wage for the full sample. The results are presented in columns 1
and 2 of Table 2.9.
Despite being statistically insignificant, the point estimate of risk premium for
married men is, on average, greater than that of single men. The implied VSL for
married men is $ 9.26 million, which is higher than that of single men (i.e. $ 5.91
million). When I compare the implied VSL for married men to the estimated VSL of
the average worker in Column 4 of Table 2.7, the estimated VSL of married men is
higher than that of the average workers. This evidence may show that married men
are more risk averse: they require higher wage compensation than do single men to
attract them to dangerous jobs.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2.9 report the results for married and single men
respectively when I include health insurance. In general, I observe a similar pattern
to the baseline model in which married men receive higher wage premium for risk
than single men do. However, I observe a striking difference in the implied VSL
for uninsured married men. The implied VSL of uninsured married men is $ 29.05
million, which is far larger than that of any group. The considerable increase in
the estimated VSL following the inclusion of health insurance status apparently is
driven by uninsured married men group. This group may exhibit strong aversion to
financial risk due to the absence of health insurance. This finding lends support to
the theoretical emphasis in Eeckhoudt and Hammitt (2004).
Previously we are concerned on how employer health insurance is measured. In
particular, the PSID does not allow us to distinguish policy holder and dependent.
Thus if the health insurance coverage is mismeasured—e.g. the observed coverage
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is actually the coverage from spouse’s employment, the positive coefficient on EHI
plausibly reflects the fact that the respondent whose health insurance is covered by
his spouse does not pay for EHI. The EHI for single men, however, should provide
a better measure of employer health coverage. Column 4 of of Table 2.9 provides
the estimate of EHI and I find the coefficient on EHI is positive. It suggests that
the positive coefficient on EHI on wage may not be driven by the imperfect measure
in health insurance. However, mismeasurement in health insurance might have an
effect, despite small. Particularly, when we compare the coefficient on EHI between
the sample of married and single men, we find positive, slightly larger and statistically
significant effect of EHI on wage among single men. Meanwhile among married men
the coefficient is not statistically significant at conventional significance level. This
may be some individuals get their coverage from their spouses and thus, the coverage
has limited effect on wage.
2.5.4

Robustness Checks

In this section, I focus on robustness checks for previous estimates. There are two
things that I address here. First is the selection problem that causes both the observed
risk and health coverage are endogenous. However, having two endogenous variables
in a single model may complicate the interpretation of risk and health insurance
parameters. In addition, we may lack valid instrumental variables that affect wages
only through the choice of risk and health insurance. Hence, to address this issue,
I use the sample of job switchers. The underlying assumption is that instrumental
variables, if there is a valid one, should shift both the risk measure and EHI coverage.
Thus, although we do not have valid instrumental variables, changes in the risk
measure and EHI coverage occur, at least, when people change their jobs (or lose
their jobs). Consequently, using the sample of job changers might partially solve
endogeneity issue. The second issue that we discussed previously is potential error in
EHI reporting—that is, we are unable to separate policy holder and dependent. In
previous section, I estimate separate the sample between married and single men with
a notion that the EHI coverage of single men should provide a clean identification
of EHI. However, single men and married men may be systematically different and
the difference could be related to EHI coverage. To tackle this problem, I focus on
married men and estimate separately the sample of married men with working and
non-working spouses. The observed EHI coverage among married men with nonworking spouse suggests that they are policy holders.
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Fixed Effects Estimator Specification Checks
Fixed-effects model permits us to control for person-specific heterogeneity by employing within-transformation of data. However, it comes at the cost of eliminating
cross-sectional variation that provides important information on wage differentials
across occupation-industry groups—i.e. variation that reflects true differences in job
riskiness. Under fixed-effects model, the main source of identification relies on withingroup variation that arises from 1) changes in fatality risk in a given occupationindustry group and 2) job changes resulting in the changes of fatality risk—i.e. workers move to different occupation-industry cells over some periods. Variation coming
from changes in the occupation-industry specific fatality risk could confound estimates of risk premiums if these changes are not systematically reflected in wage
levels. That is, over time workplace safety tends to improve (i.e. fatality risks fall),
and, at the same time, real wages are more likely to increase. I attempt to control
for these trends with year dummies in the model. However, if year dummies do not
fully control for the trends, we may indeed observe a negative relationship between
fatality risk and wage. Another possible confounding factor in fixed-effects model is
that individuals may learn about risks on the job over some periods and switch if
wage compensation for risk is inadequate.22
On health insurance, workers generally stay in jobs that provide health coverage,
and, the effect of health coverage on real wages could also be confounded by the
general trend of increased wage levels.23 Again, year dummies are expected to absorb
this trend. With the panel structure of data, however, the identification of the effect
of EHI on wages comes mainly from changes in health insurance status—i.e. workers
who gain or lose health coverage. Thus, it is likely that health insurance gainers/losers
are also those who change jobs.24
This implies that the fixed effects model—despite controlling for heterogeneity—potentially underestimates VSLs. This is driven by failure to control trends
of increased wages and falling fatality risks. The effect of the confounding factors
on the relationship between health coverage and wages is less clear nevertheless. If
more productive workers are more likely to move to jobs providing health insurance
22
Another possibility is that over time workers may accumulate skills that enable them to cope
with risk of injury
23
Despite mixed evidence, some papers show that EHI reduces worker mobility; this phenomena
is called as job-lock.
24
It is also plausible that an employee who works with the same employer loses health coverage
because of health care costs—e.g. rising health insurance premiums. Yet, Baicker and Chandra
(2006) find that increases in health premiums are compensated with lower wages instead of dropping
off health coverage.
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and higher wages, the effect of EHI coverage on wages in the previous fixed effects
estimator is also biased downward. In this section, I investigate the importance
of job changing status for the wage-risk premium estimates in Tables 2.6 and 2.8.
Specifically, first I estimate risk premiums for job changers while I still control for
unobserved heterogeneity (Schaffner and Spengler, 2010; Kniesner et al., 2012).25 I
then compare the estimated VSLs for job changers with that of workers who never
change jobs. The results are presented in Table 2.10.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2.10 exhibit estimates of risk premiums based on job
change status from the baseline model. Columns 3 and 4 present compensating wage
differentials for the insured and uninsured among job changers. The implied VSL of
job changers in the baseline model is around $ 3 million higher than the estimated
VSL with the standard model presented in Table 2.6. Furthermore, the estimated
VSL of job changers in jobs providing health insurance follows the same pattern as
in the baseline model with the sample of job changers. In particular, there is a general tendency towards falling mortality risks and rising wages among jobs providing
health coverage. Hence, we observe a negative estimated VSL among those who never
change jobs. The wage of non job changers at jobs without health coverage apparently
responds positively to increased fatality risks such that we observe a positive VSL
in Column 4 of Table 2.10. Interestingly, the implied VSL of the uninsured switchers—i.e. non-job changers without health insurance—is slightly lower than that of
uninsured with full sample in Column 4 of Table 2.8. A possible explanation to this
is that job switchers who lose health insurance are also those who are more likely
to accept lower wages, and consequently, receive lower wage compensation for risk
than do the average uninsured workers.26 Although it is also plausible, it is less likely
that job switchers who never have health coverage tend to move to riskier jobs while
accepting lower risk premium.27
The Sample of Married Men
Previously I showed that married men tend to receive a higher risk premium than
do single men. In the model with the interaction term between the fatal risk and
health insurance, I find that the VSL of married men without health insurance is
25
Several papers also use job changers—i.e. displaced workers—to solve endogeneity of health
coverage and then estimate the health insurance-wage tradeoff (Simon, 2001; Lehrer and Pereira,
2007).
26
My estimate does not separate job switchers by those who never have health insurance and
those who lose health insurance due to changing job.
27
This could happen when the unemployment rate is high. Thus, workers are willing to take
riskier jobs with lower risk premium.
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the major contributor to high VSL among the uninsured. Part of the explanation
on this is high risk aversion to non-injury risks among married men—e.g. risk to
financial loss. Splitting the sample between married men and single men also allows
me to minimize the issue created by health insurance coverage information—that
is, I cannot distinguish between policy holder and dependent. Despite splitting the
sample and estimating the model separately, I find that the coefficient on health
insurance status qualitatively similar. A larger magnitude on the coefficient on health
insurance of single men tell us that mismeasurement in EHI status plausibly bias the
coefficient, although the bias seems to be small. However, we could argue that single
men have different characteristics than married men and they may systematically
choose different types of job that are correlated with health coverage and wages. In
that situation, this approach may not yield a better estimate of EHI parameter.
In this section, I use a similar approach but I focus only on married men and divide
the sample into married men with a working spouse and those with a non-working
spouse. The observed EHI coverage among married men with a non-working spouse
implies that they are policy holder. Table 2.11 shows the results with fixed effects.
We see that the implied VSL of married with working spouse is $ 8.3 million which is
lower than the one whose spouses are not working (i.e. $ 28 million). The finding is
consistent with the risk aversion story where the single earner is more risk averse than
dual earners such that he requires higher wage premium for fatal risk. In the model
with the interaction between the fatal risk and health insurance status, we find that
the VSL of the uninsured men whose spouses are not working is the largest among
other groups. This may suggest that this group—i.e. the insured with non-working
spouses—faces greater risk to, among others, financial loss stemming from the cost of
illness and being a single earner. Risk aversion among the group then induces them
to ask very high risk premium.
Moreover, we observe that the coefficient on EHI among both samples are qualitatively similar. The point estimate of the health insurance coefficient is positive
although it is not statistically significant in all samples. The coefficient on EHI is
higher among the sample of married men whose spouses are not at work. As the
observed EHI coverage with this sample reflects the coverage of policy holder, this
seems to suggest that measurement error in health insurance variable brings the coefficient to zero—that is, measurement error may be classical. However, given that
the coefficient on EHI from both samples are not statistically significant, I cautiously
conclude that classical measurement error is the only issue for the health insurance
variable. Overall, using the samples of single men and married men with non-working
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spouses does not change our conclusion.
2.5.5

Some Alternative Hypotheses

In this part, I consider two alternative hypotheses to the findings. In general, the
empirical strategy addresses issues raised by these alternatives. While some plausible
explanations are complementary to facts in this paper, the empirical observation and
findings substantiate our framework.
The first alternative explanation to our findings is that health insurance picks
the effect of workers’ compensation on VSL. Many studies find that inclusion of
workers’ compensation in the hedonic wage model raises estimates of compensating
differentials for risk and thus, VSL (Arnould and Nichols, 1983; Viscusi and Moore,
1987). The reason is that workers’ compensation essentially put employers as the
party that assumes the liability for job-related injuries. Thus, workers’ compensation
is expected to shrink wage-risk premiums. In the absence of workers’ compensation,
risk premiums will be higher while increasing the level of workers’ compensation
benefits reduces wage levels. Different but related issue is about job selection. If
workers’ compensation covers medical expenses as does EHI, the uninsured workers
tend to go to jobs in which the likelihood of getting approval on workers’ compensation
claims is high. Therefore, one may expect that the observed effect of EHI on the rate
of wage-risk tradeoff picks up the influence of workers’ compensation on the hedonic
wage model.
As discussed previously, however, the above hedonic wage models exploit the
capabilities of panel data in controlling for person-specific heterogeneity that may
influence people job decisions involving job risks, EHI coverage, and wages. I do
not specifically control for workers’ compensation in our econometric models for the
reason that the workers’ compensation variable exhibits little variation over time. By
2010, more than half the states have the replacement rate is at 66.66 % (Sengupta
et al., 2011), and it has not changed substantially over years (Kniesner et al., 2012).
Furthermore, the extent to which workers’ compensation vary across states can be
controlled by state and year fixed effects of our models. In addition, many studies do
not find strong evidence that the uninsured use workers’ compensation to get medical
benefits (Card and McCall, 1996; Biddle and Roberts, 2003; Lakdawalla et al., 2007).
In summary, it is less likely that the effect of EHI on wage-risk premiums is affected
by workers’ compensation.
The second plausible explanation is that health insurance is simply a device to
manage multiple risks. Individuals face multiple risks, and, their willingness to reduce
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some risks may depend on the presence of and characteristics of other risks. For
example, a worker in a hazardous working condition could be exposed to pollutants
that has a harmful effect on his health. If he falls ill, he could lose working days,
potential income, and spend dollars for unexpected medical expenses. Thus, facing
risk of reduction in wealth lead him to adjust his behavior at work. For example, he
regularly wear protective measures such as, safety gears at worksite and that action
reduces both risk of illness and financial risk. Eeckhoudt and Hammitt (2001) explore
the effects of competing mortality risks and of financial risks, and predict that under
a certain condition, a positive correlation between the mortality and financial risks
increases VSL. We also see a similar role of health insurance in reducing the risk of
catastrophic financial shocks from unexpected medical expenditures. As discussed in
Section 5.2.1, aversion to financial risk among the uninsured married men leads to
high implied VSL. Therefore, health insurance is simply a device to handle competing
risks and thus, it does not have a productive impact on health.
This explanation is complement the fact that workers trade risk premiums for
health insurance. But it cannot explain overall empirical findings in this paper. If
health insurance is simply a mechanism to reduce financial risk from falling ill, we
should observe a positive relationship between the fatal risk variable and employerprovided health coverage. Specifically, workers in dangerous jobs are more exposed
to hazardous environments that put them at greater risk of illness. All else constant,
these workers should have more incentive to demand for health insurance. The empirical observation and evidence suggest otherwise, that is, workers in dangerous jobs
are less likely to have employment-based health insurance.
2.5.6

Wage premiums for health investment

A salient feature of the framework is labor market frictions that induce firms’ incentive
to pay for employees’ health investment. The framework differs from the equalizing
differences theory, and consequently, has different implications to the wage-health
insurance tradeoff.28 The canonical model of compensating differentials presume a
perfect labor market. Hence, holding other things constant, jobs providing health
insurance should offer lower than average wages: It implies a negative relationship
between health insurance and wages.
28

This paper is not the first one that sees the productivity impact of health insurance. Several
researchers also view that health insurance, or medical expenditures, increases productivity (Fang
and Gavazza, 2011; Dey and Flinn, 2005)
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When labor market is imperfect, the negative relationship between health insurance and wages is not always warranted. For example, under the framework of the
efficiency wage theory, firms may provide greater fringe benefits, including health
insurance, while keeping wages the same to induce employees’ performance. Nevertheless, it is important to highlight that the model is not completely in the opposite
side of the canonical model of compensating differentials. In fact, I argue that the
association between health insurance and wages is conditional on the level of risks.
Beyond some levels of mortality risk, the model shows that I can recover the prediction of the compensating wage theory.
From Table 2.8, fixed effects estimator suggests that the annual wage premium
for health insurance is 4.8%. This premiums is similar to findings in studies using arguably exogenous variation from displaced workers (Simon, 2001; Lehrer and Pereira,
2007). I also find that failure to control for person-specific heterogeneity results in
a potentially upward bias in the estimated wage premium for health insurance. For
example, with POLS, the insured workers earn 16.6 % higher in hourly wage rate than
do the uninsured workers. It is important to note, however, that wage premiums for
health coverage are the premiums for workers in very safe jobs (i.e. Zjk = 0).
The model predicts that the wage premium for health insurance declines as the
mortality risk increases. To show a declining wage premium for health insurance as
the risk of death at work elevates, I calculate the premiums for health insurance for
workers in the bottom 10 percent and the top 10 percent fatality risk. I use the mean
of fatality risk in each group to estimate the premiums. The results are then presented
in Table 2.12. With fixed-effects model reported in column 4 of Table 2.12, I observe
a negative wage premium for health insurance among the top 10 percent although the
point estimate is not statistically significant at 95% confidence level. Despite being
insignificant, this suggests a tradeoff between health insurance and wages, and this
finding confirms the prediction of the equalizing differences theory.
2.6

Conclusion

In this paper I investigate the implications of health insurance provision on wage
premiums for mortality risk at workplace. The model shows that the elevated risk
of death at work reduces the level of health investment made by employers. The
reason is that productivity gains from health decline as working conditions become
hazardous. Accordingly, the insured in risky jobs have to contribute more to the
associated costs of health investment in the form of lower wages: they trade the risk

37

premium for health insurance. The model shows that compensating wage differential
for the insured will be lower than that of the uninsured.
I find that an increase in the mortality risk is associated with a lower probability of EHI coverage. The effect of risk on EHI coverage is statistically significant
but small—i.e. employer-provided health coverage is less sensitive to the elevated
mortality risk. On the estimates of VSLs, I find that controlling for unobserved heterogeneity leads to a reduction in the estimated VSLs by more than 53 %. With the
baseline model accounting of individual heterogeneity, the estimated VSL is $ 7.68
million. Inclusion of health insurance in the baseline model leads to a slightly increase
in the estimated VSLs by 2.5-7.2 %. The increase in the implied VSLs in the model
with health insurance suggests that the VSL is likely to be biased downward when
we omit health insurance status from the standard model. However, the bias seems
to be small due to the low responsiveness of EHI to mortality risk at work. Salient
evidence is heterogeneity in the estimated VSLs stemming from EHI coverage status.
I find a reduction in the estimated VSL of those with health coverage by 26-37 %, depending on econometric specifications. From the model accounting of person-specific
heterogeneity, I find that the implied VSL of the insured is $ 4.87 million while it
is $ 20.87 million for the uninsured. As I investigate further, the high VSL of the
uninsured is driven by uninsured married men who probably exhibit greater aversion
to financial risk, and, require a higher wage premium to attract them to risky jobs.
Finally, I observe the wage-health insurance tradeoff only for workers in risky jobs.
This is consistent with the idea that workers in high risk jobs trade risk premiums
for health coverage.
Moreover, the proposed framework shows that heterogeneity in VSL is driven by
the employer’s incentive to invest—that is correlated by fatal risk—in the employee’s
human capital. However, the employer could induce employee’s productivity through
various means, for example, other fringe benefits such as life insurance or pension.29
Thus, they plausibly have an effect on VSL too and excluding them from the standard
hedonic wage model may bias the estimated VSL. However, our regression results
shows that the bias in VSL from omitting EHI status in the model is small, and,
we may find similar evidence with other fringe benefits—that is, the bias may be
small from omitting other fringe benefits. Despite little bias on VSL, omitting fringe
benefits may bias the coefficient on health insurance status. In particular, if the
employer induce productivity through all types of compensation (both wage and
29
In the framework of the efficient wage hypothesis, the employer could raise wage above average
wages or provide fringe benefits to influence workers’ performance.
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non-wage compensation such as health insurance and pension), the coefficient on
EHI status would be upward bias. On the other hand, if the employer trades off
types of fringe benefits, for example, providing generous health insurance coverage
at cost of lower pension fund, we should expect downward bias in the coefficient on
health insurance coverage. This conjecture, however, departs from an assumption that
fringe benefits are used to induce worker productivity, leading to higher wages—that
is, fringe benefits are positively correlated with wages. When we depart from the
standard theory of equalizing differences, the opposite prediction would occur.

Copyright c Teguh Yudo Wicaksono, 2015.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
Variables

Mean

Standard Deviation

23.44
2.99
4.23
0.82
13.64
0.76
0.17
0.91
0.82
39.78

14.92
0.57
6.63
0.39
2.20
0.43
0.38
0.29
0.39
10.48

Occupation groups, the 1997/99 period
Executive & Managerial
Professional
Technicians
Sales
Administrative Support
Services
Precision Production Craft
Machine Operators
Transportation
Handlers and Laborers

0.21
0.17
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.09
0.20
0.08
0.06
0.04

0.41
0.37
0.20
0.21
0.24
0.28
0.40
0.28
0.24
0.20

Occupation groups, the 2003/07 period
Management, business, and financial
Professional
Services
Sales
Administrative Support
Construction & Extraction
Installation & Maintenance
Production
Transportation

0.18
0.20
0.10
0.07
0.07
0.11
0.09
0.10
0.08

0.38
0.40
0.31
0.25
0.25
0.31
0.29
0.31
0.27

Real hourly wage
Log real hourly wage
Fatality rate
EHI(1=take-up)
Years of schooling
Marital status (1 =married)
Union (1=member)
Race(1=white)
EHI(1=take-up)
Age

Number of observations

10,254

Source: PSID.
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Table 2.2: Types of Coverage
Coverage

Frequency

Percent

No Insurance
Employer provided health insurance
Private health insurance purchased directly
Medicare
Medi-Gap
Medicaid/Medical Asst./ Medi- Cal
Military health care
Champus/Tricare/Champ-VA
Indian Health Insurance
State-sponsored health plan
Other
Unknown

1,265
8,373
310
11
78
40
63
7
26
10
69
2
10,254

12.34
81.66
3.02
0.11
0.76
0.39
0.61
0.07
0.25
0.10
0.67
0.02
100.00

Source: PSID

Table 2.3: Between- and Within-Group Variation for Industry by
Occupation Fatality rates
Sample

Overall Within-group
variance
variance

Between-group
variance

All sample

42.88

13.28

29.60

Never-change job

42.26

6.53

35.73

Ever-change job

43.06

15.90

27.16

Source: PSID

Table 2.4: Between- and Within-Group Variation for Industry by
Occupation EHI coverage
Sample

Overall Within-group
variance
variance

Between-group
variance

All sample

0.145

0.047

0.098

Never-change job

0.211

0.037

0.174

Ever-change job

0.111

0.051

0.059

Source: PSID
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Table 2.5: Marginal Effects of Risk of Fatal Injury on EHI
Coverage
Variable
Fatality rate

LPM

Probit

CRE Probit

-0.0016*
(0.0009)

-0.0018**
(0.0008)

-0.0009
(0.0008)

Mean of fatality rate

Observations
R-squared
Log-likelihood

-0.0021**
(0.0011)
10,254
0.0146

10,254

10,254

-4299

-3941

Note: Dependent variable is a binary variable indicating employer
health insurance coverage (EHI). Each model controls for union
status, marital status, a dummy for spouse working status, age,
age squared, and 1 digit industries and occupations. For Probit
additional control variables are years of schooling and race (i.e.
white). Variables in CRE Probit are the same as in Probit, but I
control for the mean of fatality rate, the mean of age, and the mean
of age squared. Standard errors are in parentheses *** significant
at 1%, **5%,* 10% Source: PSID

Table 2.6: Estimates of Wage Premium for Risk: the Baseline Specification
POLS

Random
Effects

Between
Effects

Fixed
Effects

Fatality rate

0.00482***
(0.000820)

0.00224***
(0.000731)

0.00495***
(0.00170)

0.00164*
(0.000949)

Observations
R-squared

10,254
0.472

10,254
0.3642

10,254
0.522

10,254
0.233

Implied VSL (millions)

22.60
(3.85)

10.52
(3.43)

23.23
(7.97)

7.68
(4.45)

Variables

Note: Dependent variable is natural log of real hourly wage. Standard errors are in
parentheses. Pooled OLS and Fixed effects estimators are robust to heteroscedasticity. Random effects, Fixed effects, and between effects model control for union
status, marital status, a dummy for spouse working status, age, age squared, 1 digit
industries and occupations, states of residence and year dummy . For pooled OLS
additional independent variables are years of education and race (i.e white is 1 and
0 otherwise). *** significant at 1%, **5%,* 10%. Source PSID.
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Table 2.7: Estimates of Wage Premium for Risk with Health Insurance
POLS

Random
Effects

Between
Effects

0.00506***
(0.0008)

0.00236***
(0.0007)

0.00531*** 0.00166*
(0.0017)
(0.0009)

0.134***
(0.012)

0.0644***
(0.0094)

0.147***
(0.018)

0.0309**
(0.012)

Observations
R-squared

10,254
0.479

10,254
0.4552

10,254
0.530

10,254
0.234

Implied VSL (millions)

23.74
(3.83)

11.08
(3.42)

24.90
(7.9)

7.87
(4.44)

Variables

Fatality rate

EHI

Fixed
Effects

Note: Dependent variable is natural log of real hourly wage. Standard errors are in
parentheses. Pooled OLS and Fixed effects estimators are robust to heteroscedasticity. Random effects, Fixed effects, and between effects model control for union
status, marital status, a dummy for spouse working status, age, age squared, 1
digit industries and occupations, states of residence and year dummy . For pooled
OLS additional independent variables are years of education and race (i.e white is
1 and 0 otherwise). *** significant at 1%, **5%,* 10%. Source PSID.
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Table 2.8: Estimates of Wage Premium for Risk with the Interaction between
Health Insurance and Risk
POLS

Random
Effects

Between
Effects

Fixed
Effects

0.00986***
(0.00151)

0.00567***
(0.00120)

0.00911***
(0.00237)

0.00445***
(0.00164)

0.166***
(0.0157)

0.0860***
(0.0113)

0.178***
(0.0227)

0.0483***
(0.0152)

-0.00611***
(0.00153)

-0.00420***
(0.00121)

-0.00576**
(0.00253)

-0.00341**
(0.00164)

Observations
R-squared

10,254
0.480

10,254
0.3648

10,254
0.531

10,254
0.235

Implied VSL
without EHI (million)

44.70
(7.10)

26.60
(5.64)

42.72
(11.12)

20.87
(7.71)

Implied VSL
with EHI (million)

17.55
(4.02)

6.91
(3.63)

15.71
(8.87)

4.87
(4.66)

Variables

Fatality rate

EHI

Fatality rate X EHI

Note: Dependent variable is natural log of real hourly wage. Standard errors are in
parentheses. Pooled OLS and Fixed effects estimators are robust to heteroscedasticity.
Random effects, Fixed effects, and between effects model control for union status,
marital status, a dummy for spouse working status, age, age squared, 1 digit industries
and occupations, states of residence and year dummy. For pooled OLS additional
independent variables are years of education and race (i.e white is 1 and 0 otherwise).
*** significant at 1%, **5%,* 10% Source PSID.
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Table 2.9: Estimates of Wage Premium for Risk by Marital Status
Baseline
Married
Single

Interaction
Married
Single

0.00182
(0.00130)

0.00575**
(0.00251)

0.00218
(0.00238)

EHI

0.0304
(0.0206)

0.0469*
(0.0251)

Fatality rate X EHI

-0.00437*
(0.00243)

-0.000701
(0.00237)

7,746
0.211

2,508
0.325

Implied VSL without EHI (million)

29.17
(12.69)

7.76
(8.49)

Implied VSL with EHI (million)

7.02
(6.67)

5.15
(6.06)

Variables
Fatality rate

0.00166
(0.00161)

Observations
R-squared

7,746
0.210

2,508
0.322

Implied VSL (million)

9.26
(6.56)

5.91
(5.76)

Note: Dependent variable is natural log of real hourly wage. Standard errors are in parentheses. The reported coefficients are fixed effects estimators that are robust to heteroscedasticity. I control for union status, a dummy for spouse working status if married, age, age
squared, 1 digit industries and occupations, states of residence and year dummy. *** significant at 1%, **5%,* 10% Source PSID.
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Table 2.10: Estimates of Wage Premium for Risk By Job Change Status
Variables

Fatality rate

Baseline
Interaction
Ever
Never
Ever
Never
Change Job Change Job Change Job Change Job
0.00231**
(0.000947)

-0.00145
(0.00260)

0.00411**
(0.00202)

0.00227
(0.00344)

EHI

0.0506***
(0.0184)

0.0387
(0.0261)

Fatality rate X EHI

-0.00218
(0.00212)

-0.00433
(0.00280)

5,604
0.233

4,650
0.284

Implied VSL
without EHI (million)

19.26
(9.44)

10.66
(16.14)

Implied VSL
with EHI (million)

9.04
(4.72)

-9.68
(12.28)

Observations
R-squared

5,604
0.231

4,650
0.283

Implied VSL (million)

10.81
(4.44)

-6.79
(12.21)

Note: Dependent variable is natural log of real hourly wage. Standard errors are in parentheses.
The reported coefficients are fixed effects estimators that are robust to heteroscedasticity. I
control for union status, a dummy for spouse working status if married, age, age squared, 1
digit industries and occupations, states of residence and year dummy. *** significant at 1%,
**5%,* 10% Source PSID.
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Table 2.11: Estimates of Wage Premium for Risk by Spouse Working Status
Working
Wife

Non-Working
Wife

Working
Wife

Non-Working
Wife

Fatality rate

0.00167
(0.00160)

0.00523**
(0.00261)

0.00552*
(0.00311)

0.0141**
(0.00596)

EHI

0.00870
(0.0186)

0.0109
(0.0358)

0.0291
(0.0244)

0.0664
(0.0436)

-0.00425
(0.00291)

-0.0101
(0.00625)

Variables

Fatality rate X EHI

Constant

0.420
(0.838)

1.979
(1.552)

0.434
(0.833)

2.044
(1.569)

Observations
R-squared

5,943
0.210

1,803
0.264

5,943
0.210

1,803
0.272

Implied VSL

8.30
(8.0)

28.00
(13.9)

Implied VSL
without EHI

27.4
(15.4)

75.2
(31.9)

Implied VSL
with EHI

6.30
(7.97)

21.37
(15.77)

Note: Dependent variable is natural log of real hourly wage. Standard errors are
in parentheses. The reported coefficients are fixed effects estimators that are robust
to heteroscedasticity. I control for union status, age, age squared, 1 digit industries
and occupations, states of residence and year dummy. *** significant at 1%, **5%,*
10% Source PSID.

48

Table 2.12: Annual wage premium for health insurance ($)
Mean

POLS

Random
Effects

Between Effect
Effects

Fixed Effect
Effects

The bottom 10 %
of fatality rate

7795.20
(735.89)

4033.99
(529.42)

8330.70
(1065.52)

2262.56
(712.17)

The top 10 %
of fatality rate

2235.85
(1079.69)

217.49
(921.16)

3093.55
(1872.10)

-839.61
(1210.33)

Note: Wage premiums are calculated from equation 2.12. I use the mean of the
bottom and top 10 % of fatality rate. Standard errors are in parentheses. Source:
PSID
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Chapter 3 Mortality Risk Premiums and Employer-Provided Health
Insurance in Universal Health Care: Evidence from the UK

3.1

Introduction

Over the last three decades, a vast body of research has documented evidence that
individuals are rewarded for taking work-specific risks, such as injury and fatality.
Viscusi and Aldy (2003) review studies suggesting that individuals are voluntary
willing to take risks at workplace in return for monetary reward. That is, they
received a wage premium for higher risk of fatality they encounter at workplace. This
evidence has become the bedrock for various job-safety policies in the US. This is, in
part, because the wage premium essentially reflects a society’s valuation of risk, and,
consequently, the benefit of job safety policies. Economists have developed the value
of a statistical life (VSL) to quantify individuals’ willingness to pay for risk reduction
and used VSL to assess the benefits of environmental regulations and workplace safety.
It is obvious that a society’s valuation of risk depends on its characteristics. Higher
income countries tend to have higher VSL that do poor countries (Viscusi and Aldy,
2003). Relatively older population are more likely to have lower VSL than are middle
aged population (Aldy and Viscusi, 2008). These differences in VSL across the population would have policy implications. In particular, as improving safety is costly
and may be valued differently across different populations, safety policies should take
into account heterogeneity in VSL. In the US, the US Department of Transportation
takes into income differences and makes adjustment VSL amount in accordance to
individual incomes (Viscusi, 2010).
Heterogeneity in VSL may stem from workplace characteristics or other policies
as well. In places where workers receive generous workers’ compensation, they accept
relatively lower wage premium for risk (Viscusi and Moore, 1987). This is conceptually can be explained as employers may compensate workers for risks they are taking
either with additional wage payments (i.e. ex ante compensation) or workers’ compensation benefits (i.e. ex post compensation). However, employers may provide non
cash compensation in order to attract workers to work in unpleasant jobs such as
health insurance or other fringe benefits (Dorsey, 1983).
Thus so far the literature has no extensive discussion yet on the effect of desirable
job packages, such as employer-sponsored health insurance, on the estimated VSL.1
1

I am only aware one paper that discusses the role of fringe benefits, including health insurance
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The importance of employer-provided health insurance in the analyses of money-risk
tradeoff is not whether health coverage directly improves job safety or compensates
injured employees, like what workers’ compensation does in the US. As workplace
safety in most developed countries has improved substantially over decades, the rate
of fatal accident at work has declined to an unprecedented level. Overall, occupational
mortality rates in developed countries are much lower than they were in previous
decades.2 But at the same time, risks of illness and the associated costs increase
substantially. Thus, individuals may accept a lower risk premium for health insurance.
Furthermore, the wage-health insurance tradeoff would have impact on the estimated VSL when workers’ valuations on health insurance differ along different levels
of job riskiness. For example, if safety is normal good, more productive workers would
seek safer occupations. However, more productive workers that tend to earn higher
incomes may value more health insurance than are less productive workers. On the
other hand, workers who go to riskier occupations reveal that they are more tolerant
to risks, including risk of death or illness, and, may value less the benefits of health
insurance. At the same time, working environments where risks to human health
are high make the costs of health insurance are high too. Thus, both employers and
workers in risky occupations are less willing to invest in employees’ health through
health insurance. As a result, the rate of tradeoff between wages and health insurance is higher for workers in risky jobs than safe jobs. Now, as workers in riskier
occupations prefer full wage compensation, we may expect that workers with health
insurance that are mostly located in safe jobs would accept lower wage premium than
do workers in risky jobs.
Using the US data, I find evidence that workers trade risk premium for health
insurance. In particular, workers with health coverage receive lower wage premium
for the elevated mortality risk at work than do workers without health insurance. It
implies that the VSL of the former is lower than that of the latter. In the context
of the US, we may expect that the tradeoff between the mortality risk premium and
health insurance exists given that the US is a country with a strong link between
health insurance and labor market outcomes—i.e. the majority of the US employees
rely on employment-based health coverage. Thus, the adjustment in the estimated
VSL that takes into account the tradeoff between ‘value of life’ and the value of health
benefits is relevant to policy analyses.
I extend the framework from the US into the context of the United Kingdom (the
on the wage premium for risk, that is, the paper of Dorsey (1983).
2
In the US, the overall fatality rate is 3.4 per 100,000 workers (BLS 2014). It is 1.2 in the United
Kingdom (UK HSE 2014).
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UK) labor market. Different from the US, the UK has universal health care system
in which all eligible individuals (almost all the UK citizens) are covered by publiclyprovided health care. Despite the low coverage of private medical insurance including employer-provided health benefits, investigating the effect of employer-provided
health insurance on VSL is warranted for several reasons. First of all, the extent
to which employer-provided health insurance (henceforth EHI) has impacts on labor market outcomes is less known in countries with a universal health care system.
This paper provides evidence that private medical insurance in the universal health
care system affects the risk premium. Second, private medical insurance in the UK
continues to grow, and, corporate health insurance market—i.e. employer-sponsored
health insurance—has been growing relatively fast in recent years (Foubister et al.,
2006). Most of the empirical research on private medical insurance in the UK have
been devoted to exploring determinants affecting demand for health benefits, and
little attention is paid to understand the implication of health benefits to workers
wages.
This paper contributes to the literature in three ways. Firstly, this paper is among
the first research that systematically elaborates the effect of employer-sponsored
health insurance on the wage-risk tradeoff under the universal health care. Secondly, the paper also contributes to the literature of health economics in general as it
provides evidence that employer-paid health insurance, even in universal health care,
has implications to labor market. The third contribution is that my paper reevaluates
findings in the estimated VSL for the UK labor markets. Previous papers find very
high estimated VSLs compared to other developed countries. As argued by Viscusi
and Aldy (2003), such high VSL based from the UK labor market could not be attributed to income effect as the UK income level was not substantially higher than
that of other developed countries. In this paper, I show that the implied VSL based
from the UK data is actually within the range of the estimated VSLs found from the
US labor data. Hence, the considerable high VSL seems to be driven by failure to
control individual heterogeneity that affects both wage levels and job riskiness.
Using data from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), I find that workers in risky jobs are less likely to receive employer-provided health insurance. The
negative effect of mortality risk on the likelihood of being covered by EHI is small
but statistically significant. An increase in the fatality rate by 1 per 100,000 leads
to a reduction of approximately 2.1 % in employer-provided health coverage. This
implies that that employer-provided health coverage is less responsive to changes in
the mortality risk.
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Perusal of compensating wage differentials for risk suggests that failing to control
for unobserved individual heterogeneity leads to an upward biased of VSL. Models
accounting of individual heterogeneity reduce estimates of compensating differentials
for risk—relative to cross-section estimator—by 68-89 %. In particular, the estimated
VSL with fixed-effects model is £7.73 million. In the US $, this value is approximately
equal to $ 11.6 million (2010 $). The estimate puts the estimated VSL based on the
UK data within the range of estimated VSLs in the US (Kniesner et al., 2012).
Inclusion of health insurance in the baseline model leads to a slightly increase
in the estimated VSLs by 7.3 %. The increase in VSLs in the model with health
insurance suggests that the VSL is likely to be biased downward when we omit health
insurance status from the standard model. However, the bias seems to be small due
to the low responsiveness of EHI to mortality risk at work.
Furthermore, there is evidence of heterogeneity in the estimated VSL stemming
from EHI coverage status. I find that workers without employer-sponsored health
insurance receive a higher wage premium for mortality risk, implying a higher VSL
for this group.3 Specifically, interacting employer health insurance status with fatal
risk increases the coefficient of risk by 63.25 %. This evidence is qualitatively similar
to what I find in the US.
I find that the risk premium for workers with health insurance is negative, resulting in a negative VSL. This is inconsistent with the standard hedonic theory.
I propose several explanations. First, this may be caused by universal health care
system. Private medical insurance, including employer-purchased health insurance,
offers access to health services that are also provided under the National Health
Service (the NHS)—i.e the UK main public health care provider. Thus, providing
additional health coverage while publicly-provided health care is available at no cost
at service point would add costs to employers, particularly employers in industries
with high levels of fatal risk.4 Consequently, employers pass full costs of health benefits to workers. At the same time, workers who value the benefits of private medical
insurance are willing to pay for it. Second, there are non classical measurement errors
that are correlated with risks and other covariates. Several papers have attributed
distinct results of VSL estimates from the UK data, including the negative risk premium to measurement error (see Viscusi and Aldy (2003) and Hintermann et al.
(2010)).
3

Despite not having employer-provided health insurance, under the universal health care all
workers are eligible to publicly-provided healthcare.
4
There is no cost at the service point. However the UK public healthcare is funded through
general taxation.
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In a comparative perspective, findings from the UK are qualitatively similar to
those prevailing in the US labor market. That is, employer-provided health insurance
reduces risk-premium. The effect of health coverage on the valuation of mortality
risk at workplace is less well known in VSL literature. This suggests that employersponsored medical benefits have impacts on wage levels and the risk premium, a
somewhat surprising result given that the UK does not have a strong link between
health insurance and employment like in the US.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses related literature while section 3 discusses the institutional setting of health insurance in the
UK. Analytical framework is discussed in Section 4. Section 5 describes econometric
implications derived from the framework. Section 6 covers the estimation results and
conclusion is in section 7.
3.2

Related Literature

In general, variation in VSL estimates derived from labor market data can be attributed to both unobserved and observed variables. Much work has been done in
order to deal with unobservables that could be correlated with injury risks but are not
easily to capture from data. Moreover, workers are not randomly assigned to jobs.
The theory of compensating differentials for risks implies that workers would sort to
jobs that fit with their taste for risk. When the unobserved characteristics of workers
systematically affect worker productivity and earnings, they influence workers’ job
decision. For example, a cool-headed worker who is able to work more productively
in dangerous jobs would go to jobs with high risk levels (Garen, 1988). As a result,
failing to handle unobserved characteristics results in biased estimates of premiums
for risk. Using an instrumental variables approach in order to address this concern,
Garen (1988) finds twofold increase in a mortality risk premium from the standard
hedonic model with OLS.
The increase in wage premiums when taking into account unobserved productivity
is also supported by subsequent theoretical findings in Hwang et al. (1992). They show
that failing to account for unobserved heterogeneity may underestimate premiums of
mortality risk, and potentially result in a negative coefficient of risk variable. Among
studies focused on the US labor market, few studies confirm the conjecture of Hwang
et al. (1992). There are, however, some exceptions with studies using data from the
UK labor markets.
Contrary to Hwang et al. (1992), Shogren and Stamland (2002) argue that un-
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observed productivity may lead to the opposite conclusion. They posit that workers
in risky jobs reveal themselves to have the ability to avoid injury, while those who
are less able to avoid injury choose less risky jobs. As a result, failing to handle
unobservables leads to overestimated wage premiums for risk. Recent studies employing longitudinal data confirm the theoretical findings in Shogren and Stamland
(2002). Kniesner et al. (2012) use Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and find
a significant reduction in the risk premiums associated with a method accounting
for unobservables. Hintermann et al. (2010) employing British panel data also find
qualitatively similar results as in Shogren and Stamland (2002).
Regarding the VSL research in the UK, Marin and Psacharopoulos (1982) are
among the first researchers using labor market data in the UK to estimate mortality
risk premiums. They find the estimated VSL for the UK workers about £0.6 million
in 1975. Using relatively new data, Arabsheibani and Marin (2000) observe that the
magnitude of VSL is far larger, and, nearly triple compared to their earlier study in
Marin and Psacharopoulos (1982). It is unclear, however, whether higher VSL from a
recent estimate reflects the rising value of longevity or some other problems related to
endogeneity of risk measures. In this study, Arabsheibani and Marin (2000) estimate
wage premiums using cross-section data and, thus, the ability to control for latent
variables that could be correlated with the risk variable may be limited.
Because of data limitation, earlier studies on mortality risk premiums in the UK
employ cross-sectional data. Recent research use panel data and come up with conclusions that the high estimated of VSL from cross-section estimators may be due
to failure to control unobserved heterogeneity (Kniesner et al., 2012). Using the
British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), Hintermann et al. (2010) employ various
econometric techniques to address problems typically associated with the hedonic
wage model. They find evidence of compensating wage differentials under restrictive
assumptions, that is, no unobserved heterogeneity and strict exogeneity in the risk
variable. Utilizing models that allow for heterogeneity, however, there is no evidence
of the risk premium. It is important to note that low within-variation in the risk
variable in their study (Hintermann et al., 2010) may contribute to the absence of
wage premiums from panel data.
In addition to unobserved heterogeneity, some studies also reveal that mortality
risk premiums vary depending on observed worker characteristics such as gender (Hersch, 1998) and age (Aldy and Viscusi, 2008). Theoretically speaking, it is possible
that the wage premiums differ for different types of workers as individuals may encounter different wage offers. A wage offer curve also depends on demand side. Thus,
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the characteristics of workplace influence the wage-risk tradeoffs as well. Union is a
striking example. Many studies document that union jobs earn a higher wage premium for risk they face than do similar workers in non-union jobs (Thaler and Rosen,
1976; Viscusi and Moore, 1987; Dorsey and Walzer, 1983; Smith, 1983; Biddle and
Zarkin, 1988; Garen, 1988). An explanation to this is that unionized workers are
more able to bargain for better safety workplace and wages.
In a comparative perspective, risk premium estimates in the UK are generally
higher than that of other developed countries (Viscusi and Aldy, 2003). This is even
after considering the levels of income per capita. While the level of risk in the UK is
the lowest among developed countries, high returns to risks would require very high
income effects. That is, high-income workers would demand considerable amounts of
wage premium to take an additional risk. Yet the per capita income in the UK is not
substantially higher than incomes of other developed countries.
This paper takes into account health insurance status into the canonical hedonic
wage model. Similar to union status, inclusion of health coverage status in the hedonic wage model departs from the notion that there are differences in characteristics
between jobs that provide health insurance and those without it. Importantly, the
differences systematically affect wage levels. Lehrer and Pereira (2007) show that
returns to schooling are substantially larger in jobs with health insurance. In fact,
they show that health insurance provision has affected wage inequality (Lehrer and
Pereira, 2007). Meanwhile the extensive literature in health economics has shown
strong links between health insurance and employment (Currie and Madrian, 1999;
Gruber, 2000). The literature of health economics in the UK has not much explored
this area. Most of the empirical research on private medical insurance has been devoted to exploring the demand for private health insurance and its determinants.
Many studies point out that the growth of private health insurance market in the
UK is triggered by relatively lower quality of public health services, such as the long
waiting lists of major health treatments in public health providers (Besley et al., 1999;
Propper et al., 2001; Wallis, 2004).
3.3

Private Health Insurance in the UK

The UK operates a mixed system of health care that combines public and private
participation on both the financing and delivery of health care. Public health care
providers are managed under the National Health Service (NHS). The NHS purchases
health services from both publicly owned and private health care providers (Foubister
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et al., 2006). As is under the system of universal health coverage, a large share of
health care expenditures are from public funds. In addition, there are also private
funds that come from private health insurance (PHI) and out-of-pocket spending.
Although there are two types of financing, the government regulates a separation
between public and private finance streams. Public funds are allowed to flow to
both public and private health care providers. That is, in some situations the NHS
purchases health services from privately-owned providers. Despite receiving public
funds through the NHS, private institutions providing services to the NHS cannot
mix private revenue and public revenue for the same NHS-contracted service.5 On
the other hand, private funds cannot flow to public providers. In other words, private
funds are limited only to private providers, such as independent hospitals or hospitals
that are part of private hospital groups. From this context, we see that private health
insurance (PHI) essentially gives individuals access to private hospitals and thus adds
more options to health care services.
Despite the dominant role of public funds, the UK has witnessed growing private
health expenditures since the 1990s. Private health spending account for almost
20% of all expenditures on health care and part of the increase in the spending is
from PHI (Foubister et al., 2006; Wallis, 2004). Interestingly, PHI continues to grow
although privately-provided health care services generally duplicates many of the
services provided by the NHS. Many address the increase in PHI to quality gap or,
at least perception about it, between public and private providers. For example, the
length of waiting lists for treatment in public providers is considered the major factor
of PHI growth (Besley et al., 1999; Propper et al., 2001; Wallis, 2004). Compared to
the NHS, PHI is more attractive because the privately insured can get faster access
to treatment and has a wider choice of specialists, treatment facilities and timing of
treatment (Foubister et al., 2006; Wallis, 2004).
Regarding health insurance markets, individuals purchase private medical insurance in two health insurance markets, namely, the corporate market and the individual market. In the corporate market, employers purchase health insurance on behalf
of their employees and, thus, health insurance is provided as part of a non-pecuniary
benefit. While the majority of employers providing medical benefits bear the costs associated with health insurance premium, only about 7 % of company schemes require
the contribution of employees to the premium (AON Hewitt, 2013). In the corporate
health insurance market, there is typically no medical underwriting, and, the health
5
For example, a general practitioner serves a patient under NHS contract. The general practitioner is not allowed to provide similar services for the same patient with private funds.
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insurance premium is generally experience-rated. Different from the corporate market, in the individual market and the market for small companies, health insurance is
underwritten. That is, the insurer companies assess health risks of enrollees, decide
risks for which they are responsible, and typically exclude all pre-existing conditions
from coverage. The difference between corporate and individual markets is more related to the size of risk pools. As we also see in the US, corporates generally could
provide relatively low cost of health coverage due to bigger risk pools.
In spite of having private medical coverage, individuals still have access to the
NHS services that are mostly free at service points. Subscribers to PHI essentially
have “dual health coverage”. It is intriguing to observe why the majority of employers
providing medical benefits pay the costs while the alternative health care at no cost
to them is available. A plausible explanation is that private medical insurance may
benefit not only employees but also employers. A survey of corporates regarding
reasons for providing medical benefits to employees shed light as to why employers
are willing to pay full amount of health insurance premiums. As we can see from
Table 4.1, productivity-related reasons are the major motivation.6 If productivity
from health is conditional on job riskiness, it is then natural to ask whether the
incentive of employer to pay the costs of health insurance is affected by risk levels as
well.
Employment-based health insurance in the UK is provided as a fringe benefit. Different from the US, however, employer-provided health insurance in the UK is taxable
benefit (Foubister et al., 2006). There are two schemes of health insurance provision:
1) partially paid health insurance coverage and 2) fully paid coverage. Besley et al.
(1999) note that jobs providing higher wages are more likely to provide health insurance, particularly jobs that require the sort of specialized professional worker. That
is, the advantages of private medical insurance that plausibly minimize disruption to
work schedules due to faster and better care may incentivize certain employers with
specialized workers. Table 3.2 displays sectoral patterns of health insurance coverage
in our sample, with employment-based coverage prevalent in mining and quarrying,
and financial services.
3.4

Conceptual framework

In this paper, I extend the model of my second chapter into the universal health
care environment. The main premise of the framework is that health is a form of
6
We can include the following motivations as the productivity-related reason, that is, 1) getting
staff back to work quickly, 2) increasing productivity and 3) reducing sickness-absence costs.
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general human capital. Similar to other forms of human capital, health increases
labor productivity.7 Healthy individuals experience shorter sick days (Pinheiro and
Dizioli, 2012), and, abler to avoid occupational injuries. In this view, health can
be seen as an input for production and health insurance, or medical expenditures in
general, is health investment.
Current health investments affects the productivity surpluses of future employment relationship. That is, both workers and employers would enjoy productivity
gains from health when they stay together. When the labor market is perfect, a
worker could move to another firm at no cost, taking all the return to health investments.8 Thus, the current employer cannot recover the costs of the investments. In
the perfect labor market, therefore, employers are not willing to invest in employees’
health. However, when outside opportunities for the worker are worse than the wage
offer of the current firm following the health investments, the worker is less willing
to move to the alternative firm. The gap between the wage offer of the current firm
and the outside opportunities reflects an imperfect labor market.9 Hence, employers
can capture the surpluses and recoup the associated costs of health investment only
when the labor market is imperfect. That is, frictions provide firms with incentives
to invest in their workers’ health (Fang and Gavazza, 2011). As shown in Acemoglu
and Pischke (1999), the more distorted labor markets, the more incentives firms have
to provide health investments.10
Despite inducing worker productivity, the extent to which health insurance improves productivity is constrained by firms’ underlying technology that is tied to
occupational hazards. Hazardous working environments have negative impacts on
human health. Workers who have constant exposures to carcinogens or dangerous
chemical substances have higher likelihood of getting ill and their health would deteriorate over time. Thus, health as human capital may be far less productive when
the rate of occupational hazard is increasing. Another implication is that health care
costs for workers in dangerous jobs would be high as the workers are more likely to
get sick. Consequently, firms are less likely to pay for health investment when the
probability of death is high. This model implies that the extent to which employers
are willing to provide private medical insurance depends largely on 1) labor market
frictions and 2) the levels of job riskiness.
7

This idea is similar to Fang and Gavazza (2011) and Tompa (2002).
In a perfectly labor market, the worker is the residual claimant of health investments
9
Recall that under a competitive labor market, wage offers are the same across all firms.
10
Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) also provide various mechanisms that leads to the gap between
the wage offer of the current firm and alternative offers.
8
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This framework, however, departs from the context of the US labor market in
which the majority of workers rely on employment-based health coverage. In the
UK, all eligible workers are covered by publicly provided health care. Thus, there
are differences in the relationship between health insurance and employment between
the US and the UK. However, the context of health care institution in the UK does
not alter substantially the implications of the model. The availability of publicly
provided health care would reduce employers’ incentives to provide health benefits
to their employees. The universal health care may also reduce frictions arising from
health investment, and thus, we return to the situation of a perfect labor market in
which workers pay for their own health investments.
In summary, the model generates two predictions that can be tested empirically.
First, firms with high rates of fatal injury are less likely to provide health insurance.
The second prediction is that, as the provision of health coverage is conditional on risk
levels, workers receiving health coverage would trade risk premium for health benefits.
It implies that the VSL of workers with employer-provided medical insurance is lower
than that of their counterpart without the insurance.
3.5
3.5.1

Data and Econometric specifications
Data

I use data from the British Household Panel Survey (BPHS). The BHPS collected
information on a sample of the UK households annually from 1991 to 2008 (i.e. 18
waves). Employment data in the BHPS covered information on occupations, earning,
education, tenure with the present employer, private health insurance coverage, and
marital status. In this paper, I use the BHPS data from wave 12 to wave 17, which
corresponds to the years of 2002-2007. Moreover, the BHPS also provided detailed
information on health insurance coverage. I am able to identify respondents who are
policy holders or dependents. We are also able to get information on the payment
sources of private health insurance coverage. Specifically, there are three payment
sources in BHPS data: 1 workers pay the coverage directly, 2 employers pay the
coverage by deducting wages, and 3 employers fully pay the coverage. I define that
a worker is covered by employer-sponsored health insurance if the coverage payment
is in condition 2 or 3. I include condition 2 into the category of workers with EHI
because the wage reduction compensating for EHI may not be one-for-one, that is,
one pound sterling cash compensation does not necessarily compensate for one pound
sterling value of health insurance. However, I use only condition 3 in robustness checks
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to see whether the estimation is sensitive to the definition of EHI.
Regarding the fatality variable, I employ fatality data from the UK Health and
Safety Executive (HSE) that collects fatal injury rates at two-digit major industries
annually. However, I use a two year average fatality rate in order to avoid large swings
in fatality rates. For example, for the fatality rate in 2005, I use the average fatality
rates of 2004 and 2005. The use of average fatality rates is common in many studies
on VSL (Kniesner et al., 2012; Hintermann et al., 2010).
To make empirical results comparable with previous studies(Arabsheibani and
Marin, 2000; Hintermann et al., 2010), furthermore, I pursue the same approach
in constructing the sample. I focus on full-time male workers aged 20-65 living in
England, Scotland, and Wales. I exclude Northern Ireland because UK HSE data do
not cover the region. Similar to the US, I exclude self-employment. I also exclude
farmers, agriculture sector, firefighters, police officers, persons in the Armed Forces
and security personnel from the sample. Following a norm in the literature of VSL
in the UK, moreover, I use annual labor income per year instead of hourly wage
(Hintermann et al., 2010).
Table 4.2 presents the summary statistics of the UK sample. Real annual labor
income in the UK sample is £27,480 at the 2010 price level. The fatality rate in the
UK is substantially lower than the one in the US, that is, 1.15 per 100,000 workers.
As we may expect, there is a striking difference between the US and the UK in
regard to employer-sponsored health insurance. In the UK where the health care
system is universal and all individuals are covered by National Health Service (NHS),
the percentage of workers with employer-sponsored health insurance is small. In our
sample, 17.5 % of the UK workers are covered by employer provided health coverage
while it is around 82% from the US sample.
3.5.2

Econometric specifications

In this section, I present econometric specifications aimed at testing the main implications of the framework. I begin with the first implication of the framework,
namely, jobs with high risk of fatal injury are less likely to provide health insurance.
Ideally, one would use premium costs borne by firms. However, the BHPS does not
provide such costs and we only observe health coverage status. With these data at
my disposal, I estimate the following regression to test the first hypothesis.
Hijt = ci + δZjt + X ijt β + εijt
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(3.1)

Hijt is health insurance take-up for worker i (i = 1,. . . , N ) in industry j (j
=1,. . . ,J) at time t ( t = 1,. . . ,T ). ; Xijt refers to a vector consisting demographic
variables: education, age, age squared, race, union status, marital status, occupations
and states of residence. The error term is denoted by εijt . Zjt is the industry specific
fatality rate. The fatality rate is the variable of interest.
A challenge to the identification of model 4.1 is that workers are not randomly
assigned to jobs. Worker characteristics could induce workers’ decision on the choices
of job riskiness and of desirable fringe benefits, such as private health insurance. For
instance, workers with relatively high ability would go to low-risk jobs that provide
health insurance as well. If these characteristics are unobserved as is in ability the
estimated δ will be biased.
To address this problem, I formulate the model as a linear probability model with
fixed effects, and estimate it using the within estimator. This approach, however,
imposes an assumption that health insurance status has a linear relationship with
all explanatory variables. Another estimation strategy is the Chamberlain-Mundlak
device (i.e. Correlated Random Effects or CRE), which can be used with non-linear
models like probit. The CRE technique allows us to control for individual specific
heterogeneity while it preserves a non-linear relationship between health insurance
coverage status and covariates (Wooldridge 2010). Finally, to understand the magnitude of the bias stemming from not controlling heterogeneity, I also estimate model
4.1 with probit model.
The interest is to estimate wage premium for mortality risk at work and calculate
value of statistical life. I begin with the standard hedonic model that is as follows.
lnwijt = ci + αZjt + Xijt β + εijt

(3.2)

ln wijt denotes the natural log of annual income and, the same as before, ci is
individual latent variable. The focal coefficient in our analysis is the coefficient of
risk variable, α. It reflects the wage premium for risk and is a basis for calculating
VSL.
The main implication of the framework is that the provision of health insurance affects the wage-risk tradeoff. In particular, If health insurance is negatively associated
with risk but positively correlated with wage, as what we may observe empirically
from model 4.1, omitting health insurance status from the standard model will lead
to a downward bias in the risk coefficient. Consequently, the inclusion of health insur-
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ance increases the wage premium for mortality risk. In the following model, I include
employer-provided health insurance status into the standard model.
ln wijkt = ci + α1 Zjkt + α2 Hijkt + Xijkt β + εijkt

(3.3)

In model 4.3, I assume that the slope of wage offer curve of the insured is the same
as that of the uninsured, though they may have different levels of wages. However,
the proposed framework in this paper suggests that workers with and without health
insurance encounter different wage offers. Specifically, workers are willing to pay
for the associated cost of health benefits in the form of lower risk premium such
that risk affects the wage structure of the insured. That is, workers contribution to
health insurance is now conditional on the level of job riskiness where workers in very
dangerous jobs pay more than do workers in safe jobs to the costs of health insurance.
To capture the impact of health insurance on the structure of wages, I interact the
variable of risk of fatal injury and the indicator of health insurance coverage. Thus
the specification 4.3 becomes
ln wijt = ci + α1 Zjt + α2 Hijt + α3 Zjt ∗ Hijt + Xijt β + εijkt

(3.4)

In the above expression, α1 now has a different interpretation. α1 measures the
wage premium for risk of workers without health insurance (i.e Hijt = 0). The
new feature of this specification is the interaction between risk and EHI status (i.e.
Zjt × Hijt ). The coefficient of the interaction, α3 , is aimed at capturing the effect of
EHI on VSL. Thus, α1 + α3 is the risk premium of workers with health insurance.
Similar to the health insurance and risk relationship, there is a major issue pertaining to the identification of the hedonic wage models in equations 3.2, 4.3 and
4.4, namely, selection problem. That is, workers are not randomly allocated to jobs.
Thus, unobserved heterogeneity, such as ability or unobserved productivity associated
with risk is correlated with fatal injury and the health insurance coverage in jobs they
choose. Failure to control for unobservables implies that the estimated coefficients of
interest (i.e. α1 , α2 , and α3 ) will be biased.
To better understand the magnitude of the bias due to unobservables, I use several
econometric methods. First, I use models accounting for heterogeneity. In particular, I use panel fixed effects estimator—the most preferred specification—and panel
random effects. Despite controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, in random effects
model I impose an assumption that the unobserved individual heterogeneity is not
correlated with the risk variable. I compare the models with a cross-section estima-
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tor: Pooled OLS (POLS). Here I assume individual heterogeneity is independent of
the fatality risk variable.
The preferred specification, fixed-effects model, permits us to control for personspecific heterogeneity by employing within-transformation of data. However, withintransformation of data plausibly leave little variation in the fatality rate and as such,
we may not be able to identify credibly the fatality parameter. Table 3.4 shows that
between-group variation exceeds within-group variation. However, for all sample, the
within-variation in the fatality rate is sufficiently large—i.e. it is about 39.6 % of
the between variation. Thus, using fixed effects model is feasible to estimate VSL.
Furthermore, the decomposition of variation by job switch status suggests that job
switchers are the one that contributes substantially to within-group variation—, that
is, the within variation of job switcher is 94.7 % of the between variation. Table
3.5 displays variation in employer health insurance coverage. We see that withingroup variation in EHI status in the total sample is sufficient to identify the health
insurance parameter (about 34.7 % of the between variation). Similar to fatality risk,
a large fraction of within-group variation in EHI status is driven by job switching. I
exploit this evidence to address potential endogeneity in risk and health insurance by
estimating the fixed-effects model with the sample of job changers.
The implied value of a statistical life at the level of wages, w̄, can be calculated
as follows
∂w
= α1 × w̄) × 100, 000]
(3.5)
VSL = [(
∂Z
3.6
3.6.1

Results
Employer-provided Health Insurance and Fatality Rate

I begin with empirical results aimed at investigating the likelihood of health insurance
coverage conditional on risk (i.e. equation 4.1). The specification is estimated by three
econometric methods: Linear Probability model (LPM) with fixed effects, Probit and
Probit with Correlated Random Effects (CRE). The results are then presented in table
4.3. The column 1 of the table exhibits the result of LPM while the column 2 and
3 report Probit CRE and Probit respectively. It is important to note that health
insurance take-up reflects the equilibrium condition between health insurance offer
from the firm side and the worker decision. Thus, in general, we can interpret the
coefficient of risk in Table 4.3 as the equilibrium condition.
I find that workers in risky job injury are less likely to received employer-provided
health insurance. In column 1, a one unit increase in fatality rate per 100,000 workers
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leads to a reduction in probability of receiving employer-provided health coverage by
0.35 percent. The coefficient of risk is significant at the confidence level of 95 percent.
Compared to the employment-based health insurance rate of 16.6 %, this estimate
represents a reduction of approximately 2.1 % in employer-provided health insurance
coverage. We also see a similar effect of risk on the health insurance coverage with
CRE probit in column 2, although it is not statistically significant at the five percent
significance level.
It is also evident that failure to control for unobserved heterogeneity results in
biased estimate of the risk coefficient. The marginal effect of fatality rate under probit
model is positive although it is statistically insignificant. The difference in marginal
effects of fatality rate between probit and linear model is clearly not driven by the
difference in functional forms. The result of CRE probit, which is similar to linear
model, confirms that latent heterogeneity is correlated with the fatal risk variable.
3.6.2

Health insurance and Wage Premium for Fatal Injury

In this section, I discuss my estimates on the wage-risk relationship, beginning with
the baseline hedonic wage models. Table 4.4 presents the results of various model
specifications, namely, pooled OLS (POLS), random effects model, and fixed effects
model. Comparisons between panel fixed effects and other estimates inform us the
magnitude of the bias in estimates of wage-risk premiums. Furthermore, I also calculate the implied value of a statistical life based on equation 4.11.
With the model controlling for person-specific heterogeneity—i.e. fixed effects
model, the estimated risk premium for an increase in deaths per 100,000 workers is
0.28 %, and accordingly, the implied VSL is £7.73 million (2010 £). The estimate is
statistically significant at the ten percent significance level. We see here an incorrect
assumption regarding the relationship between latent variable and the fatality rate
leads to biased estimate of the risk coefficient. The estimate from random effects
specification assuming that latent variable is independent of fatal risk yield a high
estimate of risk premium, and the implied VSL is around £23.21 million.11 We also
notice that failing to account for latent heterogeneity yields high VSL. With POLS
model, the implied VSL is around £72.76 million.
For comparison with previous studies, the estimated VSL with fixed-effect estimator in this paper falls in the lower bound of estimated VSL relative to other papers
that use cross-section estimators. Arabsheibani and Marin (2000) use cross-section
11

Random effects assumes that heterogeneity is distributed normally and independent of the
variable of interest. If the assumption is violated, the estimate will be biased.
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estimators and find that the implied VSL is around £16.4 million (2010 £). For
the sample of manual workers, Siebert and Wei (1994) find the implied VSL around
£8.1-9.90 million, and Sandy and Elliott (1996) £5.05-68.07 million.12 From Table
4.4, it is clear that an inability to control for individual-specific heterogeneity results
in an upward biased in the estimated VSL. This explains why earlier studies that use
cross-section estimators yield high VSL. Hintermann et al. (2010) using the BHPS
data find lower VSL than what I find, and the risk coefficient in their estimate is not
statistically significant. A plausible explanation to the insignificant coefficient of risk
in their finding may be related to the sample size. In particular, they exclude the
sample of Scotland from the estimation.13
Compared to recent findings from the US labor market data, the estimated VSL
in this paper is within the range of estimated VSLs in the US. The exchange rate
in 2010 was $1.5 per £, the implied VSL from this study is $ 11.6 million. From
recent research in the US, Kniesner et al. (2012) find the range VSLs around $ 1.1
-15.1 million ($ 2010). Viscusi and Aldy (2003) review VSL studies on the UK and
find that the implied VSLs from the UK are generally far higher than the implied
VSLs from most developed countries. Different from previous studies on the UK, the
finding from this paper suggests that the VSL from the UK is essentially comparable
to those estimated from most developed countries.
It is also instructive to note that the substantial difference in estimates of VSL
with heterogeneity versus without heterogeneity confirms the theoretical conjecture
of Shogren and Stamland (2002) that failing to control for unobserved skill will overestimate the VSL. In particular, the reduction in the estimated VSLs after controlling
for individual-specific heterogeneity suggests that heterogeneity reflects more safetyrelated productivity and risk preferences than general unobserved productivity in the
context of Hwang et al. (1992).
In the next discussion, I present the result of VSL with health insurance as an
additional control in the hedonic wage equation (Table 4.5 ). I find that with fixedeffects estimator, the estimated VSL including health insurance status is a half million
higher than the VSL ignoring health insurance—i.e it is £8.3 for model with health
insurance. This is consistent with the notion that health insurance is positively correlated with wages but is negatively related with risk, leading to the underestimated
12
As Siebert and Wei (1994), and, Sandy and Elliott (1996) use the sample of manual workers.
Thus, the implied VSL presented here is more comparable to the VSL based on Arabsheibani and
Marin (2000)
13
Hintermann et al. (2010) also use the same source of fatality data, that is, the UK Health and
Safety Executive (HSE).
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VSL in models ignoring EHI as a control variable. However, we also notice that
EHI coverage is not sensitive to risk changes—i.e. this is a suggestive of small bias.
Thus, the bias from omitting health insurance in the hedonic models seems to be
small. Additionally, I still observe a consistent pattern that models accounting of
person-specific heterogeneity yield lower VSLs.
The result of Table 4.5 departs from the model assuming that both workers with
and without employer-supported health insurance face the same slope of wage offer
curves. The framework in this paper, however, predicts that the provision of health
insurance is conditional on the level of job riskiness. In particular, the contribution
of employers to employees health benefits depends on risk levels: workers in risky
jobs have to pay more than do workers in safe jobs to health insurance in the form of
lower wages. Consequently, we expect that there is heterogeneity in VSL stemming
from health coverage status: workers with employer-provided health benefits would
have lower VSL than do workers with health coverage.
Model 4.4 is intended to test empirically the prediction, and, the empirical results
are presented in Table 4.6. In general, models with an interaction between EHI and
fatality risk increase wage-risk premiums relative to the standard model. Particularly,
the coefficient on risk increases by 11-68 %, depending on the specifications, relative
to models without health insurance. Given that the coefficient on risk in these specifications actually measures the rate of the wage-risk tradeoff for the uninsured workers
(i.e. Hijkt = 0), this evidence suggests that workers without employer-provided health
insurance receive higher wage premium for risk of death at work than do the average
workers (i.e. the wage-risk premium for all sample).
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 4.6 report estimates from the panel random-effects
and the fixed-effects estimators respectively. The fixed-effects estimator produces
the implied VSL of workers without employer-provided health insurance at £13.55
million, which is almost double the estimated VSL in the hedonic model without
health insurance. The finding from the US, I find the VSL of uninsured workers is
around $ 23.2 million ($ 2010). If we convert the implied VSL of the UK workers
without health insurance, it is $ 20.3 million (i.e. £13.55 × $ 1.5 per £). So the
VSL of workers without employment-based health insurance is quite comparable to
that of the uninsured workers in the US. Moreover, columns 1 of Table 4.5 presents
the result of the cross-sections estimator. In contrast to specifications controlling
for person-specific heterogeneity, these specifications produce considerably high wage
premiums for risk—about 2.86 %, and the implied VSL is £78.7 million.
I estimate the risk premium for workers with health insurance from the the sum
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of the risk coefficient and the coefficient of the interaction term between the risk and
health insurance (i.e. α1 +α3 ). I find that workers with health insurance receive a negative risk premium, implying negative VSLs in both fixed-effects and random-effects
estimators. The negative risk premium is inconsistent with the standard compensating differential theory. But, it suggests that workers may be willing to trade their
value of life for health benefits that cost greater than their risk premium. To be more
specific, a worker without health insurance accepts risk premium at £136 annually
for an increase in fatality rate by 1 per 100,000 workers (i.e the risk coefficient times
the average annual earning, that is, 0.0049 times £27,480). Now, a worker who wants
health coverage has to give up the risk premium, which is £136 annually, and, he is
willing to pay additional £409 annually (i.e. 0.0198 times £27,480) for the coverage
in the form of lower wages. That is, the cost of health insurance that workers are
willing to pay for an additional increase in fatality rate, on average, is £545 annually.
Therefore, as the cost of health insurance for an increase in one unit fatality rate
is greater than the risk premium, we observe the negative risk premium for workers
with health insurance.
It is instructive to note that the cost of health insurance discussed above is not
necessarily equal to the market price of health insurance. Instead, it reflects more
the rate of tradeoff between risk premium and health insurance that workers are
willing to make. However, this finding from the UK is intriguing, particularly as we
compare the finding with that of from the US. In the US, I find the positive risk
premium for the insured, suggesting that the health insurance cost less than the risk
premium for an increase in one unit fatality rate per 100,000 workers. A plausible
explanation to this rests on the UK healthcare system that universally covers all
eligible individuals. Under universal health care system, all workers essentially get
necessary health care at free cost. Additional provision of health care through private
medical insurance can be viewed as luxurious for employers and workers in jobs
with high risk of death. Therefore, the employer-provided health coverage must be
compensated by a substantial wage reduction, and, the extent of wage reduction
depends on risk levels.
Another plausible explanation to the negative coefficient on the interaction between health insurance and risk is because spurious negative correlation between wage
and risk for the sample of workers with health insurance. This may happen when
other covariates such as time dummies do not control a trend that workers may move
to jobs offering health insurance, higher wages and less risky jobs. To check this possibility, I separate estimations by the sample of those who stayed and changed their
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jobs (I discuss this in the robustness checks section). However, the findings from
the split samples do not confirm this. The negative risk premium for workers with
health insurance may be attributed to non classical measurement error. Black and
Kniesner (2003) find that non classical measurement error contribute to inconsistent
estimate of VSL. The same argument is also proposed by Viscusi and Aldy (2003) in
explaining high estimated VSL from the UK, or Hintermann et al. (2010) that also
find the negative VSL.
Furthermore, it is useful to put the findings presented in Table 4.6 into the context
of theoretical predictions in Hwang et al. (1992) and Shogren and Stamland (2002).
The substantial difference in estimated VSL with individual-specific heterogeneity
versus without individual-specific heterogeneity in the model reaffirms the theoretical
emphasis of Shogren and Stamland (2002). That is, latent individual heterogeneity is
likely to represent unobserved skill related to personal ability to avoid injury, and risk
preferences. Accordingly, failure to control for unobserved skill leads to a potentially
substantial upward bias in the estimates of compensating differentials for fatal risk.
However, job characteristics inducing labor productivity are also important to control
in the hedonic wage function, and particularly, if these characteristics vary with the
level of mortality risk (i.e. health insurance). We see that employment-based health
insurance induce, indirectly, worker productivity and omitting health insurance status
from the hedonic wage model leads to a potentially substantial downward bias in the
estimated VSL. This evidence lends support to the theoretical conjecture in Hwang
et al. (1992).
3.6.3

Robustness Checks

In this section I undertake several robustness checks. First, I consider the importance
of job change status in the estimated VSL. Here I focus on the VSL estimated by fixed
effects estimator. Second, for the model with the interaction between health insurance
and the fatality risk, I define workers with employer-provided health insurance as
those whose health insurance is fully paid for by their employers.14
Fixed Effects Estimator Specification Checks
The fixed-effects model permits us to control for person-specific heterogeneity by employing a within-transformation of data. However, it comes at the cost of eliminating
14

Recall, previously I define those with health insurance as workers whose health insurance are
1) paid through wage deduction and 2) fully paid for by employers.
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cross-sectional variation that provides important information on wage differentials
across industry groups—i.e. variation that reflects true differences in job riskiness.
Under the fixed-effects model, the main source of identification relies on within-group
variation that arises from 1) changes in fatality risk in a given industry group and 2)
job changes resulting in the changes of fatality risk—i.e. workers move to different
industry cells over the sample periods. Variation coming from changes in the industry
specific fatality risk could confound estimates of risk premiums if these changes are
not systematically reflected in wage levels. That is, over time workplace safety tends
to improve (i.e. fatality risks fall), and, at the same time, for other reasons real wages
are more likely to increase. Another possible confounding factor for the fixed-effects
model is that individuals may learn about risks on the job over some periods and
switch if wage compensation for the risk is inadequate.15
On health insurance, workers generally stay in jobs that provide health coverage,
and, the effect of health coverage on real wages could also be confounded by the
general trend of increased wage levels. Moreover as we observe the same individuals
over time, the source identification of the effect of EHI on wages comes mainly from
changes in health insurance status—i.e. workers who gain or lose health coverage.
Thus, it is likely that health insurance gainers/losers are also those who change jobs.
This implies that the fixed effects model—despite controlling for heterogeneity—potentially underestimates the VSL. In this part, I investigate the importance
of job changing status for the wage-risk premium estimates in Tables 4.5 and 4.6.
Particularly, first I estimate risk premiums for job changers while I still control for
unobserved heterogeneity (Schaffner and Spengler, 2010; Kniesner et al., 2012).16 I
then compare the estimated VSLs for job changers with that of workers who never
change jobs. The results are presented in Table 4.7.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4.7 exhibit estimates of VSLs by job change status.
In addition, Columns 3 and 4 present VSLs for workers with and without health
insurance by job change status as well. Overall, the main identification of compensating differential for fatality risk comes from workers who switch industry groups.
the variation of fatal risk for job stayers, however, does not reveal much compensating differentials for fatality risk. I find that VSL with the sample of job changers is
around £1 million higher than the estimated VSL with the whole sample presented in
15
Another possibility is that over time workers may accumulate skills that enable them to cope
with risk of injury.
16
Several papers also use job changers—i.e. displaced workers—to solve endogeneity of health
coverage and then estimate the health insurance-wage tradeoff (Simon, 2001; Lehrer and Pereira,
2007).
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Table 4.5. The job stayers, however, receive lower wage premium than do the overall
workers. The low VSL of job stayers suggests that wages do not fully respond to an
industry-specific fatality risk, leading to underestimate the VSL.
In the model with the interaction between health insurance and fatality risk, we
also see that much variation producing a compensating differential comes from job
changers. The job changers accept far lower and negative risk premium in exchange
for health insurance than do their counterpart who never change jobs. Here, we do
not see that the negative risk premium for workers with health insurance can simply
be explained by spurious relationship between wage and risk. This finding supports
the argument in Hintermann et al. (2010) that the risk measurement errors may be
correlated with other covariates, and that, the direction of bias is unknown.
Changing the Definition of Employer-Provided Health Benefits
Above estimates of VSL that include health insurance in the model define employerhealth insurance as health insurance that 1) is paid for by workers in the form of
reduced wages ( I call this as Group 1), and, 2) is fully paid for by employers ( Group
2). This definition may not truly fit with the criteria of ’employer-provided health
insurance’ as workers of Group 1 pay their own health insurance through deducted
wages. These two groups have different constraints with respect to their ability to
trade wage compensation for health insurance. Specifically, workers of Group 1 have
more flexibility to trade health benefits for cash compensation. Suppose a worker
of Group 1 finds that it is not optimal to have health insurance, he could drop the
health coverage and receive full wage compensation instead. On the other hand, the
worker of Group 2 accepts a job package consisting of ’fully-paid’ employer-sponsored
health insurance and wage. Here, he cannot trade his health insurance coverage for
cash compensation. As a result, both groups may behave differently with respect to
health coverage as fatal risk increases. In particular, the demand for health coverage
among Group 1 —i.e. those who pay for it in the form of lower wages—tends to be
more responsive to the increased risk. This is in contrast to workers of Group 2 that
might be less sensitive to changes in fatal risk as they have limited ability to adjust
their job packages. Although workers in Group 2 report that their health coverage
is fully paid by employers, holding other things the same, their relative wages may
be, after all, similar to wages of workers in Group 1—i.e. employers tacitly reduce
Group 2’s wages to compensate health benefits.
Different constraints that these two groups face bring several implications to the
estimates of VSL. First, we should expect that the bias in VSL due to omitting health
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insurance would be lower when we only use Group 2’s health coverage status in the
estimation. That is, since health insurance coverage for Group 2 is less responsive
to fatal risk, health insurance status would be weakly correlated with both risk and
wage levels. The second implication is that the rate of tradeoff between risk premium
and health coverage would be larger, in the absolute term, among workers of Group
2. This is because the workers of Group 2 cannot exchange health coverage for cash
compensation although they may have low value on health coverage. As a result,
they accept substantial lower risk premium than it would have been if they could
trade health benefits for cash compensation.
In this part, I perform additional tests in which employer-provided health insurance is defined as health coverage that is fully paid for by employers (i.e. Group 2
only). Table 4.8 exhibits the result of VSL where health coverage status used in the
model refers to only Group 2’ health insurance status. Compared to Table 4.5, the
implied VSL with fixed-effects estimator is slightly lower. It suggests that the bias
of not including health insurance in VSL is more likely to arise due to omitting the
health insurance status of workers who pay for it. Moreover, Table 4.9 shows that the
VSL of workers without fully-paid employer-provided health insurance is £1 million
lower than the VSL of workers without any employer-sponsored health insurance presented in Table 4.6. The coefficient of the interaction term between health insurance
of Group 2 and fatality rate is also lower than the same interaction term but using
the health insurance status of both groups. It suggests that the Group 2’s rate of
tradeoff between risk premium and health insurance is higher, in the absolute term,
than that of overall sample of workers with any employer-provided health insurance.
Although we observe changes in VSL when we use only the health insurance
status of Group 2, overall the changes are small. This additional analysis suggests
that previous findings are quite robust with changes in the definition of employersponsored health insurance.
3.7

Conclusion

In this paper, I investigate whether non-pecuniary benefits have an impact on wage
premiums for risk of death. The link between health insurance and compensating differentials for risk rests on the incentive of employers to provide health insurance and
the workers’ valuation of the coverage. Health benefits can be profitable to employers if employers can capture productivity gains from better health. Yet, improving
workplace safety and providing health benefits at the same time are costly to em-
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ployers. It is even more costly when the costs of health benefits are increasing with
respect to the level of job hazards. Employers with high level of hazards, therefore,
are less likely to provide health benefits. It also implies that workers have to trade
risk premium for health benefits.
Using data from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), I find that workers
in risky jobs are less likely to receive employer-provided health insurance. The negative effect of mortality risk on the likelihood of being covered by EHI is small but
statistically significant. Perusal of compensating wage differentials for risk suggests
that failing to control for unobserved individual heterogeneity leads to an upward
biased of VSL. Models accounting of individual heterogeneity reduce estimates of
compensating differentials for risk—relative to cross-section estimator—by 68-89 %.
In particular, the estimated VSL with fixed-effects model is £7.73 million. Inclusion
of health insurance in the baseline model leads to a slightly increase in the estimated
VSLs by 7.3 %. The increase in VSLs in the model with health insurance suggests
that the VSL is likely to be biased downward when we omit health insurance status from the standard model. However, the bias seems to be small due to the low
responsiveness of EHI to mortality risk at work.
There is evidence of heterogeneity in the estimated VSLs stemming from EHI
coverage status. I find that workers without employer-sponsored health insurance
receive higher wage premium for mortality risk, implying a higher VSL for this group.
Specifically, interacting employer health insurance status with fatal risk increase the
coefficient of risk by 63.25 %. Workers with employer-provided health insurance,
however, receive, a negative wage premium for fatality risk. It is less clear why
workers with health insurance receive a negative risk premium. One explanation is
that it may be related to the UKs universal health care system. Private medical
insurance, including employer-purchased health insurance, offers health services that
are similar to those provided under the NHS. Hence, providing additional health
coverage while publicly-provided health care is available at no cost at service point
would be costly to employers, particularly employers in industries with high levels of
fatal risk. So employers pass the full associated costs of health benefits to workers.
At the same time, workers who value the benefits of private medical insurance are
willing to pay for it. Another possible explanation is that the risk measurement errors
that are correlated with other covariates in the hedonic wage model.
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Table 3.1: Motives for purchasing private health insurance (percentage of employers)
Motives
To
As
To
To
To
To

get staff back to work quickly
a ”perk” for employees
keep the benefit package competitive
ensure staff are well cared for during illness
increase productivity
reduce sickness-absence costs

1998

1999-2000

2001

33.0
13.0
17.0
20.0
7.0
10.0

35.0
13.4
12.9
22.7
6.2
9.8

25.3
18.3
16.5
17.0
10.8
10.1

Source: AON Health Solutions (2002) cited from Foubister et al. (2006)

Table 3.2: Coverage of Employer-Provided Health Insurance by Industry Group
Industrial Grouping
Mining And Quarrying
Manufacturing
Electricity, Gas And Water Supply
Construction
Trade, Repair of Motor Vehicles
and Personal and Household Goods
Hotels And Restaurants
Transport, Storage And Communication
Financial Activities
Property, Business And Research Activities
Public sector
Education
Health and Social Work
Other Social Services
Total
Source:BHPS
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Covered by EHI

Sample Size

37.80
17.36
17.22
9.99
10.61

164
4066
209
1422
1980

6.65
10.01
41.67
22.52
1.58
1.18
1.16
8.13
17.52

406
1438
732
1856
1074
763
689
578
15377

Table 3.3: Summary Statistics
Variables

Mean

Standard deviation

Real annual income
Natural log of real annual income
Fatality rate
Employer health insurance
Age
Years of schooling
White
Married
Union
Natural log of tenure

27,480
10.06
1.154
0.175
39.61
13.79
0.904
0.568
0.279
1.441

16,991
0.616
1.886
0.380
11.36
3.689
0.295
0.495
0.449
0.884

Occupations
Managers and Senior Officials
Professional
Associate professional and Technical
Administrative and Secretarial
Skilled trade
Personal Service
Sales and Customer Service
Process, Plant and Machine Operatives
Elementary Occupations

0.209
0.102
0.123
0.096
0.181
0.033
0.045
0.144
0.068

0.406
0.303
0.328
0.295
0.385
0.178
0.207
0.351
0.251

Employment Size
<9
10-49
50-99
100-199
200-499
500-999
> 1000

0.155
0.273
0.119
0.114
0.150
0.077
0.111

0.362
0.446
0.324
0.318
0.357
0.267
0.314

Observation

15377

Source: BHPS
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Table 3.4: Between- and Within-Group Variation for Industry Fatality
Rates
Overall
variance

Within-group
variance

Between-group
variance

All sample

3.52

1.00

2.52

Never-change industry

3.12

0.43

2.69

Ever-change industry

4.24

2.06

2.18

Sample

Source: BHPS

Table 3.5: Between- and Within-Group Variation for Industry EHI coverage
Overall
variance

Within-group
variance

Between-group
variance

All sample

0.11

0.03

0.08

Never-change industry

0.11

0.02

0.09

Ever-change industry

0.10

0.04

0.07

Sample

Source: BHPS
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Table 3.6: Marginal Effects of Fatality Rate on EHI coverage
VARIABLES

FE

CRE Probit

Probit

Fatality rate

-0.0035**
(0.0016)

-0.0027
(0.0061)

0.0024
(0.0070)

Mean fatality rate

Observations
R-squared
Log-likelihood

0.0076**
(0.0036)
15,377
0.0149

15,377

15,377

-6204.58

-6211.84

Note: Dependent variable is employer-sponsored health insurance coverage (EHI). Each model controls for age, age squared,
union status, marital status, log tenure, the size of employees,
1 digit occupations, regions of residence and year dummy. For
probit and CRE Probit, additional control variables are years
of schooling and race (i.e. white). CRE Probit also control the
mean of fatality, the mean of age, the mean of age squared,
and the mean of log tenure. Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors for Probit and the fixed-effects estimator
are clustered by industry and robust to heteroskedasticity. ***
significant at 1%, **5%,* 10%.
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Table 3.7: Estimates of Wage Premium for fatal risk: Baseline Specification
POLS

Random
Effects

Fixed
Effects

Fatality rate

0.0265**
(0.0102)

0.0084*
(0.0044)

0.0028*
(0.0015)

Observations
R-squared

15,377
0.3454

15,377
0.2905

15,377
0.1100

Implied VSL (millions)

72.76
(27.91)

23.21
(12.13)

7.73
(4.18)

Variables

Note: Dependent variable is natural log of real annual labor
income. Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors
for the Pooled OLS and Fixed effect estimators are clustered by
industry and robust to heteroscedasticity. Each model controls
for age, age squared, union status, marital status, log tenure, the
size of employees, 1 digit occupations, regions of residence and
year dummy. For Pooled OLS and random effects estimators,
additional control variables are years of schooling and race (i.e.
white). *** significant at 1%, **5%,* 10% Source BHPS.
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Table 3.8: Estimates of Wage Premium for Fatal Risk:
Models with Health Insurance
Variables

POLS

Random
Effects

Fixed
Effects

Fatality rate

0.0256**
(0.0088)

0.0090**
(0.0042)

0.0029*
(0.0015)

EHI

0.277***
(0.0415)

0.144***
(0.0211)

0.062***
(0.0160)

Observations
R-squared

15,377
0.3711

15,377
0.3176

15,377
0.1103

Implied VSL (millions)

70.43
(24.27)

24.73
(11.48)

8.29
(4.22)

Dependent variable is natural log of real annual labor income.
Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors for the
Pooled OLS and Fixed effect estimators are clustered by industry and robust to heteroscedasticity. Each model controls for
age, age squared, union status, marital status, log tenure, the
size of employees, 1 digit occupations, regions of residence and
year dummy. For Pooled OLS and random effects estimators,
additional control variables are years of schooling and race (i.e.
white). *** significant at 1%, **5%,* 10% Source BHPS.
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Table 3.9: Estimates of Wage Premium for Fatal Risk: Models with the
Interaction between Health Insurance and Fatal Risk
Variables

POLS

Random
Effects

Fixed
Effects

Fatality rate

0.0286**
(0.0094)

0.0109**
(0.0043)

0.0049**
(0.0019)

EHI

0.3028***
(0.0466)

0.1635***
(0.0234)

0.0803***
(0.0134)

-0.0261
(0.0202)

-0.0190*
(0.0106)

-0.0198***
(0.0037)

Observations
R-squared

15,377
0.3717

15,377
0.3181

15,377
0.1122

Implied VSL without EHI (million)

78.72
(25.80)

29.93
(11.80)

13.55
(5.26)

Implied VSL with EHI (million)

6.98
(58.53)

-22.19
(32.83)

-40.91
(6.65)

Fatality rate X EHI

Note: Dependent variable is natural log of real annual labor income. Standard
errors are in parentheses. Standard errors for the Pooled OLS and Fixed effect
estimators are clustered by industry and robust to heteroscedasticity. Each model
controls for age, age squared, union status, marital status, log tenure, the size
of employees, 1 digit occupations, regions of residence and year dummy. For
Pooled OLS and random effects estimators, additional control variables are years
of schooling and race (i.e. white). *** significant at 1%, **5%,* 10% Source
BHPS.
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Table 3.10: Estimates of Wage Premium for Fatal Risk by Job Change Status
Variables

Fatality rate

Baseline
Interaction
Ever
Never
Ever
Never
Change Job Change Job Change Job Change Job
0.0035*
(0.0019)

0.0009
(0.0025)

0.0065**
(0.0024)

0.0014
(0.0024)

0.0847**
(0.0287)

0.0709**
(0.0309)

-0.0284***
(0.0067)

-0.0063
(0.0073)

6,817
0.1266

8,560
0.1140

Implied VSL
without EHI (million)

17.30
(6.28)

3.94
(6.81)

Implied VSL
with EHI (million)

-57.75
(14.74)

-13.81
(20.63)

EHI

Fatality rate X EHI

Observations
R-squared

6,817
0.1238

8,560
0.1119

Implied VSL (million)

9.31
(5.14)

2.41
(6.99)

Note: Dependent variable is natural log of real annual labor income. Standard errors are in
parentheses. Standard errors for the fixed effect estimators are clustered by industry and robust
to heteroscedasticity. The model controls for age, age squared, union status, marital status, log
tenure, the size of employees, 1 digit occupations, regions of residence and year dummy. ***
significant at 1%, **5%,* 10% Source BHPS. significant at 1%, **5%,* 10% Source BHPS.
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Table 3.11: Estimates of Wage Premium for Fatal Risk with
Fully-Paid EHI
Variables

POLS

Random
Effects

Fixed
Effects

Fatality rate

0.0252**
(0.0089)

0.0088**
(0.0042)

0.0029*
(0.0015)

EHI

0.3005*** 0.1446***
(0.0384)
(0.0178)

0.0555***
(0.0136)

Observations
R-squared

15,377
0.3707

15,377
0.316

15,377
0.1112

Implied VSL (millions)

69.34
(24.52)

24.10
(11.51)

8.00
(4.16)

Note: Dependent variable is natural log of real annual labor income. EHI is fully-paid employer-provided health insurance. Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors for the Pooled OLS
and Fixed effect estimators are clustered by industry and robust to
heteroscedasticity. Each model controls for age, age squared, union
status, marital status, log tenure, the size of employees, 1 digit
occupations, regions of residence and year dummy. For Pooled
OLS and random effects estimators, additional control variables
are years of schooling and race (i.e. white). *** significant at 1%,
**5%,* 10% Source BHPS.
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Table 3.12: Estimates of Wage Premium for Fatal Risk with the Interaction
between Risk and Fully-Paid EHI
Variables

POLS

Random
Effects

Fixed
Effects

Fatality rate

0.0274**
(0.0092)

0.0103**
(0.0042)

0.0045**
(0.0018)

EHI

0.3232***
(0.0439)

0.1638***
(0.0206)

0.0767***
(0.0112)

-0.0225
(0.0176)

-0.0186*
(0.0105)

-0.0205***
(0.0032)

Observations
R-squared

15,377
0.3711

15,377
0.3163

15,377
0.1118

Implied VSL without EHI (million)

75.16
(25.37)

28.30
(11.48)

12.49
(5.08)

Implied VSL with EHI (million)

13.43
(53.99)

-22.87
(33.75)

-43.95
(4.93)

Fatality rate X EHI

Note: Dependent variable is natural log of real annual labor income. Standard
errors are in parentheses. Standard errors for the Pooled OLS and Fixed effect
estimators are clustered by industry and robust to heteroscedasticity. Each model
controls for age, age squared, union status, marital status, log tenure, the size
of employees, 1 digit occupations, regions of residence and year dummy. For
Pooled OLS and random effects estimators, additional control variables are years
of schooling and race (i.e. white). *** significant at 1%, **5%,* 10% Source
BHPS.
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Chapter 4 Personality Traits and the Choice of Job Riskiness

4.1

Introduction

Different occupations exhibit vastly different job-related likelihood of death and injury. Certain occupations expose workers to high probabilities of injury, such as
construction laborers or truck drivers. Despite these risks, some people are voluntarily willing to bear the risks for higher wages in return, holding other things constant.
Meanwhile others are less disposed to tradeoff wages and risk. This observed behavior in the labor market is the key prediction of the compensating differential theory
that heterogeneous people would sort into jobs based on their preferences to exchange
wages for risk.
The extent of worker sorting by risk preferences has implications for labor market
policies. Researchers and policy makers have long used observational labor market
data to estimate wage premium for risk. The estimated wage premium reflects workers’ valuation of risk, and thus, the benefits of job safety improvement (Viscusi and
Aldy, 2003). The sorting of worker in the labor market based on preferences for risk
suggests that job assignment is not random. Thus, failure to account for heterogeneity in risk preferences will bias the estimated wage premium, implying that the
benefits of job safety could be overestimated (or underestimated).
However, Shogren and Stamland (2002) note that an individual who chooses to
work in a riskier occupation reveals that “he is more tolerant to risk or has personal
ability to reduce risk of death or both”. This implies that the sorting of workers
in regard to job riskiness is not only driven by risk preferences but also skills—i.e.
personal ability to reduce personal risk of injury. Meanwhile previous research focuses
more on the sorting of workers based on risk preferences (Garen, 1988; DeLeire and
Levy, 2004). The extent of sorting in the labor market based on the personal skill has
not been adequately tested. The reason may be due to the difficulty of measuring
workers’ personal skill as it cannot be observed directly using observational labor
market data. Yet, there is practical importance of taking into account the job-safety
related skill, particularly, for the estimated wage premium for risk. Kniesner et al.
(2012) estimate workers’ valuation of fatal risk using modified hedonic wage models
accounting for two forms of latent variables—i.e. unobserved general productivity and
job safety-related productivity/skill. They find that controlling for the latent variable
reduces the estimated wage premium for risk: this lends support to the prediction of
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Shogren and Stamland (2002) and suggests that workers in dangerous jobs are more
likely to have, at least, the personal skill to avoid risk of fatal injury.
This paper investigates worker sorting based on safety-related skills. Recent research has suggested that skills consist of multiple dimensions (Borghans et al., 2008).
Using a common term in the literature, economists and psychologists distinguish two
skills into cognitive and non-cognitive skill. Cognitive skill is well known as a strong
predictor for socio-economic outcomes. Recent studies suggest that non-cognitive
skill or personality trait (i.e. perseverance, extraversion, self-control) play as equally
important role as cognitive skill. Undoubtedly, cognition is essential in forming safetyrelated skills. This is obvious as cognition is critical in learning, processing information and decision making that are helpful for one to avoid accidents at workplace.
However, occupations that intensely employ cognition are more likely to be safe jobs.
Thus, individuals with high level of cognitive skill tend to be employed in safer occupations. Different from cognitive skill, personality traits consist of a wide array
of elements and the importance of each element at workplace can vary substantially
across occupations.
In this paper, I focus on the role of personality traits in safety-related skill and
their influence on worker sorting based on job risk. I pursue a pragmatic approach by
which I use measures of personality traits that have been developed by personality
psychologists and, recently, widely used by economists. Specifically I use Five-Factor
Model of personality or also known as the Big Five personality traits (Borghans et al.,
2008). The big 5 personality traits are extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness,
neuroticism, and openness to experience. In our framework, these personality traits
are inputs and the technology of skill formation transforms the traits into safetyrelated skill. This notion is similar to that of Heckman et al. (2006). Yet I use a
simpler approach in which I directly employ measures of personality traits to observe
worker sorting.
Individual with different personality traits would sort into different occupations
as each occupation may demand and value more particular traits. For instance, a
construction job requires workers to do a thorough and organized work. Hence, dutifulness (or not careless) would be an essential facet that workers must have to avoid
accidents. This facet may not be essential for workers in sales job that require more
social skill or gregariousness. Some personality facets under this big 5 personality
inventory encompass individual’s qualities that are important for one to survive in
riskier occupations.
The sorting of workers occurs because individuals are differentiated to the extent
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of their personality traits. Everyone could develop ability to be careful and more organized at work. But an individual with a strong trait of dutifulness tends to develop
the ability more quickly at lower cost than other who have no strong dutiful trait.1
As individuals have different degrees of traits, we may expect that they have different
skill levels. Under the big 5 personality traits, dutifulness is part of conscientiousness.
Therefore, high conscientious individuals are expected to have higher safety-related
skill.2
The framework of this paper is related but conceptually different from the literature on “grit” (Duckworth et al., 2007). In this paper, worker sorting occurs because
some traits tend to be more crucial than others for specific vocations. As discussed
previously, gregariousness is more relevant to sales job than construction. Grit, on
the other hand, seems to be essential to success regardless the domain. (Duckworth
et al., 2007) note that grit includes continuous working toward challenges, maintaining effort and interest over some long periods despite failure and adversity.3 Hence,
grit is the key to high achievement in many fields. Despite this, grit might overlap
with some facets of the Big 5 personality traits—that is, grit overlaps with achievement aspects of conscientiousness, such as achievement striving, self-discipline, and
self-control. But different from conscientiousness, grit emphasizes more on long-term
stamina rather than short-term intensity (Duckworth et al., 2007). This is the key
distinction between the Big 5 traits that I use in this paper and grit. It is plausible,
however, that grit is the underlying factor behind worker sorting too. That is, harsh
jobs typically do not require persistence effort over some long periods. For instance,
someone who works continuously in music would finally achieve a prominent career
in the music industry, which is, obviously, safer occupation while there might no need
persistent effort for one choosing career as a carpenter. However, data at my disposal
do not provide me with relevant grit measures such as consistency and perseverance of
effort. Despite these limitations, for our purpose the Big 5 personality traits provide
enough measures to assess worker sorting based on traits.
In this vein, moreover, I view that personality traits have a productive dimension
(i.e. productive traits) and they emerge into safety-related personal skills. However,
different from the standard human capital theory in which skill is typically valuable in
all occupations, individual traits are rewarded differently across occupations. Some
aspects of conscientiousness, as in the previous example, could be valued more in
1

The cost can be in the form of time needed to develop this skill.
We can think of safety-related skill as specific skill that is valued more in riskier occupations.
3
In the words of Duckworth et al. (2007) , the gritty individual approaches achievement as a
marathon.
2
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riskier jobs compared to safer jobs. Consequently, conscientious individuals choose to
work in riskier occupations. My approach to personality traits as productive traits is
part of growing research focusing the role of non cognitive skills in the labor market.
There is a large body of studies that view personality traits as skills or a set of
productive traits, and, find that personality traits play as equally important role as
cognitive ability in many socio-economic outcomes (see Bowles et al. (2001); Nyhus
and Pons (2005); Heckman et al. (2006); Mueller and Plug (2006); Borghans et al.
(2008); Fortin (2008); Heineck and Anger (2010); Almlund et al. (2011)).
Using data from the United Kingdom Household Longitudinal Study (the UKHLS),
I find evidence of worker sorting based on personality traits. I particularly find that
conscientious and extravert individuals tend to be employed in riskier jobs (i.e. jobs
with high rate of fatal and nonfatal injury). In regard to conscientiousness, personality facets covered in this category describe qualities that are clearly important for
someone to handle a harsh working environment. On the other hand, I also find that
agreeableness, openness, and neuroticism are negatively associated with risk of injury—i.e. individuals with these traits are inclined to choose safer jobs. Neuroticism
in particular includes dimensions such as anxiety, nervous (vs relaxed) and impulsiveness. These traits do not render the necessary skill to reduce risk of injury and
are less valued in riskier occupations.
There is concern about the reliability of personality measures (i.e measurement error). To quantify the extent of measurement error, I calculate reliability coefficients
for personality trait measures by calculating Cronbach’s alpha coefficients. While
the estimated coefficients are close to the ones from previous studies, a considerable
fraction of the variability in the measured traits is because of measurement error. Another concern is the direction of the relationship, that is, current environments (e.g.
occupations, age) influence individuals’ responses to personality trait questions in the
survey. Heckman et al. (2006) show that scores of personality test are affected by the
levels of schooling at the time of test. Meanwhile some studies on personality suggest
that personality traits are relatively stable and insulated from environment (Costa Jr
and McCrae, 1994; McCrae and Costa, 2003). Despite finding from personality literature, I conduct several sensitivity analyses. First, I use ‘adjusted’ personality traits.
The adjusted personality traits are residuals from the regression of personality traits
on age and occupations. Hence, the adjusted traits are expected to be independent
from the effects of age and occupations. Using this approach, I still find a consistent
pattern on job sorting—i.e. agreeableness, openness, and neuroticism are associated
negatively with risk of injury while conscientiousness and extraversion have a positive
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relationship with risk. Second, I use lagged measurers of traits. In particular, I regress
current risk on past five year personality measures. Under the full specification, four
traits (agreeableness, conscientiousness, extraversion and neuroticism) have the same
sign as the previous estimates although they are not statistically significant.4 It is
only openness that changes the sign from negative in the previous estimates to positive in the estimate using the lagged score of personality traits. However, it is also not
statistically significant. Overall there is evidence suggesting that sorting of workers
and jobs based on personality traits and risk of injury occur.
In addition, I test whether inclusion of personality traits into the hedonic wage
model reduces the wage premium for risk. That is, if the sorting of worker takes
place and personality traits are inputs for safety-related skill, failure to control them
results in upward bias on the coefficient of risk. Empirical results confirm the notion
that personality traits can serve as a proxy for safety-related skill. In particular, OLS
model controlling for personality traits yields lower estimated wage premium for risk
than that of OLS model without traits. This informs us that inability to control the
traits results in the upward bias of the risk coefficient. However, the OLS model with
personality traits does not perform better relative to panel data estimators such as
fixed effects and random effects. This is not surprising as job sorting is not only driven
by heterogeneity in personality traits. Preferences on risks and other unobservables
are clearly correlated with the decision of job riskiness and wage levels. Thus, they
are important to be controlled as well in the hedonic wage equation.
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. It provides new evidence
about the relationship between personality traits and decision to work in risky jobs.
The results complement DeLeire and Levy (2004) that show the role of family structure as risk preferences (or measures of risk aversion). Yet this paper conceptually
differs from theirs where I treat personality traits as inputs for skill. In regard to
this, this paper provides indirect evidence to the conjecture of Shogren and Stamland
(2002) that workers who choose risky occupations suggest that they may possess skill
to reduce personal risk of death at workplace. The paper may also provide additional
insight on the observed earning differences by personality traits from previous studies.
The relationship between personality traits and earnings are mediated through job
sorting, and the sorting based on skills and job riskiness is among the one that could
trigger differentials in earnings.5
I proceed as follows. In section 2, I discuss extensively the related literature. I also
4

When I do not control for occupations, it is only neuroticism that is statistically significant.
There is ample evidence of the positive relationship between wages and occupation-specific risks
(Viscusi and Aldy, 2003).
5
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propose a simple conceptual framework in section 3 to understand the relationship
between personality traits and the choice of job riskiness. In this section, I discuss
how personality traits can be used as inputs for skills. Section 4 data and econometric
specifications. In regard to data, I elaborate measurements of risks and personality
traits. The results are discussed in section 5 and provide sensitivity analyses. Section
6 concludes.
4.2

Related Literature

This paper is closely related to studies that job sorting based on the preferences of
workers (Bonin et al., 2007; Krueger and Schkade, 2008). Bonin et al. (2007) show
that workers sort into occupations based on risk preferences. In particular, individuals that show strong willingness to take risks are more likely to go to jobs with
high earning variability—i.e. interpreted as high earning risk. They also show that
attitudes toward risk affect wages, suggesting that, in addition to human capital such
as education, individual attributes have an impact on incomes. Krueger and Schkade
(2008) provide evidence that gregarious individuals are more likely to go to jobs that
involve frequent social interaction. Specifically, workers who spent much time interacting with others (e.g. friends) tend to work in jobs that require high frequency of
job-related interaction. In addition, they also show that these workers (i.e. workers
in jobs with high frequent interaction) exhibit higher levels of job satisfaction. Their
finding also suggest that working conditions, such as time pressure, close supervision,
and perceived risk of job loss, determine work satisfaction. My paper elaborates further the evidence from Krueger and Schkade (2008). That is, I investigate how some
individuals with particular personality traits enabling them to work under unpleasant
working conditions tend to take such dangerous jobs.
In the literature of job-related risk, we also observe that individuals with particular
attributes are sorted to occupations with different levels of risk of injury (Garen, 1988;
DeLeire and Levy, 2004). Garen (1988) uses family structure, such as marital status
and the number of children, to address the potential endogeneity of job riskiness in
the hedonic wage model used to estimate the valuation of risk reduction (i.e. the
value of a statistical life). The basic assumption here is that the family structure
influences workers’ willingness to accept risk and thus, job decision. DeLeire and
Levy (2004) undertake a direct test on occupational sorting based on job riskiness.
They show that individuals in the role of primary care givers are less willing to trade
risk for wages and as a result, they choose to work in relatively safer jobs. Single
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moms and single dads are among the group of primary care givers who tend to work
in occupations with low risk of death. They also find that among a group of married
workers, the presence of children increases risk aversion more for women than for men
(DeLeire and Levy, 2004). These papers are suggestive of family structure serving as
a good proxy for worker preferences toward risk of injury at workplace.
This paper is also part of emerging research exploring the role of non-cognitive
ability (i.e. personality traits) in the labor market (Bowles et al., 2001; Nyhus and
Pons, 2005; Mueller and Plug, 2006; Heckman et al., 2006; Borghans et al., 2008;
Cunha and Heckman, 2008; Fortin, 2008; Heineck and Anger, 2010; Cobb-Clark and
Tan, 2011; Heineck, 2011; Bollinger et al., 2012; Nandi and Nicoletti, 2014). Heckman
et al. (2006) provide evidence that cognitive and non-cognitive abilities affect social
and economic outcomes. Consistent with previous research, they find evidence of
cognitive abilities explaining much variation in wages. However, they also find that
the effects of cognitive abilities are equally strong to the effects of non-cognitive
abilities on the wage variation (Heckman et al., 2006). In some cases, the effects of
non-cognitive abilities are stronger than cognitive abilities. For example, they find
that non-cognitive abilities determine schooling decision (i.e. acquisition of skills) and
earnings conditional on schooling levels. Both cognitive and non-cognitive also explain
risky behaviors such as smoking, marijuana use, and teenage pregnancy and marriage.
Cunha and Heckman (2008) argue that cognitive and noncognitive abilities affect
labor market outcome through skill formation that is important in labor markets. In
this paper, I pursue the basic idea in Cunha and Heckman (2008) that personality
traits are essentially inputs for the skill formation that is required in risky jobs.
My paper is complementary to papers by Mueller and Plug (2006), Heineck and
Anger (2010), and Heineck (2011) that use big 5 personality traits to predict labor market outcomes. Mueller and Plug (2006) suggest that personality matters
in labor market and its effect on earning is comparable to that of cognitive ability.
They propose the idea that big 5 personality traits (i.e extroversion, agreeableness,
conscientiousness, neuroticism, and openness to experience) have productivity dimension—i.e. the idea views personality traits as human capital. Mueller and Plug (2006)
show evidence that individuals possess higher levels of particular traits are observed
of having higher earnings. Interestingly, returns to personality traits differ across
gender. Men receive premium for being antagonistic (i.e. low level of agreeableness)
and emotionally stable (i.e. low level of neuroticism). Being more conscientious (i.e.
high level of conscientiousness) and open (i.e. high level of openness) are associated
with higher earnings for women.
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Using data from Germany, Heineck and Anger (2010) also provides evidence that
lower level of agreeableness is associated with higher level of wages for men. However,
he also finds that antagonistic females (i.e. low level of agreeableness) are also associated with higher wages. Thus, it suggests that agreeableness in general has a negative
effect on wages. Heineck (2011) use data from the British Household Paney Survey
(BHPS) and show evidence that higher agreeableness and neuroticism are associated
with lower wages and they are particularly strong for female workers. Meanwhile
being open to new ideas and conscientious are associated positively with wages.
Meanwhile these papers examine a direct impact of personality traits on earning.
My paper focuses on the intermediary channel of personality traits. That is, personality traits affect wages through their influences on individual occupational choices.
Cobb-Clark and Tan (2011) show that personality traits influence occupation segregation contributing to the disparity in relative wages between men and women. In
this paper, I examine job sorting based on the risk of job-related injury and how
personality traits determine this sorting process.
4.3

Conceptual framework

The framework of this paper is built upon the theory of equalizing differences (Rosen,
1986; Krueger and Schkade, 2008). The basic idea of the framework is that workers
are differentiated by the extent to which they possess skills that make them more
productive in dangerous jobs.6 The skill is produced through the technology of skill
formation that uses personality traits as inputs (Heckman et al., 2006). For example,
a worker with personality of being organized tends to be more vigilant at work, and,
this personality increases awareness toward his working environment. Thus, that
worker has more ability to avoid injury. This notion is also related to the paper of
Shogren and Stamland (2002) in which they argue that workers who take dangerous
occupations reveal themselves that they are risk tolerant or they possess personal
job-safety skills. The implication is that high skill workers would go to risky jobs and
low skill workers go to relatively safe jobs. Hence, job sorting occur because workers
differ in their skills driven by variation in personality traits.
To be more concrete, let D represent the level of job riskiness (i.e. both fatal and
non-fatal injury). Let us assume D takes two value where D = 1 is the risky job and
D = 0 is the safe job. The distribution of jobs depends on the technology of firms.
However, I assume that it is too costly for a firm to change the level of riskiness given
6
Skills here are individual abilities to reduce risk of injury at workplace (Shogren and Stamland,
2002).
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the current technology. For instance, it would take an expensive technology for a
construction job to reduce the rate of injury to the same level as that of a retail job.
Hence I take the distribution of firms along D as given and focus matching on the
side of workers.
The preference of a worker is represented by the wage rate and the job risk,
that is, U (W, D). The utility of all workers increases with wage. In regard to risk of
injury, workers generally dislike the risk. Hence for some workers, D creates disutility
and thus, U (W, 1) < U (W, 0). However, some workers may find themselves more
productive when working at risky job such that U (W, 1) > U (W, 0). Shogren and
Stamland (2002) posit that some workers may be more tolerant to risk or possess
ability to reduce risk of injury and thus, they choose to work in risky jobs. Coolheaded
workers, for example, probably are more productive working in risky occupations than
safe jobs (Garen, 1988). Here I focus on the sorting of workers based on ’skill’, and,
pursue other studies that view personality traits as a set of productive traits that
may be valued in particular occupations (i.e. riskier occupations)
Moreover, the skill enabling workers to reduce personal mortality risk at workplace
is developed from the personality traits of a worker. Specifically, there is a technology
of skill formation that transforms personality traits (e.g. self-consciousness, selfdiscipline, gregariousness) into skill. Hence, personality traits are five inputs to the
skill formation. They are Openness (denoted by tO ), Conscientiousness (i.e. tC ),
Extraversion (tE ), Agreeableness (tA ), and Neuroticism (tN ). Let s denotes skill and
the technology of skill formation is governed by the following function.
s = k(tO , tC , tE , tA , tN )

(4.1)

k(., ., ., ., .) is the technology of skill formation that I assume to be continuous and
the same across all workers. A challenge for equation (4.1) is to predict the effects
of personality traits on the personal skill reducing the personal likelihood of being
injured. Regarding this, I rely on the description of personality facets and findings
from previous psychological studies.
• Openness to experience encompasses the preference for ideas and imagination.
Individuals with high openness show interest in artistic activities and occupations. Costa et al. (1984) find that open individuals are interested in occupations such as author, anthropologist, journalist, playwright, and independent
research scientist. They are also generally curious and highly value knowledge
(McCrae and Costa, 2003). These adjectives of openness are somewhat differ-
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ent from circumstances in risky jobs that are clearly not too artistic. Hence,
I expect that open individuals are less able to develop the skill necessary for
riskier jobs. As a result, I expect that ∂k/∂tO < 0,
• Conscientiousness indicates individual differences in dimensions of organization and achievement. It includes an individual preferences for self-disciplined
and organized. Highly conscientious individuals tend to be dutiful and do a
thorough job. These characteristics would enhance the skill relevant to deal
with circumstances in risky occupations that often require order and vigilance.
Therefore I expect that conscientiousness has a positive effect on the skill (i.e.
∂k/∂tO > 0).
• Extraversion incorporates the preference for social interaction. The personality
facets include gregariousness, assertiveness and adventurous. Despite these adjectives, it is less clear whether extravert individuals are risk loving. In many
instances, gregarious individuals would go to occupations with high social interactions with coworkers or customers such as sales or teachers. These occupations typically are low-risk jobs. Vestewig (1977), however, find the evidence
that extroverts prefer gamble more than do introverts. Therefore, the effect of
extraversion on the skill is ambiguous (i.e. ∂k/∂tE R 0).
• Agreeableness encompasses individual dimensions of trusting and generous sentiments. Agreeable people show strong tendency to act in accordance with other
people’s interests. Antagonism (i.e. the opposite of agreeableness) is associated
with tough minded and hardheaded. Some risky occupations require aggressiveness that means low agreeableness. Thus, agreeableness has a negative effect
on the skill (i.e. ∂k/∂tA < 0)
• Neuroticism is a dimension of individual differences in anxiety (i.e. nervous
versus relaxed), impulsive (i.e. emotional vs. calm) and mental stability. High
neurotic individuals tend to worry a lot and get nervous easily. They are also
not able to handle stress well. Lauriola and Levin (2001) find that high neuroticism is associated with less risky decision-making. Hence, I expect that the
neuroticism has a negative effect on the skill required to reduce risk of injury
(i.e. ∂k/∂tN < 0)
I assume that personality traits (i.e. tp where p = O, C, E, A, N ) are distributed
normally across member of workforce (i.e tp ∼ N [µt , σt2 ]). This may be a strong
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assumption but Figure 4.1 shows that the distribution of personality traits resemble
normal distribution. The skill technology is assumed to additive and linear in personality traits, so the distribution of s will be normal as well s ∼ N [µs , σs2 ], where µs
and σs are the unconditional mean and standard deviation of s respectively.
The skill makes workers more productive and firms value the skill. Let denote r
the unit price of the skill. Thus, total reward that the worker receives for the skill
level s at price r is z (i.e. z = rs). That is, z is the total monetary value of the
skill that is equivalent to the wage-payment.7 As a result, the skill enters into the
utility function through its monetary values generated by its productive use. Hence,
the monetary value of skill is additional wage payments as workers possess the skill
that is productive in risky jobs. Alternatively, in this setting we can think of z as
compensating variation.
Now, there is z such that a worker is indifferent between accepting a risky job and
a safe job i.e. U (W1 + z, 0) = U (W1 , 1). The safe job and the risky job pay differently
and thus the wage differential between the two can be denoted as ∆W = W0 − W1
where W0 and W1 are the safe job and the risky wages respectively. The job sorting
process among workers depends on the relationship between z and ∆W for a worker.
If ∆W < z for a worker then the worker would go to the risky job (D = 1). On the
other hand, if ∆W > z, thus the worker would go to the safe job (D = 0).
This framework shows a mechanism in which personality traits affect the choice of
job riskiness through the skill formation. As workers are differentiated by the extent
of personality traits, they would have different levels of the ability, s, and as a result,
they receive different compensation, z. For instance, holding other traits constant,
a worker with high level of neuroticism tends to have lower ability to handle stress.
That is, that worker would have lower s and then, lower z. When z is low enough
such that ∆W > z, the worker chooses a safe occupation. Meanwhile a worker who
is vigilant tends to be more protective and able to work carefully (i.e. high level
of conscientiousness). This worker accumulates the skill reducing the likelihood of
getting injured (i.e. high level of s). As the reward to the skill is linear on the level
of the skill, higher s results in higher z. Consequently, the worker would choose a
riskier job.
In the equilibrium, the assignment of workers to firms is determined by the number
of job types (i.e. risky and safe jobs) and the distribution of workers’ skill. On the
demand side, the number of job types depends on the distribution of firm technology.
7

This framework is similar to Almlund et al. (2011).
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More specifically, job riskiness is tied to the firm technology.8 Given the nature of
technology, in the short run, firms find that reducing risks is too costly and they
cannot switch from offering risky jobs to safe jobs. Thus, the technology of firms and
types of jobs offered will be fixed. Further, holding the demand side (i.e. the firm
side) and the skill price (i.e. r) constant, the supply of workers to risky jobs would
depend on the distribution of z, which is also determined by the distribution of s. In
particular, if the skill reward follow distribution F (z) with smooth density function
of z as f (z) and normalize total labor force to 1, the fraction of workers going to safe
R ∆W
jobs (i.e D = 0) is 0 f (z) dz and the fraction to the risky job is 1 − F (∆W ).
This simple framework suggests that workers would go to jobs where their skill is
valued more. Workers whose personality traits improve the skill to reduce the probability of getting injured will seek riskier jobs, and, similarly, employers producing
high levels of risk will seek such workers—that is, the job safety-related skill is valued
more in riskier jobs. On the other hand, workers with traits that produce less the
ability would go to safer jobs. This implies that job assignment is nonrandom. Thus,
one can investigate further the sorting by examining the selection bias that occurs
due to heterogeneity in the skill reward, z—i.e. this is also an implications of heterogeneity in the skill of workers, s. The selection bias is expressed as the gap between
the conditional and unconditional expectation of z given D. Also, recall that the
safety-related skill s is normally distributed, thus f (•) is also normally distributed.
Therefore, the conditional expectation of z given that the job is risky (i.e. D = 1)
can be written as
E(z|D = 1) = µz + σz φ(α)/(1 − φ(α))

(4.2)

Where α = (∆W − µz )/σz . The unconditional mean of skill reward is µz and
the standard deviation of z is denoted by σz . φ(.) and Φ(.) are the standard normal
probability density function and cumulative distribution respectively. With data at
my disposal, I am not able to observe directly skill s. However, as the skill technology
is assumed to be linear and additive in personality traits, I parameterize skill as the
first order approximation (I will discuss this more detail in the econometric section.).
8

This conceptually follows Thaler and Rosen (1976) that job-related injury is by-product of
production. The basic idea here is that the firm produces not only output sold to the consumer
market but also risk of accidents sold to the labor market.
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4.4
4.4.1

Data and Econometric specifications
Data

For the analysis, I use the United Kingdom Household Longitudinal Study (UKHLS
or Understanding Society). The UKHLS is one of the largest longitudinal datasets.
It collects the sample of 40,000 households with 100,000 individuals. Currently, there
are three waves from the plan of 18 waves. The first three waves are the year of 2009,
2010, and 2011. The information of the UKHLS consists of hours worked, earning,
workers’ occupation, education, health condition and family status. Starting in the
wave 2, the UKHLS includes sample from another longitudinal survey that took
place before, namely, the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). The BHPS is
conducted annually from 1991 to 2009. In this regard, the UKHLS can be seen
as the continuation of the BHPS, although the UKHLS collected additional nonBHPS respondents. Furthermore, the UKHLS collected more diverse socio-economic
questions than did the BHPS. However, regarding data on employment and wages,
the BHPS had more detailed information.
In the wave 3 (2011), the UKHLS collected information on the big 5 personality
traits (i.e. personality module). The big 5 personality traits are collected through 15
personality related questions (in the following subsection I will explain more detailed
on the big 5 personality trait questions). These questions are not asked in every wave.
Given that, I merge the personality trait module with employment and individual
information from three waves of the UKHLS. Moreover, I restrict the sample to
respondents who were between the ages of 20 and 65 years, currently living in the
UK, in full-time job and paid employment. The total person-year sample is 34,407
observations. Then, I merge the UKHLS data with data on job-related injury rates
(i.e. both fatal and non fatal injury) the UK’s Health and Safety Executive (HSE)
from 2008-2012. The job-related injury dataset provides information on fatal and
nonfatal accidents at the two digit Standard Industrial Classification code (SIC).
Risk Measures
I use two measures of job-related risk, namely, fatal and non-fatal risks. The risk variables are constructed from rates of fatal and nonfatal injury. The UK HSE provides
a comprehensive inventory of all work-related injuries in a given year and it comes
from reports by the Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations (RIDDOR).
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In the UK, RIDDOR imposes a legal responsibility on employers to report workplace incidents to the enforcing authority, that is, Health and Executive Safety (HSE)
and several local authorities. The workplace-safety regulations stipulate three categories of reportable injury to workers: 1) fatal, 2) major injuries and 3) over-3-day
injuries. Some examples of major injuries are fractures and amputation. Over-3-day
injuries are injuries that lead workers absence from work or inability to carry their
usual job for over three days. Considering the severity of injuries, and, the purpose
of this paper, I use fatal injury and major injuries as measures of risk of injury.
The use of reported injuries (i.e. fatal and major injuries) as the risk measure relies
on a crucial assumption that the subjective risk assessments by workers and employers
are aligned with the objective measures of the risk represented by the rates of injuries
(Kniesner et al., 2012). Viscusi and Aldy (2003) reviewed studies suggesting that
there is a strong correlation between workers’ subjective risk assessments and reported
injury rates. Here, we may think that the reported injury rates render workers and
employers about the nature of the job, and thus, workers use this information to form
risk beliefs. Therefore, we expect that the rates of injuries could serve as a proxy for
the subjective risk beliefs.
Personality Trait Measures
Personality psychologists have constructed various measures for personality traits.
The most prominent personality measure is Five-Factor Model or the big-five personality traits. The big 5 traits have long been used and widely acknowledged in the
psychology literature as a way to summarize wide arrays of personality characteristics
(see John and Srivastava (1999)). Many recent economic studies looking at the role
of non-cognitive skills on labor market outcomes also utilize the measures. Thus,
using the big five inventory is both practical and widely accepted in economics and
psychology literatures. Here, I also use the big 5 personality trait measures to elicit
individual personality characteristics.
As discussed above, the big 5 personality traits consist of the five basic psychological elements: 1) Openness to experience, 2) Conscientiousness, 3) Extraversion,
4) Agreeableness, and 5) Neuroticism. It is instructive to note that these five traits
are not a mutually exclusive psychological classification i.e. individuals differ in the
degrees of these traits. For example, an extrovert individual may tend to be lazy—i.e.
high level of extraversion but low in conscientiousness. Researchers elicit personality
traits through psychological surveys that typically consist of a long list of questions.
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Individual responds to these questions are then classified into the five psychological
arrays.
Information on personality traits in the UKHLS, however, is based on a short
version personality questions. Despite of using concise-version personality questions,
many studies support the reliability of this approach (see for example Benet-Martı́nez
and John (1998) and Gosling et al. (2003)). Specifically, the UKHLS asks 15 questions
containing claims, and, of which three each are intended to capture the associated
personality trait. Respondents are then asked to rate these questions on how they
see themselves on a 7-point scale (i.e. 1 “does not apply” to 7 “applies perfectly”).
Similar to other studies, I construct each personality trait by averaging the score of
three related questions. There is a concern that variation in personality measures
stem from measurement error. To assess this problem, I compute Cronbach’s alpha
reliabilities.9 For each personality trait , I find that Cronbach index as follows:
Agreeableness 0.60, Conscientiousness 0.52, extraversion 0.65, neuroticism 0.71, and
Openness 0.63. These coefficients are close to the ones found from Heineck (2011),
Bollinger et al. (2012), and Nandi and Nicoletti (2014) that use the British Household
Panel Survey (BHPS).
Table 4.1 shows the big five personality traits and the questions asked in the
UKHLS to measure each trait. As was discussed previously, some personality traits
could be thought as important inputs enabling workers to handle risk of injury at
workplace. For instance, a worker with high score of neuroticism indicated by high
level of anxiety and inability to handle stress is expected to choose a safer workplace
as they will have low level of personal skill to reduce mortality risk at workplace. On
the other hand, a worker with high level of extraversion who is more adventurous tend
to be more skillful in reducing personal risk of injury and thus, they are more likely to
go to a relatively dangerous occupation, holding other things constant. These various
measures of personality traits could capture latent individual skill that determines
job sorting based on risk of injury.
4.4.2

Econometric specifications

In order to test the effect of personality traits on the level of risk that workers are
willing to bear, I use the following econometric model
Riskijt = si + Xijt β + uijt
9

(4.3)

Cronbach’s alpha reliability index is the standard procedure used to assess the validity of
personality measures.
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Riskijt is risk variable. I use two risk variables: the rates of fatal injury and
non-fatal injury. si is the worker skill. Xi jt is the vector of individual characteristics.
Some of the characteristics are time-invariant such as sex and education. The skill,
si , is not observable through data. Yet as si is linear in personality traits, the first
order approximation to the technology of skill formation can be written as
si =

X

γtpi + εi

(4.4)

where p = O, C, E, A, N (i.e. personality traits). The idiosyncratic aspect of skill
is denoted by εi where εi is distributed normally. Substituting equation (2) to (1),
we get the following econometric equation.
Riskijt =

X

γtpi + Xijt β + εi + uijt

(4.5)

The above model is estimated with OLS (or pooled cross-section time series to
be precise) and tobit. Tobit model allows us to censor observation with zero value of
injury rate. This is important as fatalities are rare event and thus we may observe a
large number of ’zero’ in fatality rate.
4.5

Results

4.5.1

Baseline Personality Traits and Risk

Table 3 exhibits estimates of OLS and Tobit models where the dependent variable
is the rate of fatal injury10 . As fatalities are rare events, RIDDOR does not report
publicly fatality rates close to zero for some industries. Tobit model then may fit to
address this issue as the model allows for censoring at zero. The variables of interest
are personality traits: agreeableness, conscientiousness, extraversion, neuroticism and
openness to experience. In addition to these variables, in some models I include a
dummy variable indicating whether a respondent became smoker at age 16 years old.
The decision to smoke at early age may indicate their tolerant attitudes toward risky
behavior, including risk of fatal injury. Related to this, Viscusi and Hersch (2001) also
find that smokers are more likely to choose riskier jobs. Column 1 of OLS and Tobit
models in Table 4.3 report results in which I do not include control for occupations.
As personality traits may be correlated with occupations, controlling for occupations
in Column 2 of Table 4.3 is expected to reduce omitted variable bias.
10

it is in per 100,000 workers.
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The results confirm some of the model expectation in 4.1. I in particular find that
Agreeableness, Neuroticism, and Openness are negatively related with fatality rate.
From column 1 of OLS estimate, a one standard deviation increase in agreeableness,
neuroticism and openness are associated with a decrease in fatality rates by 0.034,
0.029, and 0.041 per 100,000 workers respectively. This translates into a percentage
reduction in fatality rate by 7.4% (agreeableness), 6.3 % (neuroticism), and 8.9 %
(openness). This suggests that friendly, tense, and more open individuals tend to
go to relatively safe jobs. On the other hand, conscientiousness and extraversion are
associated positively with fatal rate. A one-standard deviation increase in conscientiousness and extraversion are associated with an increase in fatality rate by 0.03
and 0.016 per 100,000 workers respectively. That is, more organized and extrovert
individuals tend to go to riskier jobs.
The result in the model with full specification still confirms the pattern. Onestandard deviation increase in agreeableness, neuroticism and openness are still associated negatively with fatality rate at workplace and positively with conscientiousness
and extraversion. In column 2, we see that smokers at 16 years old tend to go to
riskier job. Yet, when I control for occupation dummies, the effect of smoking at early
age becomes insignificant. This might be due to highly correlation between types of
occupations and the smoking variable.
Tobit models with censoring at zero yield higher coefficients of personality traits
and the results are the same as the ones with OLS. Column 1 of Tobit model shows
that agreeableness, neuroticism and openness are associated with lower fatality rate.
Furthermore, a one-standard deviation increase in these traits reduces fatality rate
by 0.05, 0.056 and 0.09 per 100,000 workers respectively, suggesting a percentage
reduction in fatality rate by 10.9 %, 12.2 %, and 19.6 % respectively. Meanwhile a
one standard deviation increase in conscientiousness and Extraversion are associated
with an increase in fatality rate by 0.054 and 0.027 per 100,000 workers or an increase proportionally by 11.7 % and 5.9 %. There is a tendency that the coefficients
of personality traits are attenuated when I include control for occupations in tobit
estimates. Comparing to the OLS estimates, the attenuation, moreover, seems to be
larger in tobit. However, tobit models suggest a stronger tendency of job sorting due
to personality traits.
Other variables in the regression reported in Table 4.3 also provide some insight
on job sorting. Men are more likely to go to riskier jobs than are women. White
tends to risky jobs and riskier jobs are mostly in private sector. Highly educated
workers typically sort into safer jobs. Despite being insignificant, married workers
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tend to go to safer jobs. This is similar to previous findings on the marital status-risk
relationship (Garen, 1988; DeLeire and Levy, 2004).
Furthermore there is ample evidence suggesting a close connection between risks of
fatal injury and non-fatal injury. The literature on the risk-wage relationship suggests
that both risks are positively correlated —i.e. jobs with high risk of fatal injury are
typically also the ones with high risk of nonfatal injury. Thus, we may expect that
personality traits play the same effect in regard to risk of non fatal injury as they do
in risk of fatal injury. Table 4.4 reports the results for non-fatal injury, and the same
as in Table 4.3, I report the results of both OLS and Tobit. The results from Table
4.4 shows that the coefficients of personality traits have the same sign as they are in
the regression of fatal injury.
From column 1 of Table 4.4 we see that a one standard deviation increase in
agreeableness, neuroticism, and openness leads to a reduction in nonfatal injury by 2.08, -2.18 and -4.34 per 100,000 workers respectively. It means a percentage reduction
in the risk of nonfatal injury by 2.1 %, 2.2%, and 4.4% for agreeableness, neuroticism
and openness respectively. Compare to sorting based on risk of fatal injury, the
reduction of non-fatal risk is much smaller. This could be because almost many jobs
have non zero nonfatal injury. Thus, workers may be indifferent about two jobs with
small differences in the risk of nonfatal injury. Moreover, the majority of workers
may be far more tolerant to risk of nonfatal accidents at workplace. Consequently, it
results in a weaker job sorting process. This is different from the risk of fatal injury
where workers encounter various jobs with substantial differences in the mortality
risk.
Previously we observed that women tend sort to safer jobs. Table 4.5 provides the
results of job sorting by gender. In general, I do not find evidence that personality
traits are associated with the job sorting of women except for extraversion where
extrovert women are more likely to choose riskier jobs. For men, we see a consistent
pattern on the relationship between personality traits and risk. Concise men tend to
go to riskier jobs—a one standard deviation increase in conscientiousness is associated
with an increase in fatality rate by 0.042 per 100,000 workers (or an increase in fatality
rate by 9%). Meanwhile, the association between conscientiousness and nonfatal
injury rate among the sample of men is not statistically significant. It is important
to note that the model specification of Table 4.5 is similar to the one in column 3
of Table 4.1 of OLS model. Hence, comparing both tables, we see that much of job
sorting due to fatality rate is driven by men.
Table 4.6 exhibit the results by job sectors (i.e private vs public). Earlier we saw
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that public sector is associated with safer occupations. Here we observe that among
public sector workers risk of fatal injury is less sensitive to agreeableness, conscientiousness and neuroticism. On the other hand, extrovert and less open individuals
tend to go to riskier occupations in public sector. On the other hand, antagonistic, more organized and more stable mentally individuals in private sector would go
to riskier jobs. Moreover, evidence that some personality traits are significantly associated with the risk in private sector while other traits and the risk are strongly
correlated in public sector may suggest that some traits are awarded differently across
sectors.
4.5.2

Robustness Checks

There is a concern that social and economic environments may influence personality,
and thus, personality traits are endogenous. For example, Heckman et al. (2006)
shows that the level of schooling at the date of the test may affect the score of
personality tests among young individuals. This creates several problems. First, we
encounter the problem of reverse causality and one is simply unable to draw the causal
effect of personality traits on the choice of job riskiness based on the previous results.
Second, I rely on an assumption that personality traits are latent and stable over
time. Previous works in personality traits suggest that personality traits are relatively
insulated from environment and fairly stable for individuals beyond 30 years old (i.e.
this is known as the plaster hypothesis) (Costa Jr and McCrae, 1994; McCrae and
Costa Jr, 1996, McCrae and Costa Jr; McCrae and Costa, 2003). Yet Srivastava et al.
(2003) show that some traits evolve overtime. While Heckman et al. (2006) find the
effect of schooling on the scores of personality measures among young individuals and
personality traits evolve, this could raise the issue of spurious relationship between
the choice of job riskiness and personality traits if the variable of schooling does not
fully capture its effect on both personality traits and job riskiness.
Regarding the first problem, it is instructive to note that this paper does not
attempt to make a causality claim. In spite of not making causality claim, I attempt
to address the reverse direction between personality traits and risk by using the lagged
measures of personality traits. In particularly I regress risk on the personality traits in
the past. The main assumption here is that the current choice of job riskiness should
have no effect on the measured of personality traits in the past. In this approach, I
merge personality traits in the BHPS with the UKHLS.11 On the second problem, I
11

Starting the second wave, the UKHLS take the original respondents in the BHPS. So I am able
to merge the personality traits from the BHPS to the UKHLS dataset.
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undertake a common approach that is used in the literature (Nyhus and Pons, 2005;
Heineck and Anger, 2010). Specifically, I regress each personality trait on age and age
squared and take residuals from the regression to replace the variables of personality
traits. The residuals are expected to be free from age effects. Although this may be
imperfect, this approach is expected to handle the effect of environment and age on
personality traits.
Residual Personality Traits
I begin to address the second problem where I use the residuals of the regressed
personality traits on the characteristics of workers—i.e. I call them as adjusted personality traits—and use them to examine job sorting. To be specific, I estimate the
following model
tpi = Zi α + t̂pi

(4.6)

tpi is personality trait p of individual i. Zi is the vector of individual characteristics. It contains age, age squared, a dummy for private sector, and 9 dummies of
occupations at the time where the test of personality traits was conducted (i.e. it is
in the third wave or 2011-2012) . t̂pi is the residuals that are expected to be uncorrelated with age and types of occupations. In some sense, they also reduce the effect of
distaste (or taste) of occupations on personality traits. I then use tˆpi for the second
stage of estimation. Thus equation 4.11 becomes
Riskijt =

X

γb
tpi + Xijt β + εi + uijt

(4.7)

Table 4.7 reports the result of adjusted personality trait measures. This table
is similar to Table 4.3 where I provided the results of both OLS and Tobit model.
Compared to the result of column 1 from both OLS and tobit models in Table 4.3 (i.e.
where we use direct scores of personality traits), we do not observe that the adjusted
personality traits (i.e. residuals of personality traits) alter qualitatively the main
conclusion (Column 1 of Table 4.7). Agreeableness and neuroticism are still associated
with lower choice of job riskiness. Openness is still negative but insignificant. In spite
of not being insignificant, we still observe that conscientiousness and extraversion are
associated positively with decision to work in risky jobs. This is qualitatively similar
to the previous result. Yet the substantial decline in the estimated coefficients as we
use the residuals of personality traits is suggestive evidence that types of occupations
may influence personality traits.
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In the model controlling for all the characteristics of workers (i.e. column 3 of
Table 4.7), the coefficients of adjusted personality traits are very close to the ones in
the previous model presented in column 2 of Table 4.3 which controls for occupations.
This points out that occupations and workplace environments seem to have effects
on personality traits. Thus, the adjusted personality traits are expected to minimize
these effects.
The Lagged Measures of Personality Traits
The second approach that I use to minimize the interdependency between the rates of
injury and personality traits is using lag personality trait measures. In this approach, I
combine two datasets, namely, BHPS and UKHLS. In 2005, BHPS asked respondents
about personality traits. The questions about personality traits in BHPS are the same
as the questions in UKHLS. I then merge personality traits in BHPS 2005 with data
UKHLS for survey year 2010 and 2011 (wave 2 and 3). The reason of using UKHLS
waves 2 and 3 is because UKHLS wave 2 started including the sample of BHPS.
Using the long lag of personality trait measures is important in many ways. First
of all, if the current personality trait measures are sensitive to the current working
environment, implying that the measures are less valid in capturing latent individual
variables, we expect that current occupations should not shape the lagged personality
traits. Second, similar to all studies in the literature, I depart from an assumption
that personality traits as latent variable (i.e constant overtime). If the assumption
is hold, the effects of the current scores and of the lagged scores of personality traits
on the choice of job risk should be, to some extent, the same. Lastly, I use five year
lagged scores of personality traits, and thus, individuals may change jobs within this
period. Hence I allow that individuals change jobs that really suit their preferences
and, thus, we can capture the effects of personality traits on decision to work in risky
jobs.
With the lagged scores of personality traits, I estimate the following regression
Riskijt =

X

γtp,2005
+ Xijt β + εi + uijt
i

(4.8)

Equation 4.8 is similar to equation 4.11, except that I use the scores of personality
traits in the year 2005. Table 4.9 exhibits the result of the effects of lag personality traits on the current rates of job injury. Interestingly, the pattern of the effects
qualitatively similar to the previous two models. In some cases, the magnitude of the
effects are the same as it is in Table 4.3. Conscientiousness has a positive correla-
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tion with the decision to work in risky occupations and the magnitude, remarkably,
is similar to the result presented in Table 4.3. Neuroticism and Openness to new
experience are associated negatively with the level of risk of injury and again, the
magnitude of the coefficients is close to what we find with personality traits measures
from UKHLS data. This suggests that the personality trait measures are able to
capture the latent variables and, surprisingly, the effects of some measures are pretty
stable in relatively long term. Moreover, Agreeableness is negative and significant for
the case of non-fatal injury. Meanwhile Extraversion becomes negative when we use
lag personality traits.
4.5.3

Hedonic Wage Model with Personality Traits

The evidence of worker sorting to risk-safe jobs based on personality traits suggests
that people are not randomly assigned to jobs. Thus, differences in individual traits
would affect both the choice of wage levels and job riskiness. This implies that failure to control for the traits would result in biased estimates of wage premium for
risk based on OLS. If traits are similar to job-safety related skill, based on the prediction Shogren and Stamland (2002), we expect that the risk premium estimated
through the OLS model without controlling for personality traits tends to be upward
bias. In this section, I discuss the importance of controlling personality traits in
the hedonic wage model. I also exploit the capabilities of panel data to control for
unobserved heterogeneity. In particular, I use fixed effects and random effects estimators. Inclusion of these models will provide comparison between models accounting
for unobservables (i.e. fixed effects and random effects) and those not controlling
for unobservables (i.e OLS). I will start with panel data estimators controlling for
unobservables. Specifically, I estimate the following model
ln wijt = ci + αRiskijt + Xijt β + εijt

(4.9)

ln wijt natural log of real monthly labor income. The unobserved heterogeneity is
denoted by ci . Xijt is other time-variant covariates that are similar to previous specifications. Under fixed effects model, ci is parameter to be estimated while in random
effects, ci is assumed to be uncorrelated with observed covariates. The coefficient of
interest is α that represents the risk premium.
I compare panel data estimators with pooled OLS. First, I run regression with
OLS that does not control for personality traits.
ln wijt = αRiskijt + Xijt β + εijt
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(4.10)

In the second OLS model, I include personality traits and estimate the following
model.
X p
ln wijt = αRiskijt +
γti + Xijt β + εijt
(4.11)
α from these models provide information on the size of the bias. The fixed effects
estimator provides us a consistent estimate of α. Thus, fixed effects model will be
used as a benchmark for other models. Moreover, occupation or job sorting may also
occur along gender basis. Hence, I estimate the risk premium for male workers and
female separately.
Table 4.11 exhibits results for the mortality risk premium. With fixed effects
estimator that controls for person-specific heterogeneity, the estimated risk premium
for male workers due to an increase in one death per 100,000 workers is 0.69 %. Yet
the point estimate is not statistically significant at the standard significance level.
Random effects estimator that also controls for person-specific heterogeneity yields
higher estimated mortality risk premium (i.e. the fatal risk premium is 1.6 %).
We compare these estimators with pooled OLS both with and without controlling
for personality traits among men. The estimated mortality risk premium based on
the standard pooled OLS is 2.15% for an increase in death per 100,000 workers.
Controlling for the personality traits reduces the risk premium to 1.9%. This suggests
that personality traits could serve as a proxy for the safety-related skill. This evidence
also confirms the prediction of Shogren and Stamland (2002) that failure to control
the safety-related skill would lead to upward bias in the risk premium. Comparing
the OLS model controlling for traits (i.e. OLS-traits) with fixed effects estimators
suggests that the former does not perform better than the latter. It is not surprising as
there may be substantial unobserved heterogeneity that is not captured by personality
traits but is correlated with the fatal risk—that is, unobserved heterogeneity can be
preferences for risk.
We observe, in general, similar findings among women. In particular, the estimated mortality risk premium under models accounting for person-specific heterogeneity is lower than the ones with OLS. The estimated mortality risk premium
under fixed effects is 1.04%. Meanwhile it is 1.59 % in the OLS model controlling for
personality traits. Compared to estimators with the sample of men, the difference
between fixed effects estimator and the OLS-Traits model among women is lower.
This may suggest that personality traits capture part of unobervables in the sample
of women. Moreover, the estimated risk premium of women is higher than that of
men. This can be explained by risk-aversion among women by which women require
higher compensating differential in order to take the same risky jobs.
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In addition to risk variable, I also find there is association between personality
traits and wages. Among the sample men, being conscience is associated positively
with wages—i.e. a one standard deviation increase in conscientiousness is associated
with 2.1 % higher wage and it is statistically significant. On the other hand, neuroticism and agreeableness are associated negatively with wages. Different from men,
among women, extraversion and openness result in higher wages by 1.16% and 2.03%
respectively. Similar to men, agreeableness and neuroticism have negative effects on
wages in the sample of women. As women and men may enter different types of occupations, this suggests that personality traits are valued differently across occupation
and, consequently, gender as well. Overall, the finding on the relationship between
personality traits and wages is similar to previous studies.
Table 4.12 displays the results for non-fatal injury. Under fixed effects estimator,
the wage premium for non fatal injury is 0.01 % due to an increase in one non-fatal
injury per 100,000 workers. However, the estimated non-fatal risk premium under
OLS models is biased and they yield an inconsistent sign as what compensating differential theory predict. Random effects estimator that accounts for person-specific
heterogeneity also produces the inconsistent sign of non fatal injury variable. Furthermore, there is no substantial difference in the wage premium for non-fatal injury
between men and women.
I investigate further on how distributions of personality traits affect the wage
premium for risk. Table 4.13 exhibits the results of hedonic wage model where I
interact the fatal risk with personality traits. We now observe that, in the model
with the interaction, the difference in the coefficient on the risk measure with between
the OLS and fixed effect estimator is not as large as in the previous models. It is
important to note, however, the coefficient on risk suggests the risk premium for the
average individuals. The results also suggest that there is heterogeneity in the risk
premium due to personality traits. In particular, with the fixed effect estimator—our
preferred specification—suggests that agreeable men are more likely to ask for a
higher risk premium than do the average men.12 This is consistent with the previous
finding where we find that individuals with high level of agreeableness tend to avoid
in risky jobs. Thus, as the risk increases, high agreeable workers demand higher
premium to compensate the risk they are taking. The interaction term between the
fatal risk and agreeableness in the OLS model is negative. While we expect that
fixed effects estimator control for unobservables, the coefficient on agreeableness with
12
Recall that I normalize the distribution of personality traits. Thus the average men should
have traits around zero or negative.
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the OLS estimator is downward bias. Furthermore, we do not observe substantial
heterogeneity in the risk premium due to other types of personality traits.
4.6

Conclusion

As noted by Shogren and Stamland (2002), a worker who chooses to work in riskier
occupation reveals himself about his risk preference or ability to reduce risk of death
at workplace, or both. Thus far, the extent of sorting in the labor market based on
ability to reduce personal risk of injury has not been adequately tested. In this paper,
I use big 5 personality traits as a proxy for the skill to reduce risk of injury at workplace. The big 5 personality traits are extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness,
neuroticism, and openness to experience. Different from previous papers that study
the sorting of workers based on risk preferences and risk of death, in this article I
treat personality traits as inputs for skill.
Using data from the United Kingdom Household Longitudinal Study (the UKHLS),
I find that personality traits determine job sorting. I particularly find that conscientious and extravert individuals tend to be employed in riskier jobs (jobs with high
rate of fatal and nonfatal injury). In regard to conscientiousness, personality facets
covered in this category describe qualities that are clearly important for someone to
handle a harsh working environment. On the other hand, I also find that agreeableness, openness, and neuroticism are negatively associated with risk of injury—i.e.
individuals with these traits are inclined to choose safer jobs. Neuroticism in particular includes dimensions such as anxiety, nervous (vs relaxed) and impulsiveness.
These traits do not render the necessary skill to reduce risk of injury and are less
valued in riskier occupations. I conduct several sensitivity analyses. Overall, I find
evidence suggesting that sorting of workers and jobs based on personality traits and
risk of injury occur.
Moreover, it is plausible that personality traits are developed through interaction
between individuals and institutions, and they vary across geography. For example,
Scotland has stronger labor union tradition than do England and it is also the strong
base of Labour Party, which may suggest that Scotland and England have different
institutions. Thus, the relationship between personality traits and job sorting is
confounded by this unobserved factor. However, the extent to which this institution
may influence the sorting is controlled by region fixed effects, and despite controlling
for geography, we still observe the evidence of worker sorting.
As we discussed previously, another concern regarding personality traits is that
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they are changing during individual life stages. For instance, personality traits during
adolescence may affect the school level and thus, it affects someone’s future occupation, including the choice of job riskiness. Thus, the current job sorting is a result
of the observed personality traits in the past—for example, Heckman et al. (2006)
show the influence of traits on the levels of schooling and thus they have long-term
consequences. Unfortunately, data at my disposal do not allow me to trace the effect
of personality traits at every stage of individual life. A worthwhile direction for future
research would be to measures personality traits over life stages and then test how
they affect related outcomes at every stage.

Copyright c Teguh Yudo Wicaksono, 2015.
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Table 4.1: The Big Five personality traits: related facet-adjectives and the UKHLS questions
Big Five traits

Personality facets
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Ideas (curious)
Fantasy (imaginative)
Aesthetics (artistic)
Openness
Actions (wide interests)
Feelings (excitable)
Competence (efficient)
Order (organized)
Dutifulness (not careless)
Conscientiousness
Achievement striving (thorough)
Self-discipline (not lazy)
Gregariousness (sociable)
Assertiveness (Forceful)
Activity (energetic)
Extraversion
Excitement seeking (adventurous)
Positive emotions (enthusiastic)
Trust (forgiving)
Straightforwardness (not demanding)
Altruism (warm)
Agreeableness
Compliance (not stubborn)
Modesty (not show-off)
Anxiety (tense)
Angry hostility (irritable)
Depression (not contended)
Neuroticism
Self-consciousness (shy)
Impulsiveness (moody)

Source: Cited from Nandi and Nicoletti (2009)

Respondents see themselves as someone who
O1. is original, comes up with ideas
O2. values artistic, aesthetic experiences
O3. Has an active imagination

C1. does a thorough job
C2. tends to be lazy (reversed score)
C3. Does things efficiently

E1. Is talkative
E2. Is outgoing, sociable
E3. Is reserved (reversed score)

A1. Is sometimes rude to others (reversed score)
A2. Has a forgiving nature
A3. Is considerate and kind

N1. Worries a lot
N2. Gets nervous easily
N3. Is relaxed, handles stress well (reversed score)

Figure 4.1: Distribution of Personality Traits
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Table 4.2: Summary Statistics
Variable

Mean Standard Deviation

Fatal rate
Non fatal rate

0.46
97.83

1.03
71.90

Personality traits
Agreeableness
Conscientiousness
Extraversion
Neuroticism
Openness

5.58
5.59
4.59
3.50
4.63

0.98
0.96
1.24
1.32
1.17

14.35
41.78
0.88
0.56
0.53
0.33
0.61

3.41
11.03
0.33
0.50
0.50
0.47
0.49

0.13
0.28
0.12
0.11
0.13
0.07
0.15

0.34
0.45
0.33
0.32
0.34
0.26
0.35

0.18
0.16
0.18
0.12
0.08
0.08
0.05
0.07
0.07

0.39
0.37
0.39
0.33
0.27
0.27
0.22
0.26
0.26

Years of Schooling
Age
white
married
Male
Smoker at age 16
Private Job
Number of Employment
<9
10-49
50-99
100-199
200-499
500-999
> 1000
Occupations
Managers and Senior Officials
Professional Occupations
Associate professional and Technical Occupations
Administrative and Secretarial Occupations
Skilled trade occupations
Personal Service Occupations
Sales and Customer Service Occupations
Process, Plant and Machine Operatives
Elementary Occupations
Note: UKHLS
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Table 4.3: OLS and Tobit Models for risk of fatal injury
Variables
Agreeableness
Conscientiousness
Extraversion
Neuroticism
Openness
Smoker at age 16
Male
Age
Age Squared
Years of Schooling
Married
White
Private Job
Constant

Number of employment
Region
Occupation
Year dummy
Observations
R-squared
Log Pseudolikelihood

OLS
(1)

Tobit
(2)

-0.0339*** -0.0270***
(0.0097)
(0.0096)
0.0330*** 0.0257***
(0.0091)
(0.0089)
0.0161*
0.0167*
(0.0094)
(0.0091)
-0.0298*** -0.0217***
(0.0082)
(0.0079)
-0.0409*** -0.0213**
(0.0088)
(0.0088)
0.0369**
0.0147
(0.0180)
(0.0176)
0.3948*** 0.2533***
(0.0166)
(0.0158)
0.0027
0.0001
(0.0055)
(0.0053)
-0.0000
0.0000
(0.0001)
(0.0001)
-0.0220*** -0.0095***
(0.0023)
(0.0023)
-0.0162
-0.0056
(0.0163)
(0.0159)
0.1009*** 0.1018***
(0.0220)
(0.0214)
0.2875*** 0.1917***
(0.0156)
(0.0172)
0.5427*** 0.4644***
(0.1356)
(0.1325)

(1)

(2)

-0.0534*** -0.0393***
(0.0137)
(0.0134)
0.0540*** 0.0436***
(0.0133)
(0.0130)
0.0272**
0.0234*
(0.0137)
(0.0133)
-0.0556*** -0.0398***
(0.0125)
(0.0121)
-0.0909*** -0.0539***
(0.0130)
(0.0128)
0.0467*
0.0098
(0.0259)
(0.0252)
0.6692*** 0.4661***
(0.0272)
(0.0257)
0.0022
0.0024
(0.0078)
(0.0076)
-0.0000
-0.0000
(0.0001)
(0.0001)
-0.0507*** -0.0233***
(0.0037)
(0.0037)
-0.0374
-0.0113
(0.0245)
(0.0239)
0.0889**
0.1033***
(0.0371)
(0.0360)
0.4860*** 0.2718***
(0.0246)
(0.0269)
0.4228**
0.1391
(0.2007)
(0.1986)

Yes
Yes
No
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
No
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

34,407
0.1005

34,407
0.1491

34,407

34,407

-44444.314

-42894.308

Note: Dependent variable is three-year average fatality rate at two digit industry
level. For tobit models, observations are censored at 0. Column 2 controls for occupations. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered at the level of
the individual. *** significant at 1%, **5%,* 10%.
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Table 4.4: OLS and Tobit models for risk of nonfatal injury
Variables

OLS

Tobit

(1)

(2)

Agreeableness

-2.0816***
-1.8185***
(0.6469)
(0.6089)
Conscientiousness
1.9641***
1.2805**
(0.6386)
(0.5999)
Extraversion
1.8916***
1.8732***
(0.6296)
(0.5911)
Neuroticism
-2.1890***
-1.5741***
(0.5965)
(0.5656)
Openness
-4.3386***
-1.7945***
(0.6193)
(0.5862)
Smoker at age 16
3.5181***
0.5017
(1.2577)
(1.1916)
Male
23.7699*** 12.3450***
(1.2295)
(1.1876)
Age
0.4083
0.5484
(0.3792)
(0.3618)
Age Squared
-0.0028
-0.0055
(0.0045)
(0.0043)
Years of Schooling
-2.9494***
-1.1413***
(0.1749)
(0.1754)
Married
-3.3799***
-1.2807
(1.1905)
(1.1307)
White
-2.4397
0.3602
(1.8542)
(1.7116)
Private Job
4.1337***
-5.5667***
(1.1200)
(1.1882)
Constant
141.0618*** 108.4133***
(9.8979)
(9.7439)
Number of employment
Yes
Yes
Region
Yes
Yes
Occupation
No
Yes
Year dummy
Yes
Yes
Observations
R-squared
Log Pseudolikelihood

34,407
0.0831

34,407
0.1733

(1)

(2)

-2.0816***
(0.6469)
1.9558***
(0.6384)
1.8906***
(0.6297)
-2.1801***
(0.5964)
-4.3471***
(0.6195)
3.5413***
(1.2575)
23.7560***
(1.2293)
0.4058
(0.3791)
-0.0027
(0.0045)
-2.9462***
(0.1749)
-3.3934***
(1.1902)
-2.4538
(1.8534)
4.1160***
(1.1199)
141.1743***
(9.8967)
Yes
Yes
No
Yes

-1.8189***
(0.6088)
1.2742**
(0.5997)
1.8724***
(0.5912)
-1.5667***
(0.5655)
-1.8041***
(0.5865)
0.5222
(1.1914)
12.3372***
(1.1872)
0.5459
(0.3616)
-0.0054
(0.0043)
-1.1400***
(0.1753)
-1.2927
(1.1303)
0.3455
(1.7108)
-5.5777***
(1.1878)
108.5519***
(9.7429)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

34,407

34,407

-194371

-192593

Note: Dependent variable is three-year average nonfatal injury rate at two digit industry
level. For tobit models, observations are censored at 0. Column 2 controls for occupations.
Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered at the level of the individual.
*** significant at 1%, **5%,* 10%.
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Table 4.5: OLS models for fatal and nonfatal risk by gender
Variables

Fatal Risk
Male
Female

Agreeableness

-0.0436***
0.0040
(0.0153)
(0.0082)
Conscientiousness 0.0422***
-0.0020
(0.0152)
(0.0070)
Extraversion
0.0108
0.0214***
(0.0159)
(0.0073)
Neuroticism
-0.0372***
0.0031
(0.0142)
(0.0069)
Openness
-0.0272*
-0.0153*
(0.0150)
(0.0088)
Smoker at age 16
0.0377
-0.0178
(0.0287)
(0.0166)
Age
-0.0053
0.0131***
(0.0092)
(0.0044)
Age Squared
0.0001
-0.0002***
(0.0001)
(0.0001)
Years of Schooling -0.0165***
-0.0021
(0.0040)
(0.0023)
Married
-0.0211
0.0057
(0.0278)
(0.0147)
White
0.1577***
0.0352*
(0.0360)
(0.0201)
Private Job
0.1934*** 0.2023***
(0.0307)
(0.0159)
Constant
1.0649***
-0.1233
(0.2238)
(0.1217)
Observations
R-squared

18,159
0.1238

16,248
0.0758

Non Fatal Risk
Male
Female
-2.7469***
(0.9180)
1.0848
(0.9599)
2.2990**
(0.9704)
-1.9248**
(0.9238)
-2.9229***
(0.9795)
1.4224
(1.8424)
0.4787
(0.5827)
-0.0037
(0.0069)
-1.6056***
(0.2865)
-2.6627
(1.9042)
3.2162
(2.6630)
-8.5821***
(1.8986)
138.7043***
(15.2064)

0.1160
(0.7137)
1.2278*
(0.6448)
1.0927*
(0.6277)
-0.9208
(0.6431)
-0.6180
(0.6305)
-0.8666
(1.3790)
0.9892**
(0.3860)
-0.0115**
(0.0046)
-0.6269***
(0.1946)
0.0819
(1.2227)
-2.5243
(2.0226)
-0.8104
(1.4303)
75.9274***
(11.0532)

18,159
0.1903

16,248
0.0671

Note: Each model is estimated by OLS. Dependent variables are three-year average fatal and nonfatal injury rate at two digit industry level. All models control
for regions, year dummies, occupations and number of employment. Standard
errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered at the level of the individual.
*** significant at 1%, **5%,* 10%.
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Table 4.6: OLS models for fatal and nonfatal risk by job sectors
Variables
Agreeableness
Conscientiousness
Extraversion
Neuroticism
Openness
Smoker at age 16
Male
Age
Age Squared
Years of Schooling
Married
White
Constant

Observations
R-squared

Fatal Risk
Private
Public

Non Fatal Risk
Private
Public

-0.0326**
-0.0149
-2.5700***
-0.2505
(0.0133)
(0.0112)
(0.8479)
(0.6483)
0.0297**
0.0151
1.0597
1.1863*
(0.0128)
(0.0099)
(0.8623)
(0.6411)
0.0109
0.0216**
1.9304**
1.7845***
(0.0137)
(0.0089)
(0.8715)
(0.6186)
-0.0271**
-0.0107
-1.4616*
-1.5576***
(0.0117)
(0.0078)
(0.8234)
(0.5761)
-0.0209
-0.0174*
-1.3442
-2.0817***
(0.0128)
(0.0089)
(0.8438)
(0.6144)
0.0271
-0.0087
0.2399
0.1592
(0.0246)
(0.0197)
(1.6687)
(1.2993)
0.2934*** 0.1831*** 13.7483*** 12.0631***
(0.0233)
(0.0184)
(1.7811)
(1.2515)
-0.0026
0.0002
0.2397
0.9913**
(0.0073)
(0.0062)
(0.4947)
(0.4164)
0.0000
-0.0000
-0.0005
-0.0128**
(0.0001)
(0.0001)
(0.0060)
(0.0050)
-0.0130***
-0.0028
-1.4757*** -0.7082***
(0.0033)
(0.0030)
(0.2640)
(0.1807)
0.0208
-0.0466***
0.5482
-3.6193***
(0.0231)
(0.0180)
(1.6656)
(1.1752)
0.1451***
0.0328
1.9893
-1.4523
(0.0300)
(0.0247)
(2.4163)
(1.9136)
0.7473***
0.3211** 113.7220*** 83.5808***
(0.1801)
(0.1454)
(13.4864)
(10.7708)
21,019
0.1166

13,388
0.1298

21,019
0.1722

13,388
0.2094

Note: Each model is estimated by OLS. Dependent variables are three-year average fatal and nonfatal injury rate at two digit industry level. All models control
for regions, year dummies, occupations and number of employment. Standard
errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered at the level of the individual.
*** significant at 1%, **5%,* 10%.
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Table 4.7: OLS and Tobit models for risk of fatal injury using residual personality
traits
Variables
Agreeableness
Conscientiousness
Extraversion
Neuroticism
Openness
Smoker at age 16
Male
Age
Age Squared
Years of Schooling
Married
White
Private Job
Constant
Number of employment
Region
Occupation
Year dummy
Observations
R-squared
Log Pseudolikelihood

OLS
(1)

Tobit
(2)

-0.0211** -0.0260***
(0.0100)
(0.0097)
0.0355*** 0.0267***
(0.0097)
(0.0095)
0.0230**
0.0173*
(0.0094)
(0.0092)
-0.0071
-0.0201**
(0.0083)
(0.0081)
-0.0283*** -0.0217**
(0.0094)
(0.0092)
0.0372**
0.0146
(0.0181)
(0.0176)
0.4079*** 0.2545***
(0.0164)
(0.0158)
0.0041
0.0009
(0.0055)
(0.0053)
-0.0000
-0.0000
(0.0001)
(0.0001)
-0.0228*** -0.0095***
(0.0023)
(0.0023)
-0.0150
-0.0055
(0.0163)
(0.0159)
0.0980*** 0.1019***
(0.0220)
(0.0214)
0.2961*** 0.1954***
(0.0155)
(0.0172)
0.3144*** 0.3560***
(0.1206)
(0.1194)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
34,407
0.0987

34,407
0.1490

(1)

(2)

-0.0329** -0.0386***
(0.0140)
(0.0136)
0.0579*** 0.0458***
(0.0142)
(0.0138)
0.0297**
0.0236*
(0.0138)
(0.0134)
-0.0230* -0.0387***
(0.0127)
(0.0123)
-0.0638*** -0.0555***
(0.0138)
(0.0135)
0.0485*
0.0097
(0.0260)
(0.0252)
0.6870*** 0.4675***
(0.0271)
(0.0257)
0.0047
0.0040
(0.0078)
(0.0076)
-0.0000
-0.0000
(0.0001)
(0.0001)
-0.0526*** -0.0234***
(0.0037)
(0.0037)
-0.0351
-0.0112
(0.0245)
(0.0239)
0.0860**
0.1037***
(0.0371)
(0.0360)
0.5027*** 0.2796***
(0.0247)
(0.0269)
-0.0477
-0.1190
(0.1764)
(0.1776)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
34,407

34,407

-44508

-42897

Note: Dependent variable is three-year average fatal injury rate at two digit industry level. For tobit models, observations are censored at 0. Column 2 controls for
occupations. Personality traits are derived from residuals taken from regression of
personality traits on age, age squared, and occupations. Standard errors are robust to
heteroscedasticity and clustered at the level of the individual. *** significant at 1%,
**5%,* 10%.
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Table 4.8: OLS and Tobit models for risk of nonfatal injury using residual personality
traits
Variables

OLS

Tobit

(1)

(2)

Agreeableness

-1.6442**
-1.8210***
(0.6559)
(0.6143)
Conscientiousness
2.1478***
1.3569**
(0.6777)
(0.6350)
Extraversion
2.0293***
1.8683***
(0.6380)
(0.5978)
Neuroticism
-0.7624
-1.5531***
(0.6144)
(0.5786)
Openness
-2.2216***
-1.8195***
(0.6515)
(0.6144)
Smoker at age 16
3.5207***
0.4968
(1.2607)
(1.1918)
Male
24.2234*** 12.3753***
(1.2133)
(1.1847)
Age
0.4847
0.5684
(0.3781)
(0.3601)
Age Squared
-0.0031
-0.0054
(0.0045)
(0.0043)
Years of Schooling
-3.0704***
-1.1445***
(0.1737)
(0.1752)
Married
-3.1965***
-1.2737
(1.1947)
(1.1308)
White
-2.6747
0.3772
(1.8631)
(1.7118)
Private Job
4.9067***
-5.3169***
(1.1169)
(1.1871)
Constant
123.1019*** 100.3865***
(8.5271)
(8.5774)
Number of employment
Yes
Yes
Region
Yes
Yes
Occupation
No
Yes
Year dummy
Yes
Yes
Observations
R-squared
Log Pseudolikelihood

34,407
0.0798

34,407
0.1732

(1)

(2)

-1.6435**
(0.6558)
2.1386***
(0.6776)
2.0281***
(0.6382)
-0.7537
(0.6143)
-2.2335***
(0.6518)
3.5442***
(1.2605)
24.2094***
(1.2130)
0.4819
(0.3779)
-0.0030
(0.0045)
-3.0673***
(0.1737)
-3.2104***
(1.1944)
-2.6894
(1.8623)
4.8894***
(1.1167)
123.1623***
(8.5241)
Yes
Yes
No
Yes

-1.8213***
(0.6142)
1.3505**
(0.6348)
1.8676***
(0.5979)
-1.5453***
(0.5786)
-1.8299***
(0.6146)
0.5174
(1.1916)
12.3676***
(1.1842)
0.5658
(0.3599)
-0.0054
(0.0043)
-1.1431***
(0.1752)
-1.2858
(1.1304)
0.3623
(1.7110)
-5.3275***
(1.1868)
100.4662***
(8.5742)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

34,407

34,407

-194432.24

-192594.56

Note: Dependent variable is three-year average nonfatal injury rate at two digit industry
level. For tobit models, observations are censored at 0. Column 2 controls for occupations.
Personality traits are derived from residuals taken from regression of personality traits on age,
age squared, and occupations. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered
at the level of the individual. *** significant at 1%, **5%,* 10%.
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Table 4.9: OLS and Tobit models for risk of fatal injury using past scores of
personality traits
Variables
Agreeableness
Conscientiousness
Extraversion
Neuroticism
Openness
Smoker at age 16
Male
Age
Age Squared
Years of Schooling
Married
White
Private Job
Constant
Number of employment
Region
Occupation
Year dummy
Observations
R-squared
Log Pseudolikelihood

OLS
(1)

Tobit
(2)

-0.0099
-0.0028
(0.0216)
(0.0208)
0.0137
0.0052
(0.0203)
(0.0196)
-0.0123
-0.0059
(0.0204)
(0.0198)
-0.0357*
-0.0237
(0.0185)
(0.0181)
0.0231
0.0482
(0.0296)
(0.0303)
0.0685
0.0402
(0.0426)
(0.0417)
0.3739*** 0.2261***
(0.0395)
(0.0385)
0.0062
0.0132
(0.0120)
(0.0118)
-0.0000
-0.0001
(0.0001)
(0.0001)
-0.0226*** -0.0102*
(0.0052)
(0.0054)
-0.0131
0.0190
(0.0387)
(0.0374)
0.1396*
0.1323*
(0.0742)
(0.0718)
0.3338*** 0.2080***
(0.0399)
(0.0432)
0.2783
-0.0595
(0.3451)
(0.3327)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
5,621
0.1070

5,621
0.1602

(1)

(2)

-0.0307
-0.0096
(0.0297)
(0.0285)
0.0417
0.0244
(0.0284)
(0.0276)
-0.0108
-0.0064
(0.0285)
(0.0276)
-0.0551**
-0.0332
(0.0269)
(0.0262)
-0.0292
0.0205
(0.0367)
(0.0382)
0.0944*
0.0303
(0.0572)
(0.0549)
0.6294*** 0.4287***
(0.0618)
(0.0572)
-0.0001
0.0119
(0.0167)
(0.0164)
0.0000
-0.0001
(0.0002)
(0.0002)
-0.0430*** -0.0220***
(0.0076)
(0.0075)
-0.0463
0.0014
(0.0543)
(0.0524)
0.2119
0.1716
(0.1361)
(0.1325)
0.4574*** 0.2174***
(0.0555)
(0.0626)
0.3688
-0.1045
(0.4891)
(0.4796)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
5,621

5,621

-7397

-7125

Note: Dependent variable is three-year average fatal injury rate at two digit industry
level. For tobit models, observations are censored at 0. Column 2 controls for occupations. Personality traits are from the 2005 scores of personality traits (i.e. from the
2005 BHPS dataset). Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered
at the level of the individual. *** significant at 1%, **5%,* 10%.
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Table 4.10: OLS models for risk of nonfatal injury
using past scores of personality traits
Variables

(1)

(2)

Agreeableness

-2.2438
-1.8231
(1.4446)
(1.3753)
Conscientiousness
1.6125
0.9094
(1.4594)
(1.3969)
Extraversion
0.3569
0.7777
(1.3224)
(1.2118)
Neuroticism
-2.3816*
-1.3108
(1.3290)
(1.2519)
Openness
-1.5369
1.2818
(1.5441)
(1.4725)
Smoker at age 16
1.4993
-1.9248
(2.6407)
(2.5161)
Male
25.7802*** 14.2043***
(2.6653)
(2.6245)
Age
-0.1141
0.8617
(0.8112)
(0.7745)
Age Squared
0.0008
-0.0113
(0.0095)
(0.0091)
Years of Schooling
-2.6647*** -1.3124***
(0.3255)
(0.3193)
Married
-3.5292
-0.1529
(2.6157)
(2.4945)
White
3.8906
3.8450
(6.8459)
(6.2221)
Private Job
8.2391***
-2.8906
(2.4079)
(2.5716)
Constant
126.1884*** 81.1325***
(22.8557)
(22.2207)
Number of employment
Yes
Yes
Region
Yes
Yes
Occupation
No
Yes
Year dummy
Yes
Yes
Observations
R-squared

5,621
0.0964

5,621
0.1872

Note: Dependent variable is three-year average nonfatal
injury rate at two digit industry level. Personality traits
are from the 2005 scores of personality traits (i.e. from the
2005 BHPS dataset). Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered at the level of the individual.
*** significant at 1%, **5%,* 10%.
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Table 4.11: Hedonic Wage Estimations: Fatal Injury
Variables

Fatal

Male
Fixed Eff. Random Eff.

Female
OLS

0.0069
(0.0057)

0.0160***
(0.0033)

0.0215***
(0.0035)

6.0395***
(0.7655)

6.0227***
(0.0706)

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
18,159
0.0122

OLS-Traits

0.0123
(0.0077)

0.0156*
(0.0087)

5.8799***
(0.0761)

6.8915***
(0.7961)

6.3851***
(0.0755)

6.1622***
(0.0790)

0.0159*
(0.0085)
-0.0358***
(0.0052)
0.0051
(0.0057)
0.0116**
(0.0053)
-0.0211***
(0.0051)
0.0203***
(0.0054)
6.1742***
(0.0793)

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

18,159
0.3204

18,159
0.3373

18,159
0.3415

16,248
0.0151

16,248
0.3443

16,248
0.3568

16,248
0.3624

Extraversion
Neuroticism
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Openness

Observations
R-squared

OLS

0.0104
(0.0098)

Conscientiousness

Number of employment
Region
Occupation
Year dummy

Random Eff.

0.0197***
(0.0035)
-0.0177***
(0.0051)
0.0210***
(0.0052)
-0.0012
(0.0054)
-0.0291***
(0.0053)
-0.0049
(0.0053)
5.8732***
(0.0765)

Agreeableness

Constant

OLS-Traits Fixed Eff.

Note: Dependent variable is natural log of real monthly labor income. Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors for OLS and OLS-Traits are
clustered by individuals and robust to heteroscedasticity. Each model controls for age, age squared, union status, marital status, private job, the size
of employees, 1 digit occupations, regions of residence and year dummy. For OLS and OLS Traits estimators, additional control variables are years of
schooling and race (i.e. white). *** significant at 1%, **5%,* 10% Source UKHLS.

Table 4.12: Hedonic Wage Estimations: Non Fatal Injury
Variables

Non Fatal

Male
Fixed Eff. Random Eff.

Female
OLS

0.0001
(0.0001)

-0.0001
(0.0001)

-0.0000
(0.0001)

6.0100***
(0.7668)

6.0367***
(0.0710)

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
18,159
0.0122

OLS-Traits

-0.0000
(0.0001)

-0.0001
(0.0001)

5.9051***
(0.0764)

6.8676***
(0.7966)

6.3842***
(0.0764)

6.1731***
(0.0798)

-0.0002
(0.0001)
-0.0357***
(0.0052)
0.0053
(0.0057)
0.0121**
(0.0053)
-0.0212***
(0.0051)
0.0199***
(0.0054)
6.1859***
(0.0801)

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

18,159
0.3267

18,159
0.3355

18,159
0.3400

16,248
0.0160

16,248
0.3441

16,248
0.3567

16,248
0.3623

Extraversion
Neuroticism
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Openness

Observations
R-squared

OLS

0.0004***
(0.0001)

Conscientiousness

Number of employment
Region
Occupation
Year dummy

Random Eff.

-0.0001
(0.0001)
-0.0188***
(0.0051)
0.0219***
(0.0052)
-0.0009
(0.0054)
-0.0300***
(0.0053)
-0.0057
(0.0053)
5.8990***
(0.0767)

Agreeableness

Constant

OLS-Traits Fixed Eff.

Note: Dependent variable is natural log of real monthly labor income. Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors for OLS and OLS-Traits are
clustered by individuals and robust to heteroscedasticity. Each model controls for age, age squared, union status, marital status, private job, the size
of employees, 1 digit occupations, regions of residence and year dummy. For OLS and OLS Traits estimators, additional control variables are years of
schooling and race (i.e. white). *** significant at 1%, **5%,* 10% Source UKHLS.

Table 4.13: Hedonic Wage Estimations: Interacting Fatal Risk with Personality Traits
Male

Variable
OLS
Fatal

0.0187***
(0.0029)
Fatal × Agreeableness
-0.0044*
(0.0026)
Fatal × Conscientiousness
-0.0015
(0.0028)
Fatal × Extraversion
0.0044*
(0.0024)
Fatal × Neuroticism
-0.0006
(0.0029)
Fatal × Openness
0.0022
(0.0030)
Constant
5.8733***
(0.0585)
Observations
R-squared

18,159
0.3417

Female
FE

OLS

FE

0.0127* 0.0238***
0.0154
(0.0070)
(0.0087)
(0.0147)
0.0123*
-0.0023
0.0040
(0.0067)
(0.0063)
(0.0095)
-0.0007
-0.0117*
-0.0125
(0.0060)
(0.0070)
(0.0103)
0.0003
0.0010
-0.0050
(0.0046)
(0.0065)
(0.0106)
0.0059
0.0002
-0.0142
(0.0070)
(0.0078)
(0.0109)
-0.0006
0.0169**
-0.0044
(0.0067)
(0.0081)
(0.0085)
6.0200*** 6.1720*** 6.9065***
(0.7669)
(0.0626)
(0.7959)
18,159
0.0126

16,248
0.3628

16,248
0.0153

Note: Dependent variable is natural log of real monthly labor income. Standard
errors are in parentheses. Standard errors for OLS are clustered by individuals
and robust to heteroscedasticity. Each model controls for age, age squared, union
status, marital status, private job, the size of employees, 1 digit occupations, regions
of residence and year dummy. For the OLS estimator, additional control variables
are personality traits, years of schooling and race (i.e. white). *** significant at
1%, **5%,* 10% Source UKHLS.
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Chapter 5 Conclusion

In this dissertation, I study heterogeneity in VSL stemming from health insurance coverage. The second chapter of this dissertation discusses the role of employer-provided
health insurance on the VSL using the US labor market data. In this chapter I build
a framework showing that the level of job risks influences the incentive of employers
to provide EHI. Using Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), I find evidence of
heterogeneity in VSL due to health insurance status: the estimated VSL for workers
with health insurance is lower than those without one. Chapter 3 extends the framework of the second chapter into the United Kingdom (the UK) labor market. The
main contribution of this chapter is that it provides empirical evidence that private
health insurance affects labor market outcomes—this is less known in countries with
a universal health care system. Using the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS)
I find evidence that the workers trade substantially wage-risk premium for private
medical insurance. This is consistent with the finding from the US. Chapter 4 specifically discusses worker sorting and how it may affect the mortality risk premium. In
this chapter, I focus on the role of personality traits in safety-related skill and their
influence on worker sorting based on job risk. Using data from the United Kingdom
Household Longitudinal Study (the UKHLS), I provide evidence of worker sorting
based on personality traits.
Further research can be extended to explore the influence of other fringe benefits
on VSL. One may consider the provision of life insurance and pension, and, their
effects on the estimated VSL. In addition, findings from Chapter 4 suggest that personality traits do not fully capture unobservables that may be correlated safety-related
skill. A plausible explanation is probably that the functional form or specifications
that describe the relationship between personality traits and worker sorting are not
entirely correct. Therefore, further research can explore better models that are able
to recover parameters of personality traits that affect the choice of job riskiness.

Copyright c Teguh Yudo Wicaksono, 2015.
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